Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 20STCV35842, Date: 2024-09-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV35842 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: 34
Kaplan v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, et al. (20STCV35842)
The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On September 18, 2020, Plaintiff Ben Kaplan
filed his Complaint against Defendants NBCUniversal Media, LLC; Working Title
Group, LLC; Focus Features LLC; Gary Oldman; Douglas Urbanski; and Jim Osborne.
The causes of action in the Complaint arise from the alleged wrongful
appropriation of Plaintiff’s movie script.
On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff amended his
Complaint to substitute Does 11 and 12 with Douglas Management, Ltd. and
Douglas Management Group LLC, respectively.
On March 12, 2021, all of the Defendants
filed their “Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.” (Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint had not yet been filed with the Court.)
On April 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed his First
Amended Complaint (FAC).
On February 6, 2024, the court dismissed
without prejudice Defendant Douglas Management Group, LLC from the FAC.
On April 24, 2024, Defendants Working Title
Group LLC, Gary Oldman, Douglas Urbanski, Douglas Management, Ltd., and Jim
Osborne (“Moving Defendants”) filed their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(“MJOP”). In support of their MJOP, Moving Defendants concurrently filed: (1)
Declaration of David Grossman; (2) Request for Judicial Notice; and (3)
Proposed Order.
On May 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed his
Opposition to the MJOP. In support of his Opposition, Plaintiff concurrently
filed his Declaration.
On May 16, 2024, Moving Defendants filed their Reply in support of the MJOP. Moving Defendants concurrently filed their Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice.
I. Request for Judicial Notice
In the original Request for
Judicial Notice and the Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, Moving
Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of:
(1)
various filings in this matter, including orders
by this Court and the Court of Appeal;
(2)
the reporter’s transcript of the June 18, 2021
hearing; and
(3)
Norman v. Ross (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
617, which was issued on April 23, 2024.
The court GRANTS judicial notice as
to Items Nos. 1-2, and DENIES judicial notice as to Item No. 3.
II. Legal Standard
“A party may move for judgment on
the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (b)(1).)
“The motion provided for in this
section may only be made on one of the following grounds: . . . (B) If the
moving party is a defendant, that either of the following conditions exist: (i)
The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in
the complaint. (ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd.
(c)(1)(B).)
“A motion for judgment on
the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence
attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that
can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 995, 999, citations omitted.)
“In deciding or reviewing a
judgment on the pleadings, all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be
true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly
alleged.” (Fire Ins. Exch. v. Super. Ct. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446,
452.)
III. Discussion
A.
The
Parties’ Arguments
Moving Defendants argue: (1) that the failure to pay Plaintiff for the
use of his ideas cannot serve as the basis for his joint venture claims; (2)
that Plaintiff is judicially estopped from arguing that his injuries arose
after March 2015, when the “loss of Oldman” occurred; and (3) that Plaintiff’s
joint venture claims are time-barred. (MJOP, pp. 14:21–22, 17:3–4, 20:8.)
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing: (1) that the challenged claims arise, in
part, from the misappropriation of Plaintiff’s ideas; (2) that the judicial
estoppel argument has no basis and misrepresents Plaintiff’s claims; (3) that
the delayed discovery rule applies here; (4) that true damages from the breach
of the joint venture only arose once it became clear that Churchill would
not be the first Winston Churchill movie to market; and (5) that to the extent
additional facts are needed, amendment should be permitted. (Opposition, pp.
8:2, 10:10–11, 12:7, 14:16–17, 15:6.)
In their Reply, Moving Defendants: (1) reiterate their argument that the
joint venture claims are time-barred; (2) reiterate their argument that
Plaintiff is precluded from arguing that his joint venture claims arose upon
the film’s 2017 release; (3) argue that the recent case of Norman v. Ross (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 617 stands for the proposition that the Court must dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims if the Court accepts Plaintiff’s new arguments; (4)
reiterate their judicial estoppel argument; and (5) argue that “delayed
discovery” does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims. (Reply, pp. 4:2, 5:7–8,
6:18–19, 7:14, 8:24.)
