Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 23PSCV00130, Date: 2024-02-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23PSCV00130 Hearing Date: February 28, 2024 Dept: K
Plaintiff R.C.
Henderson Trust, LLC’s Application
for Default Judgment is DENIED without prejudice.
Background
Plaintiff R.C. Henderson Trust, LLC (“Plaintiff”) alleges as follows:
On May 21, 2015,
Plaintiff, through its predecessor in interest, and Adam Selayandia
(“Selayandia”) entered into a purchase agreement (“Agreement #1”), whereby
Plaintiff purchased from Selayandia his right to receive certain periodic
annuity payments, including 10 annual payments of $2,475.72 beginning on April
30, 2016 and ending on April 30, 2025 (the “Agt. #1 Payments”). Per the
Agreement, Selayandia was to deliver to Plaintiff a letter of instruction,
addressed to the annuity company, New York Life Insurance Company (“NY Life”),
directing that the Agt. #1 Payments be sent to Plaintiff at an address
designated by Plaintiff.
On November 23, 2015,
Plaintiff, through its predecessor in interest, and Selayandia entered into a
separate Purchase Agreement (“Agreement #2”) whereby Plaintiff purchased from
Selayandia his right to receive 17 annual payments of $2,475.72 beginning on
April 30, 2026 and ending on April 30, 2042. Selayandia agreed in writing that
the Agt. #2 Payments should be sent by NY Life to Plaintiff. Plaintiff received
payments due in April 2016 through April 2021, but did not receive the payment
due in April 2022. Plaintiff believes Selayandia has redirected the monies.
Discussion
Plaintiff’s Application for Default Judgment is denied without prejudice. The following defects are noted:
1.
Exhibits A and B to the Declaration of Richard Connelly
reflect that the agreements were made between Selayandia and Peachtree
Settlement Funding, LLC (“Peachtree”). Plaintiff is requested to explain its
relationship with Peachtree and to attach a copy of any assignment, to the
extent one exists.
2.
Plaintiff has alleged the existence of two separate
purchase agreements, (1) one made on or about May 21, 2015 between Plaintiff,
through its predecessor in interest, and Selayandia involving the purchase of
10 annual annuity payments of $2,475.72 beginning on April 30, 2016 and ending
on April 30, 2025 (i.e., “Purchase Agreement”) and (2) a second made on or
about November 23, 2015 between Plaintiff, through its predecessor in interest,
and Selayandia involving the purchase of 17 annual annuity payments of
$2,475.72 beginning on April 30, 2026 and ending on April 30, 2042 (i.e.,
“Purchase Agreement No. 2”). (Complaint, ¶¶ 4-8). Plaintiff asserts that,
although it received the payments due April 2016-April 2021, it did not receive
the payment due April 2022 and believes that Selayandia redirected the payment
so that he would receive it instead of Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 12).
Plaintiff “seeks judgment against
Defendant for principal of $2,475.72, plus the same amount for each year the
annual annuity payment remains diverted . . .” (Emphasis added). The
proposed judgment appears problematic to the court. Plaintiff cannot be said to
have breached Purchase Agreement No. 2, inasmuch as none of the annuity
payments are yet due. Plaintiff appears to acknowledge as much, because its
first cause of action for Breach of Contract references only the Purchase
Agreement. (Complaint, ¶ 14). The Declaration of Richard Connelly is silent as
to whether or not Plaintiff received the payment due on April 30, 2023 under
the Purchase Agreement; assuming Plaintiff did not receive same, then it would
appear to the court that the principal sought should be $4,951.44 (i.e.,
$2,475.72 (x) 2 [i.e., for April 2022 and April 2023]).
Paragraph 7 of the proposed
judgment reads as follows: “$2,475.72 for each year after 2022 the annual
annuity payment remains diverted, plus interest.” It would appear to the court
that Paragraph 7 should be amended to state something along the lines that
Plaintiff is entitled to receive the payments due April 30, 2024 and April 30,
2025 under the Annuity Purchase Contract dated on or about May 21, 2015 between
Peachtree and Selayandia.
3. Connelly identifies the $233.24 set forth in Paragraph 2(b)(1) of Judicial Council Form CIV-100 as interest (Connelly Decl., ¶ 11). The court requests that Plaintiff provide an interest calculation and identify this amount in Paragraph 2(c) of Judicial Council Form CIV-100 instead of Paragraph 2(b)(1) therein.