Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 21PSCV01015, Date: 2022-09-01 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 21PSCV01015 Hearing Date: September 1, 2022 Dept: O
1. Defendant Karen Brown’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED, in the reduced amount of $13,175.00.
2. Plaintiff Donald Ray Pierre’s Motion to Amend Previous Complaint is DENIED.
Background
Plaintiff Donald Ray Pierre (“Plaintiff”) alleges as follows: Karen Brown (“Brown”) made defamatory statements about Plaintiff in court.
On December 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting a cause of action against Brown and Does 1-25 for:
1. Defamation of Character
On March 18, 2022, the court granted Brown’s special motion to strike. On April 12, 2022, “Judgment in Favor of Defendant Karen Brown Against Plaintiff Donald Ray Pierre With Prejudice and with Costs and Reasonable Attorney’s Fees” was filed.
1. Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Legal Standard
“A cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of
the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue
shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines
that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(1).) “[I]n
any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special
motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and
costs…” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(c)(1)(emphasis added).)
“The language of the anti-SLAPP statute is mandatory; it requires a fee award to a defendant who brings a successful motion to strike.” (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 490.) “A ‘prevailing’ defendant within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (c), includes a defendant whose anti-SLAPP motion was granted as to some causes of action but not others.” (Huntington Life Science, Inc. v. Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1267.) “[A]n award of fees may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141.)
Discussion
Brown moves the court for an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $25,625.00 in connection with her preparation and prosecution of her anti-SLAPP motion.
1. Entitlement to Fees
On March 18, 2022, the court
granted Brown’s special motion to strike. On April 12, 2022, “Judgment in Favor
of Defendant Karen Brown Against Plaintiff Donald Ray Pierre With
Prejudice and with Costs and Reasonable Attorney’s Fees” was filed, which provided as follows:
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant
KAREN BROWN against
Plaintiff DONALD RAY PIERRE with
prejudice and with DEFENDANT to
recover her costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees. The amount, if any, of
reasonable attorney's fees to be
determined pursuant to a motion for attorney’s
fees.
A fee award is mandatory, pursuant to the above legal authority.
2. Reasonableness of Fees
The court turns to the issue of reasonableness of the fees
sought. “[T]rial courts have broad discretion in determining the amount of a
reasonable attorney's fee award. This determination is necessarily ad hoc and
must be resolved on the particular circumstances of each case.” (Meister v. Regents of University of
California (1998)
“[O]nce a party has established he or she is entitled to fees, the lodestar method is generally presumed to be the starting point in analyzing the appropriate amount of attorney fees. Under this method, a court first calculates the number of hours reasonably spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate for each billing professional, and then may adjust the amount based on various relevant factors to ensure the fee reflects the fair market value [of the attorney services] for the particular action. (K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425 [quotation marks and citations omitted].)
a.
Reasonableness of Hourly Rates
“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees. The court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)
Attorney John G. Jahrmarkt (“Jahrmarkt”) represents that he has a billing rate of $625.00 per hour. (Jahrmarkt Decl., ¶ 4.)
Based on the court’s own experience and knowledge, as well as on the experience and qualifications of counsel as set forth in the Jahrmarkt Declaration, the court finds that Jahrmarkt’s requested hourly rate should be reduced from $625.00/hour to $425.00/hour.
b. Reasonableness of Time Incurred
“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)
Jahrmarkt attests that he expended 26 hours in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion and has/will expend an additional 15 hours in connection with the instant motion. Plaintiff does not challenge any specific items. The court, however, finds that the time expended in connection with the instant motion is excessive and will reduce same to 5 hours total.
3. Conclusion
The motion is granted in the reduced amount of $13,175.00 (i.e., $11,050.00 for anti-SLAPPmotion, plus $2,125.00 for fee motion).
2. Motion to Amend Complaint
Discussion
Plaintiff moves the court for an order to file an amended complaint.
The motion is
summarily denied. “Code of Civil Procedure section 473 allows the trial
court to grant leave to amend pleadings at any stage of the proceedings, and
the exercise of this authority is within the sound discretion of the judge.
Amendments proffered after judgment is rendered, however, are allowed only if
the judgment is vacated as by granting a motion for new trial.” (Young v.
Berry Equipment Rentals, Inc. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 35, 38 [citations
omitted].) Here, judgment was
entered on April 12, 2022. Plaintiff has not sought to vacate the judgment.