Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 22PSCP00250, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 22PSCP00250, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

The Court often posts its tentative several days in advance of the hearing. Please re-check the tentative rulings the day before the hearing to be sure that the Court has not revised the ruling since the time it was posted.

Please call the clerk at (213) 633-0154 by 4:00 pm. the court day before the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative.

Case Number: 22PSCP00250 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: 34

1. Petitioner Jorge Huerta’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.

2. Petitioner Jorge Huerta’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part. Fees are AWARDED in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent in the reduced amount of $68,770.00.

3. Respondent City of Balwin Park’s Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED in part. Costs are AWARDED in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent in the reduced amount of $9,157.39.

Background

On May 31, 2022, Petitioner Jorge Huerta (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for a Writ of Administrative Mandate directing Respondent City of Baldwin Park (“Respondent”) to set aside an administrative decision to suspend Petitioner from his position as a police officer with the Baldwin Park Police Department for 15 days without pay.

On October 10, 2022, the court entered default against Respondent.

On December 12, 2022, the court granted Respondent’s Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Entry of Default.

On July 28, 2023, Respondent filed an answer.

On August 26, 2024, the court granted Petitioner’s Writ of Administrative Mandate.

On October 24, 2024, Petitioner filed this Motion for Attorney’s Fees. On February 4. 2025, Respondent filed an opposition. On February 10, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply.

On November 4, 2024, the court entered judgment in favor of Petitioner.

On November 6, 2024, Petitioner filed this Motion for Reconsideration. On December 18, 2024, Petitioner filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration. On February 4, 2025, Respondent filed an opposition. On February 10, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply.

On November 15, 2024, Petitioner filed a Memorandum of Costs.

On December 3, 2024, Respondent filed this Motion to Tax Costs. On February 4, 2025, Petitioner filed an opposition. On February 10, 2025, Respondent filed a reply.

On December 24, 2024, the court found cases 22PSCP00250 and 24PSCP00567 related.

1. Motion for Reconsideration

Legal Standard

“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)

Discussion

Petitioner requests the court to withdraw the judgment entered on November 4, 2024, and enter a new judgment that provides for injunctive relief. (Motion, at p. 3.) Petitioner contends that a judgment was entered in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.231. (Id., at p. 4.) Petitioner notes that on August 29, 2024, the court issued an order granting Petitioner’s Writ of Mandate. (Id., at p. 3.) On October 23, 2024, Petitioner's counsel prepared a proposed judgment and sent it to opposing counsel. (Ibid.) On October 24, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel mistakenly filed the proposed judgment with the court. (Ibid.) On October 24, 2024, Respondent’s counsel filed objections to the proposed judgment, including that Petitioner failed to meet and confer, and an alternative proposed judgment. (Ibid.) Petitioner's counsel replied that the filing of the judgment was an error and stated that Petitioner's counsel still intended to meet and confer. (Ibid.) The court then entered the judgment submitted by Respondent’s counsel without a hearing or allowing Petitioner to submit objections to the proposed judgment. (Ibid.)

Petitioner argues that under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (“POBRA”) it is considered a punishment to enter any negative information in a police personnel file. (Id., at p. 4.) Thus, Petitioner contends that the current judgment does not order Respondent to remove negative information entered in Petitioner’s file. (Ibid.) As such, the judgment does not provide the relief requested because it still authorizes punitive action against Petitioner in violation of POBRA. (Ibid.) As such, Petitioner argues that the court is required to grant injunctive relief under Government Code section 3309.5. (Id., at pp. 5-6.)

