Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 22PSCV01725, Date: 2024-02-02 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Jose M. Cervantes’ and Crystal Viramontes’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees is

Plaintiffs Jose M. Cervantes and Crystal Viramontes (together, “Plaintiffs”) allege as follows:

On October 2, 2020, Plaintiffs purchased a used 2019 Ford Expedition, VIN No. 1FMJUIJT7KEA29777 (“subject vehicle”). Plaintiffs allege that the subject vehicle suffers from various defects and that the subject vehicle has not been repaired after a reasonable number of attempts.

On November 8, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”) and Does 1-10 for:

On July 18, 2023, a conditional “Notice of Settlement of Entire Case” was filed.

“Any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (a).)

“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

Plaintiffs move the court, per Civil Code § 1794, for an award of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $42,248.55 (i.e., $27,557.50 in fees, plus 0.5 multiplier enhancement of $13,778.75, plus $912.30 in costs and expenses).

The court rules on Defendant’s evidentiary objections as follows: Overruled as to Nos. 1-3, 7-8 and 22-33 and Sustained as to Nos. 4-6 and 9-21.

The court rules on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections as follows: Sustained as to No. 1.

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code § 1794, subdivision (d). The only dispute relates to the appropriate amount of recovery.

The court turns to the issue of reasonableness of the fees sought. “[T]rial courts have broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award. This determination is necessarily ad hoc and must be resolved on the particular circumstances of each case.” (Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 452.) “Trial judges are entrusted with this discretionary determination because they are in the best position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in their courts.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)

“[O]nce a party has established he or she is entitled to fees, the lodestar method is generally presumed to be the starting point in analyzing the appropriate amount of attorney fees. Under this method, a court first calculates the number of hours reasonably spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate for each billing professional, and then may adjust the amount based on various relevant factors to ensure the fee reflects the fair market value [of the attorney services] for the particular action. (K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425 [quotations and citations omitted].)

“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees. The court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

Brian T. Shippen-Murray (“Shippen-Murray”), senior attorney- $500.00/$550.00

The court determines that a reduction in the above hourly rates is warranted under the circumstances. This is a straightforward lemon law case, with no cited complexities. Based on the court’s own experience and knowledge, as well as on the experience and qualifications of counsel as set forth in Daghighian’s declaration, the court finds that the above hourly rates should be reduced to $425.00/hour for Rosenstein, $400.00/hour for Daghighian, and $350.00/hour for Shippen-Murray and Hamblin.

“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

Daghighian attests, and the billing records attached as Exhibit A to his declaration reflect, that the above attorneys expended the following time on this matter: (1) Daghighian: 14.9 hours; (2) Rosenstein: 4.9 hours; (3) Shippen-Murray: 0.5 hours and (4) Hamblin: 27.7 hours. (Daghighian Decl., ¶¶ 7- 11, Exh. A).

Defendant argues that the court should strike out 6.8 hours billed by Hamblin on January 9, 2023 as impermissible “block billing.” “Block billing occurs when a block of time [is assigned to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279 [internal quotations and citation omitted].) “Block billing presents a particular problem for a court seeking to allocate between reimbursable and unreimbursable fees, and trial courts are granted discretion to penalize [block billing] when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not.” (In re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695 [internal quotations and citation omitted].) The January 9, 2023 entry in question reads as follows: “Analyze discovery requests to both plaintiffs, including form interrogatories, requests for production and request for admissions; draft responses; draft email regarding responses.” The court determines that the above entry does not constitute block billing, inasmuch as each of the discrete tasks performed in responding to Defendant’s discovery are clearly identified and compensable.

Defendant next argues that the court should strike out 0.3 hours billed by Rosenstein on July 3, 2023 (reading “fee demand”) as vague. The court disagrees, inasmuch as it appears that the foregoing entry pertains to Rosenstein’s evaluation of the attorney’s fees issue.

Defendant argues that a December 20, 2022 billing entry by Hamblin for 1.8 hours (reading “[c]onduct initial analysis of case, including review of complaint, answer, repair history, purchase documents and other available client documents”) is duplicative of a November 4, 2022 billing entry by Rosenstein for 2.4 hours (reading: “[r]eview client’s purchase and repair documents; [a]nalyze case facts under Song-Beverly Act; [d]raft [c]omplaint and accompanying documents”). The court disagrees.

Again, the entries were made by two different attorneys, Rosenstein and Hamblin and involve different task descriptions. Defendant then argues that Hamblin’s June 5, 2023 billing entry for 2.7 hours and June 6, 2023 billing entry for 1.2 hours are duplicative; however, the first entry indicates that it was for a partial analysis of Defendant’s discovery responses, including requests for admissions, interrogatories and requests for production whereas the second entry was directed to the document production and drafting of a table of contents. Defendant also contends (not in its opposition but in its Exhibit A, which the court declines to consider based on its ruling on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection) that Rosenstein’s June 16, 2023 and June 22, 2023 billing entries for “settlement communications” are duplicative. Even if the court were to consider Exhibit A, the court rejects Defendant’s argument, inasmuch as these entries indicate that such communications were conducted six days apart.

Defendant argues that the court should strike out 3.5 hours billed, which it described as “inter-office communications.” Defendant does not cite to any particular entries in its opposition, but instead references its Exhibit A, which again the court declines to consider based on its ruling on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection. Even if the court were to consider Exhibit A, the allegedly offending entries cannot be categorized as “inter-office communications.” The court rejects this argument.

Defendant argues that the court should strike out Plaintiffs’ request for 5.0 hours of anticipated fees for reviewing Defendant’s opposition, preparing the reply and attending the hearing. The court declines this request.

The court reduces the amount of attorney’s fees from $27,557.50 to $17,912.50.

Plaintiffs assert that they should be awarded a 0.5 multiplier. “[T]he lodestar. . . may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, . . . (1) the novelty and difficult of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-1132.)

The court determines that Plaintiffs have not articulated any basis warranting the imposition of a multiplier.

Plaintiffs request $912.30 in costs and expenses. The court is unaware of a Memorandum of Costs having been filed. Costs are to be pursued separate from the instant motion.

The motion for attorney’s fees is granted, in the reduced amount of $17,912.50.

[1] The motion was filed (and served via email) on October 17, 2023 and originally set for hearing on January 25, 2023. On December 7, 2023, a “Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order” was filed, wherein the January 25, 2024 scheduled hearing was continued to February 2, 2024; notice was given to counsel.