Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 21PSCV00698, Date: 2022-08-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21PSCV00698 Hearing Date: August 24, 2022 Dept: O
1. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Hafiz KR
Bhutta’s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED. The court will hear from
counsel for Cross-Complainants as to whether leave to amend is requested, and as
to which cause(s) of action, and will require an offer of proof if so.
2. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Hafiz KR Bhutta’s Motion to Strike Portions of Cross-Complaint is DENIED as MOOT.
Background
Case No. TC024974
Legal Standard
A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading, inter alia, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or is uncertain (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) A demurrer may also be made, in an action founded upon a contract, that it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (g).)
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) “[A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].)
Discussion
Hafiz demurs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), to the first through third causes of action in Haroon, Mohammad, Bina, Saif and East LA Infinity’s cross-complaint, on the basis that they each fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain.
Request for Judicial Notice
“[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
Haroon, Mohammad, Bina, Saif and East LA Infinity allege that they entered into the $150K agreement with Hafiz on or about October 3, 2013 (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 21) and that Hafiz, by filing the FAC in the underlying action, “is in direct violation of. . . release language and covenant not to sue, and is explicitly in breach of the $150K Agreement pursuant to the language contained in Paragraph III.H” (Id., ¶ 29.) They seek damages in this instant cross-complaint based on Hafiz’s purported breach of the $150K Agreement. Haroon, Mohammad, Bina, Saif and East LA Infinity’s second cause of action is likewise based on the $150K Agreement and Hafiz’s purported breach of same.
The foregoing allegations are based on the flawed belief that Hafiz’s FAC is based on the $150K Agreement. It is not. Hafiz has alleged, in relevant part, that he is the assignee of M3M’s interests and the beneficiary of the claims in this lawsuit (FAC, ¶ 1); that, in or around October 2013, M3M settled its lawsuit against Defendants (i.e., case styled M3M v. Infinity Care, et al., Case No. TC024974) by entering into three agreements (Id., ¶¶ 14, 20 and 21); and that this instant lawsuit pertains to Defendants’ violation of one of these three agreements, known as the FRF Agreement (Id., ¶¶ 14 and 22). Page 8, line 10 of the FAC, in fact, states as follows: “Agreement #2: ‘$150K” AGREEMENT: (not a part of this complaint).”
Hafiz’s demurrer is sustained.
Third Cause of Action (i.e., Declaratory Relief)
“A complaint for declaratory relief must demonstrate: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.” (Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410.)
Again, Haroon, Mohammad, Bina, Saif and East LA Infinity’s cause of action is based upon their flawed belief that Hafiz’s FAC is based on the $150K Agreement. (See Cross-Complaint, ¶ 43 [“Cross-Complainants request that the Court exercise its inherent power to interpret and ascertain Cross-Complainant’s rights under the $150K Agreement, and applicable law, and accordingly enter a judgment declaring that Cross-Complainants are not liable to Bhutta for any of the re-asserted claims in the FAC from the M3M Litigation, that Bhutta has released Cross-Complainants from any liability and sums pursuant to the terms of the $150K Agreement, and otherwise declaring the rights and obligations of the parties and applicable law”], ¶ 44 [“There exists a justiciable controversy between Cross-Complainants and Bhutta over Bhutta’s allegation that Cross-Complainants are obligated to pay him any monies, and as to Cross-Complainants’ claim that Bhutta has released Cross-Complainants from liability for the sums alleged in his FAC pursuant to the terms of the $150K Agreement, which are ripe for judicial determination and in which Cross-Complainant have a legally protectable interest”] and ¶ 45 [“A declaratory judgment is necessary and appropriate at this time so that the parties may know their respective rights and duties regarding Bhutta’s responsibility to release Cross-Complainants from these claims pursuant to the terms of the $150K Agreement and pay Cross-Complainants for the damages incurred in connection with Bhutta’s breach of the $150K Agreement, and act accordingly herein”].)
Accordingly, Hafiz’s demurrer is sustained.
2. Motion to Strike
Hafiz’s motion to strike is denied as moot, based upon the ruling made on the demurrer.