As an initial matter, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration as a judgment was already entered in Petitioner’s favor on November 4, 2024. Before entry of judgment, “the court retains complete power to change its decision as the court may determine; it may change its conclusions of law or findings of fact,” which include hearing a motion for reconsideration. (Nave v. Taggart (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1177.) “After entry of judgment, however, the trial court loses its power to rule on a reconsideration motion.” (Ramon v. Aerospace Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1237.) A final judgment terminates the litigation between the parties and leaves nothing in the nature of judicial action to be done other than questions of enforcement or compliance. (Id., at p. 1238.) Given the entry of judgment in Petitioner’s favor, the court has no jurisdiction to rule on this Motion for Reconsideration under section 1008(a)

However, the court recognizes that a trial court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider a ruling to correct an error.¿(Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1096-1097.) It is clear that there was a procedural error when the court entered judgment in this matter in violation of Local Rule 3.231 which provides that “the prevailing party will be ordered to prepare a proposed judgment and any writ of mandate, serve them on the opposing parties for approval as to form, wait ten days after service for any objections, meet and confer if there are objections, and then submit the proposed judgment and applicable writ along with a declaration stating the existence or non-existence of any unresolved objections. An order to show cause re: judgment hearing will be set for purposes of resolving any objections and signing the judgment.” (Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.231(n).) As such, Petitioner is to follow Local Rule 3.231 by serving a proposed judgment to Respondent, await any objections, meet and confer, and request the court for an OSC re: Judgment to resolve any objections, if necessary.

2. Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Legal Standard

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)

Discussion

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Petitioner moves the court to award him $219,915.00, which is comprised of $100,890.00 in attorney’s fees with a 2.0 multiplier and $18,135.00 in attorney’s fees for the instant motion. (Motion, at pp. 17, 20.) Petitioner argues that he is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees under Government Code section 3309.5 and/or Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (Id., at pp. 10-11.)

In opposition, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to attorney’s fees under any statute. (Opp., at pp. 6-7.) Respondent also argues that the requested amount in attorney’s fees is unreasonable and should be reduced or denied entirely. (Id., at pp. 16-17.)

In reply, Petitioner continues to argue that he is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees pursuant to Government Code section 3309.5 and/or Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (Reply, at pp. 10-11.) Additionally, Petitioner argues that the attorney’s fees are appropriate. (Id., at pp. 8-9.)

2. Authority for Fees & Prevailing Party

a. Legal Standard

Attorneys’ fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(10)(B).)

b. Discussion

i. Government Code Section 3309.5

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to his attorney’s fees under Government Code section 3309.5 as it requires the court to award attorney’s fees if a violation of POBRA is found to be malicious. (Motion, at pp. 10-11.)

If the court finds that a public safety department, “maliciously violated” any provision of POBRA with the intent to injure an officer, the department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 to be awarded to the officer and for reasonable attorney’s fees. (Govt. Code, §3309.5(e).)

The court did not make a finding that Respondent acted maliciously with the intent to injure in its ruling granting Petitioner’s Writ of Administrative Mandate and relief under POBRA. (Court Order, dated August 29, 2024.). Instead, the court found that the imposition of Petitioner’s punishment was outside the statute of limitation in violation of POBRA. As such, Petitioner cannot invoke section 3309.5(e) to recover his attorney’s fees.

ii. Private Attorney General

Alternatively, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to his attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (Motion, at p. 11.)

Section 1021.5 permits a trial court to award fees to a successful party in any action that: “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., §1021.5.)

Courts take a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party’” in order to effectuate the policy underlying section 1021.5. (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.) The party seeking attorney fees need not prevail on all of its alleged claims in order to qualify for an award. (Harbor v. Deukmejian, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1103; Daniels v. McKinney, (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 42, 55.) A party “may be considered successful if they succeed on any significant issue in the litigation that achieves some of the benefit they sought in bringing suit.” (Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 376, 382.) In determining whether the issue upon which a party prevailed is significant, “the court must critically analyze the surrounding circumstances of the litigation and pragmatically assess the gains achieved by the action.” (Ibid.)