B. The
Discovery Rule
1. Legal
Standard
“The
statute of limitations usually commences when a cause of action accrues, and it
is generally said that an action accrues on the date of injury. Alternatively,
it is often stated that the statute commences upon the occurrence of the last
element essential to the cause of action. These
general principles have been significantly modified by the common law
‘discovery rule,’ which provides that the accrual date may be delayed until the
plaintiff is aware of her injury and its negligent cause.” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris
Indus. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931, cleaned up.)
“A close cousin of the discovery rule is the well accepted
principle of fraudulent concealment. It has long been established that the
defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the
applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the
claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. Like the discovery
rule, the rule of fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to
effect substantial justice between the parties; its rationale is that the
culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the
extent that it hindered an otherwise diligent plaintiff in discovering his
cause of action.” (Bernson, supra, at p. 931, cleaned up.)
“While
ignorance of the existence of an injury or cause of action may delay the
running of the statute of limitations until the date of discovery, the general
rule in California has been that ignorance of the identity of the defendant is
not essential to a claim and therefore will not toll the statute. As we have
observed, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects
or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has
done something wrong to her. Aggrieved parties generally
need not know the exact manner in which their injuries were effected, nor the
identities of all parties who may have played a role therein.” (Bernson,
supra, at p. 932, cleaned up.)
2. Discussion
Here, the crux of the Parties’ current
disagreement is whether most of the alleged conduct was beyond the various
applicable statutes of limitations at the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint on
September 18, 2020 and his FAC on April 13, 2021.
Among other things, Plaintiff
alleges in the pleading: (1) that “[o]n March 10, 2015, Mr. Oldman abruptly
pulled out of Churchill”; (2) that “[d]espite repeated requests for an
explanation for this sudden about-face, Mr. Oldman’s representatives gave no
reason to Mr. Lamb and Mr. Kaplan for the decision”; (3) that “[i]t was later
announced that Mr. Oldman was in talks, and then engaged, to play the role of
Winston Churchill in Working Title’s motion picture Darkest Hour”; (4)
that “Mr. Urbanski and Mr. English were also engaged by Working Title to
perform the very same services on Darkest Hour that they would have
performed for Churchill”; and (5) that “Darkest Hour premiered at
film festivals starting in September 2017 to great critical acclaim.” (FAC, ¶¶
42–43.)
Contrary to
Moving Defendants’ arguments, the statute of limitations issues here are not
purely questions of law. Rather, due to possible issues with discovering the
alleged misconduct—issues that are consistent with the allegations made in the
FAC—these are mixed questions of law and fact.
If a trier
of fact finds facts that would support a determination that the applicable
statutes of limitations were tolled until September 2017, then there should be
no issue with the causes of action that have four-year statutes of limitations
given that the FAC was filed on April 13, 2021.
As to the two-year statutes of
limitations, Plaintiff submits three “tolling agreements” that appear to have
tolled “[t]he running of all periods of limitation” from August 12, 2019 to
August 31, 2020. (Decl. Kaplan, Exhs. 1–3.) Furthermore, Plaintiff accurately
notes that Emergency Rule 9 tolled statutes of limitations from April 6, 2020
until October 1, 2020. (Opposition, p. 9:16–21.) Given that the Complaint was
filed on September 18, 2020 and Moving Defendants have not disputed that the
alleged conduct in the FAC relates back to alleged conduct in the Complaint, it
would similarly appear a later determination by a trier of fact that applicable
statutes of limitations were tolled until September 2017 would mean there are
no issues with the two-year statutes of limitations.
C. The
Allegations at Issues
The Parties disagree about exactly
what conduct is at issue in the pleadings.
Because the statutes of limitations
involve discovery-related questions of fact that are unrelated to this question
(and obviate granting judgment on the pleadings due to the statutes of
limitations), the court need not, and does not, resolve this issue at this
time.
D. Judicial
Estoppel
1.
Legal
Standard
“Judicial
estoppel is an equitable doctrine that applies when ‘(1) the same
party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or
quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in
asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or
accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5)
the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.’
The application of judicial estoppel, even when all necessary elements are
present, is discretionary.” (Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 824, 842, quoting Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974,
986–987, also citing MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental &
Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422.)
2.
Discussion
For the same reason stated above in Section III.C., the court does not
reach the question of whether Plaintiff is judicially estopped.
IV.
Conclusion
The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.