Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 21PSCV00668, Date: 2023-07-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21PSCV00668    Hearing Date: July 20, 2023    Dept: K

Defendant City of El Monte’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Complaint is

GRANTED.

Background[1]  

Plaintiff Alexandra Marroquin (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant City of El Monte failed to

provide her with Level 1 retiree health benefits, which she was eligible for and promised.

On August 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting a cause of action against Defendant and Does 1-10 for:

1.                  Breach of Contract

The Final Status Conference is set for July 25, 2023. Trial is set for August 8, 2023.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119 [emphasis theirs].)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4^th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (p)(2).)

Discussion

Defendant moves the court for an order granting summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s complaint.

Evidentiary Objections

The court declines to rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections due to non-compliance with California Rules of Court rule 3.1354, subdivision (b) (i.e., “[e]ach written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: . . . (3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material”).

Merits

On August 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting a cause of action against Defendant for Breach of Contract. Plaintiff alleged therein that she was eligible for and should have received Level 1 retiree Health Benefits as provided in Article VIII of Defendant’s General Mid-Management MOU but was not provided same.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the parties’ Separation Agreement. On November 25, 2019, Plaintiff signed and dated (and initialed the bottom of each page) an agreement titled Separation Agreement (“Agreement”) with Defendant related to her retirement from Defendant that was effective October 31, 2020. (Martinez Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A) The Agreement provided that “the Parties desire[d] to resolve any and all employment disputes, disagreements, and claims by entering into this Agreement as a full, final, and complete settlement of this matter.” (Id.) Paragraph 2 of the Agreement, entitled “Consideration by Parties,” includes the following subdivision: “[Plaintiff] shall continue to receive all benefits to which she is entitled to under [Defendant’s] 2020 Executive Benefits Profile, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement” and that “[Defendant’s] 2020 Executive Benefits profile is attached and incorporated hereto as Exhibit ‘A.’” (Id., ¶ 2(e).) Paragraph 2 of the Agreement further reads that “[Plaintiff] understands and acknowledges that she is not entitled to any other consideration, compensation, or benefit from [Defendant] other than the consideration described under this Section. (Id., ¶ 2.) The Agreement contains an integration clause[2]. (Id., ¶ 12).

Paragraph 5 of the Agreement reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

Release by [Plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] agrees for herself . . ., to forever release

and discharge [Defendant], its elected and appointed officials, employees,

attorneys, and former employees (‘City Releasees’) from any and all claims,

debts, promises, agreements, demands, damages, causes of action, attorneys’

fees and costs, losses and expenses or every nature whatsoever, known or

unknown, suspected or unsuspected, filed or unfiled, and covenants not to

sue or otherwise initiate or cause to be initiated any legal or administrative

proceeding against the City Releasees with respect to any matter arising out

of, or in connection with, [Plaintiff’s] employment with [Defendant] and the

conclusion of that employment, including any and all claims or demands

related to salary, vacation pay, administrative leave, sick leave, holidays, and

benefits pursuant to any federal, state, or local law. Without limiting the

foregoing, [Plaintiff] understands and agrees that she is waiving any and all

rights she had to pursue any causes of action available to her including, but not

limited to, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, . . . or any other facts, transactions, or occurrences relating to

[Plaintiff’s] employment with [Defendant]. . .

Paragraph 6 of the Agreement reads as follows:

            Waiver by [Plaintiff]. For the purpose of implementing a full and complete

release and discharge of [Defendant], [Plaintiff] expressly acknowledges that

this Agreement is also intended to include, in its effect, without limitation, all

claims which [Plaintiff] knows of or expects to exist in her favor at the time of

the date of execution hereof, and that [Plaintiff] agrees that this Agreement

contemplates the extinguishment of any such claim or claims related to or arising

out of the facts giving rise to this Agreements. [Plaintiff] expressly waives and relinquishes all rights and benefits she may have under Section 1542 of the

California Civil Code against one another. Section 1542 reads as follows:

Section 1542. [Certain Claims Not Affected by General Release] A

general release does not extend to claims that the creditor or releasing

party does not know or suspect to exist in her or her favor at the time

of executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have

materially affected her or her settlement with the debtor or released party.

            It is expressly understood and agreed by [Plaintiff] that the possibility of

unknown claims exists and has been explicitly taken into account in determining

the consideration to be given for this Agreement and that a portion of the

consideration, having been bargained for with full knowledge of the possibility of

such unknown claims, was given in exchange for the release and discharge of the

matters, claims and/or rights covered by this Agreement.

“In general, a written release extinguishes any obligation covered by the release's terms, provided it has not been obtained by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence.” (Skrbina v. Fleming Companies (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366.) “The general rule is that when a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the absence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or understanding; but it is also a general rule that the assent of a party to a contract is necessary in order that it be binding upon him, and that, if the circumstances of a transaction are such that he is not estopped from setting up his want of assent, he can be relieved from the effect of his signature if it can be made to appear that he did not in reality assent to it.” (Id. at 1366-1367 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

Plaintiff concedes that she entered into the Agreement. Plaintiff does not dispute City Manager Alma Martinez’s statements that the Agreement was entered into “following arm’s length negotiation and discussion” and that Plaintiff advised “she would review the agreement with her attorney before signing” (Martinez Dec., ¶¶ 4 and 5). Plaintiff, then, does not contest the validity of the release and waiver.

Further, “[r]elease, indemnity and similar exculpatory provisions are binding on the signatories and enforceable so long as they are clear, explicit and comprehensible in each of their essential details. Such an agreement, read as a whole, must clearly notify the prospective releasor or indemnitor of the effect of signing the agreement.” (Skrbina, supra, 45 Cal.App.4^th at 1368.) Plaintiff does not assert that the release excludes her breach of contract claim.

Instead, Plaintiff claims that Defendant made a mistake in the benefit level assignment given to her. Plaintiff’s argument does not present any legal grounds to avoid the terms of the Agreement.[3] Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding whether she released her claims.