On August 29, 2024, the court granted Petitioner’s Writ of Administrative Mandate and relief under POBRA. (Court Order, dated August 29, 2024.) Although the current judgment does not provide for all the relief requested by Petitioner, it is clear that Petitioner succeeded in a significant issue involved in this litigation providing some of the benefits sought by Petitioner. As such, Petitioner was the successful party in this matter.

Additionally, Petitioner argues that as the court found that Respondent violated Petitioner’s right as protected under POBRA, the court is required to issue injunctive relief that would correct Respondent’s practice of disregarding and failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry as to whether the imposition of discipline is complying with POBRA which renders a benefit to other officers and the public at large. (Motion, at p. 13.)

In opposition, Respondent argues that the benefit conferred from this litigation applies only to Petitioner as the court’s ruling is a reversal of Petitioner’s two-week suspension. (Opp., at p. 9.) As such, Petitioner has not conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of person. (Ibid.)

The section 1021.5 factors are interrelated; the more fundamental and important the right vindicated, the lower the showing required for the element that a large class of persons benefit. (Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 319.) Generally, “a right need not be constitutional in nature to justify the application of the private attorney general doctrine.” (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council, (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 935.) Nor must “important rights” be confined to a particular area of law. (Ibid.) At the same time, “[b]ecause the public always has a significant interest in seeing that laws are enforced, it always derives some benefit when illegal private or public conduct is rectified... the Legislature did not intend to authorize an award of fees under section 1021.5 in every lawsuit enforcing a constitutional or statutory right.” (Flannery v. California Highway Patrol, (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 634 (citing Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 933).) Courts should generally realistically assess the significance of the right in relationship to the achievement of fundamental legislative goals. (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 936; Robinson v. City of Chowchilla, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 394.)

Although injunctive relief was not provided for in the judgment as it stands, the court finds that Petitioner’s action has nevertheless enforced an important right. The statute of limitations principles in POBRA serve an important purpose as articulated by the California Supreme Court “which is to ensure that an officer will not be faced with the uncertainty of a lingering investigation, but will know within one year of the agency's discovery of the officer's act or omission that it may be necessary for the officer to respond in the event he or she wishes to defend against possible discipline.” (Mays v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4^th 313, 322.) As such, Petitioner’s action enforced an important right affecting the public interest.

Petitioner has also shown that courts have held that enforcing or vindicating rights under POBRA confers a significant benefit to the general public. It has been found that enforcement of POBRA should help sustain stable relations between peace officers and their employers, which assures effective law enforcement, which directly inures to the benefit of the public. (Baggett v. Gates, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 143.) The California Supreme Court provided that no one can argue that effective law enforcement is not a “significant benefit.” (Ibid.) Here, a right under POBRA was vindicated and enforced and that is consistently held to confer significant benefit to the general public.

Moreover, Petitioner argues that the instant case involved extensive litigation and Petitioner’s counsel had to spend significant resources without charging Petitioner an hourly fee for the services. (Motion, at p. 14.) As Petitioner was not expected to recover significant sums from overturning his two week suspension, Petitioner’s counsel did not work on a contingency agreement and relied on the expectation that Petitioner would recover his attorney’s fees. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Respondent argues that because Petitioner did not reasonably attempt to settle this matter before commencing this lawsuit, Petitioner has not shown necessity to bring this action. (Opp., at p. 12.) Respondent also argues that that Petitioner’s recovery does not transcend his personal interest in the lawsuit as Petitioner’s recovery involved the reversal of his two-week suspension and two weeks back pay. (Ibid.)

“An award on the ‘private attorney general’ theory is appropriate when the cost of the claimant's legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 941 (quoting Cnty. of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 82, 89).) “Although objective financial incentives and subjective motives may overlap, and indeed sometimes may be indistinguishable, it is clear from the language and purpose of the statute that only the former is the proper subject of the court's inquiry when assessing the financial burden of litigation under section 1021.5.” (In re Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1221.)

