Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 22PSCV00472, Date: 2022-09-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22PSCV00472 Hearing Date: September 26, 2022 Dept: O
Defendant Micron Environmental Labs, Inc.’s Motion to
Strike Punitive Damages from First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. The court will hear from counsel for
Plaintiff as to whether leave to amend is requested and will require an offer
of proof if so.
Background
Plaintiff Adriana Ledezma (“Plaintiff”) alleges as follows:
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
Discussion
Defendant moves the court for an order striking out all references to exemplary/punitive damages at 8:4-7, 11:3-6, 13:20-23, 16:3-6, 18:8-10, 20:19-21, 22:21-24, 25:1-2, 27:3-6 and Paragraph 8 of the prayer for relief at 24:14 of Plaintiff’s FAC.
Punitive damages may be awarded upon clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subject a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (b).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)
Further, “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (b).)
A “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice. . .’” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)
Here, Plaintiff has not pled facts supporting oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. Plaintiff has alleged that she was fired three months after she was hired and has alleged discrimination because she was pregnant at the time. (FAC, ¶¶ 7, 14 and 15.) The stated reason for Plaintiff’s termination was that Defendant “could not count on [Plaintiff] being fully here,” followed by a recitation of specific occasions on which Plaintiff missed work. (Id., ¶ 15.) All Plaintiff alleges factually is that she was pregnant, that she told her supervisor at the end of her first shift that she was pregnant, that she was given time off for medical appointments and that she was terminated on April 12, 2022. (Id., ¶¶ 8-15.) There are no allegations that Plaintiff was treated rudely or disparagingly or that she was harassed or treated differently from her co-workers on the basis of her pregnancy. Further, there are no allegations that any of Plaintiff’s requested schedule modifications were refused or were not accommodated.
The motion, then, is granted.