It is clear that Petitioner instituted this litigation to overturn an admonishment and that his recovery was minimal and limited. Robinson v. City of Chowchilla held the necessity and financial burden factor is analyzed under a cost-benefit analysis “in which the expenses of the litigation are compared with the ‘financial benefits that the litigation yields or reasonably could have been expected to yield.’” (Robinson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4^th at 401.) As Petitioner has incurred significant fees and costs, under the Robinson cost-benefit analysis the expenses of litigation outweigh the financial benefits this litigation yielded or reasonably could have been expected to yield. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the financial burden of private enforcement transcended Petitioner’s personal interest.

Although neither side addresses the third prong with respect to section 1021.5, it is not in the interest of justice to pay the attorney’s fees in this action out of Petitioner’s recovery for his back pay. Section 1021.5 created a private attorney general doctrine designed to encourage private actions to enforce important public policies that on a practical level would be infeasible without a mechanism authorizing the award of attorney’s fees. (Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 142.) Accordingly, it would not be in the interest of justice to pay the attorney’s fees in this case out of Petitioner’s recovery

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has shown that he is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 1021.5.

3. Method of Calculation for Fees

a. Legal Standard

In determining a reasonable attorney fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)

b. Discussion

Petitioner argues that the lodestar adjustment method should be used to calculate the award for attorney’s fees. (Motion, at p. 7.)

Respondent does not dispute this or propose a different method.

The court uses the lodestar adjustment method to calculate fees.

4. Reasonableness of the Fees Claimed

a. Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates

i. Legal Standard

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437, citations omitted.)

ii. Discussion

Petitioner’s counsel claims the following hourly rates: (1) $800.00 per hour for Counsel Dennis E. Wagner; (2) $700.00 per hour for Counsel Marty E. Zemming; (3) $650.00 per hour for Counsel Daniel Moussatche; and (4) $200.00 for Paralegal Esmeralda Townsend. (Moussatche Decl., ¶ 17, Exh. 2.)

Petitioner contends that the hourly rates of Petitioner’s counsel are within the rate of attorney’s with a similar caliber performing work of similar complexity in this venue justifying the rates requested by counsel. (Motion, at p. 19.)

In opposition, Respondent argues that the hourly rates requested are unreasonable as Petitioner failed to provide supporting evidence for their reasonableness. (Opp., p. 18.) Respondent also argues that Petitioner claims that he was charged a significant discounted flat fee, but Petitioner’s motion provides a chart with a high hourly rate for each billing attorney creating a discrepancy. (Ibid.)

In reply, Petitioner argues that the hourly rates requested are not unreasonable nor out of line with rates within the area in the calendar year 2025. (Reply, at p. 9.)

After considering the information provided, the court finds that the appropriate hourly rate for (1) Counsel Dennis E. Wagner is $550.00 per hour; (2) Counsel Marty E. Zemming is $500.00 per hour; and (3) Counsel Daniel Moussatche is $400.00 per hour. Furthermore, the court finds that attorney’s fees should not be awarded for services provided by Paralegal Esmeralda Townsend. (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312.)

b. Reasonableness of the Number of Hours

i. Legal Standard

“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances¿of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited, and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to¿the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [cleaned up].)

ii. Discussion

Petitioner’s counsel claims the following hours were incurred: (1) 3.90 hours by Counsel Dennis E. Wagner; (2) 0.50 hours by Counsel Marty E. Zemming; (3) 139.00 hours by Counsel Daniel Moussatche; and (4) 35.35 hours by Paralegal Esmeralda Townsend. (Moussatche Decl., ¶ 17, Exh. 2.) Additionally, Petitioner claims an additional 2.50 hours by Counsel Dennis E. Wagner, 23.50 hours by Counsel Daniel Moussatche, and 4.30 hours by Paralegal Esmeralda Townsend for the time spent filing this motion. (Motion, at p. 17.)

The declaration and billing records provided by Petitioner’s counsel are sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Petitioner’s fee recovery is based on 209.05 hours Petitioner’s counsel spent litigating this case through the instant motion. (Moussatche Decl., ¶ 17, Exh. 2.) The fees incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing records submitted to this court. Petitioner’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case. Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

However, the court will not grant attorney’s fees on 39.65 hours spent as the court finds that attorney’s fees should not be awarded for services provided by Paralegal Esmeralda Townsend. (Roe, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at 312.)

Accordingly, the court grants Petitioner’s requested attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $68,770.00 for 169.40 hours at the hourly rates established above.

c. Reasonableness of Multiplier

i. Legal Standard

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

ii. Discussion

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a multiplier of 2.0. (Motion, at p. 20.) Petitioner argues that the case required extensive review of the record and research into poorly addressed areas of law. (Ibid.) In addition, Petitioner notes that the case required oral argument and further briefing requested by the court. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Respondent argues that the requested multiplier is excessive and unjust as the instant case was not complex as it was a standard Writ of Mandate action. (Opp., at p. 20.)

In reply, Petitioner continues to argue that the litigation involved required substantial hours reviewing the record to show the court that Petitioner was entitled to a finding in his favor. (Reply, at p. 9.)

The court agrees with Respondent that the POBRA issue involved was not complex. The court’s opinion on the petition was not a sweeping decision interpreting procedural rights under POBRA, rather it focused on a fact specific analysis with respect to the statute of limitations provision under POBRA. The holding in this case was driven by the specific facts in this matter. This is not an instance where Petitioner successfully won a declaratory judgment for many or convinced the court to make a significant reinterpretation of POBRA. The court denies Petitioner’s request for a 2.0 lodestar multiplier.

3. Motion to Tax Costs

Legal Standard

Under the law, a verified memorandum of costs is correct. However, a party may contest the costs that a prevailing party seeks. (Code Civ. Proc., §1034(a).) The challenging party has the burden of demonstrating that those costs are unreasonable or unnecessary. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486; 612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1285.) If the opposing party proper objects to the costs, “they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Ladas v. California State Automobile Association (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) To be recoverable, the costs must be “reasonably necessary” to the conduct of litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., §1033.5(c).)

“Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 744; Code Civ. Proc., §1033.5(c).) However, items not mentioned in the code of civil procedure and “asserted upon application may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc., §1033.5(c)(4).)

Discussion

Respondent moves to strike Petitioner’s memorandum of costs in its entirety, or in the alternative, to tax the costs by at least $1,737.21 for unnecessary and unreasonable costs. (Motion, at p. 5.) Petitioner requests $9,214.99 in costs. (Memorandum of Costs, at p. 4.)

Judgment Below Jurisdictional Minimum

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033(a), states: “Costs or any portion of claimed costs shall be as determined by the court in its discretion in a case other than a limited civil case in accordance with Section 1034 where the prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have been rendered in a limited civil case.”

“[S]ection 1033(a) applies when a plaintiff has obtained a judgment for money damages in an amount (now $25,000 or less) that could have been recovered in a limited civil case, but the plaintiff did not bring the action as a limited civil case and thus did not take advantage of the cost- and time-saving advantages of limited civil case procedures. In this situation, even though a plaintiff who obtains a money judgment would otherwise be entitled to recover litigation costs as a matter of right, section 1033(a) gives the trial court discretion to deny, in whole or in part, the plaintiff's recovery of litigation costs.” (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 982–983.)

Respondent argues that Petitioner should not recover any costs because this action was filed in an improper forum and Petitioner failed to recover the jurisdictional minimum. (Motion, at p. 6.)

In opposition, Petitioner argues that venue was proper as Petitioner was seeking extraordinary relief under Government Code section 3309.5. (Opp., at p. 2.) Petitioner also argues that the amount in controversy involved included Petitioner's request for fines against Respondent which would have been up to $25,000.00 per violation under section 3309.5. (Ibid.) Petitioner contends that Respondent waived the argument of improper venue by failing to file a motion to transfer the case to a limited jurisdiction court. (Id., at p. 3.) Lastly, Petitioner argues that there was no prejudice or increase in costs by this case being heard in an unlimited jurisdiction court. (Ibid.)

In reply, Respondent argues that Petitioner fails to rebut Respondent's arguments that the action was filed in an improper division as Petitioner did not recover over $25,000.00. (Reply, at p. 5.)

Under the circumstances, the court declines to deny Petitioner’s recovery of litigation costs pursuant to section 1033(a). While Petitioner’s recovery is well below the unlimited jurisdiction minimum, it cannot be determined that Petitioner wasted judicial recourses. (Valentino v. Elliott Sav-On Gas, Inc. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 692, 701 [reasoning that section 1033(a) “is to discourage plaintiffs from ‘over filing’ their cases”].) This is primarily because Petitioner had reasonable grounds for a request for relief that would support damages exceeding the jurisdictional minimum.

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion is denied on this ground.

Tax Costs

Next, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s costs should be reduced significantly to account for Petitioner's failure to achieve his litigation objectives. (Motion, at p. 9.) Respondent contends that Petitioner delayed reviewing the administrative record index until after Respondent had finalized it and Petitioner requested the court to include additional documents which accrued unnecessary fees for transcript services and attorney’s fees. (Ibid.) As such, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s memorandum of costs should be taxed in the amount of 4.00 hours of attorney work at $360.00 per hour ($1,440.00), plus the costs of the Arianna Le and Officer Jimenez interviews that were not utilized in the briefs ($101.25), plus the additional transcription processing fee ($55.00). (Ibid.)

In opposition, Petitioner argues that he achieved the primary goal in litigation as the court found in favor of Petitioner. (Opp., at p. 4.) Petitioner also argues that there was no delay in preparation of the record due to Petitioner. (Id., at p. 5.) Lastly, Petitioner argues that the costs incurred for completing the record were necessary and Respondent provided no authority that allows the taxing of costs for completing a record because the document were not used at trial. (Ibid.)

The court does not find that Respondent carried its burden of demonstrating that these costs are unreasonable or unnecessary. As such, Respondent’s motion to tax $1,596.25 in costs is denied.

Respondent also argues that Petitioner improperly included $57.60 in costs under the demonstratives category as Petitioner’s costs are unrelated to models, enlargements, or photocopies of exhibits, and thus are not recoverable. (Motion, at p. 11.) Moreover, Respondent contends that Petitioner improperly included the filing fee ($60.00), and One Legal Fees ($24.36) associated with his Motion for Reconsideration which are not recoverable under section 1033.5 as post-judgment costs. (Ibid.) As such, $140.96 should be taxed from Petitioner’s costs. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Petitioner does not directly address Respondent’s arguments regarding these costs. Instead, Petitioner contends that post-judgment costs were necessary as Petitioner filed an improper proposed judgment and the court entered judgment without conducting a hearing which gave rise to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. (Opp., at p. 6.)

In reply, Respondent argues that the court should tax Petitioner’s attachment expenses costs of $8,224.75, in addition to the other argued costs. (Reply, at pp. 4-5.)

The court finds that as Respondent’s arguments regarding attachment expenses were only argued in the reply, Petitioner did not have an opportunity to respond. Moreover, the court finds that Petitioner’s costs for a Motion for Reconsideration were necessary and reasonable due to the circumstances presented in this case. However, the court does not find that Petitioner sufficiently justified the $57.60 incurred for models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits.

As such, the court taxes $57.60 in costs claimed by Petitioner.

Conclusion

1. Petitioner Jorge Huerta’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.

2. Petitioner Jorge Huerta’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part. Fees are AWARDED in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent in the reduced amount of $68,770.

3. Respondent City of Balwin Park’s Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED in part. Costs are AWARDED in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent in the reduced amount of $9,157.39.