Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 23PSCV00711, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23PSCV00711 Hearing Date: March 7, 2024 Dept: K
Plaintiff Rigoberto Mendoza’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to
Requests for Production of Documents is GRANTED.
Defendant is to provide further, Code-compliant responses within 20 days from
the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions are awarded in the reduced
amount of $760.00 and are payable within 30 days of the date of the notice of
ruling.
Background
On March 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting a cause of action against Defendant and Does 1-10 for:
1.
Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Express
Warranty
A Case Management Conference is set for March 7, 2024.
Legal Standard
“[T]he demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that. . . (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[,] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive [and/or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).)
The moving party must demonstrate a
“reasonable and good faith attempt” at an informal resolution of each issue
presented. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) “In lieu of
a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court
may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request
and each response in dispute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(3).)
A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) If the moving party has shown good cause for the production of documents, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)
Notice of the motion must be provided “within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.310, subd. (c).)
“[T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction. . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)
Discussion
Plaintiff moves the court, per Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.310, for an order compelling Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (i.e., Nos. 16, 19-32 and 37-41). Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions against Defendant and its attorneys of record in the amount of $2,310.00.
Plaintiff’s counsel Phil Thomas (“Thomas”) represents as follows: On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff propounded the subject discovery on Defendant. (Thomas Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. A.) On November 27, 2023, Defendant provided unverified responses. (Id., ¶ 6, Exh. B.) On January 9, 2024, Defendant served verifications. (Id., ¶ 7, Exh. C.) Defendant’s initial document production included several dozen files in .pdf format identified only by a Bates number. (Id., ¶ 9). On December 15, 2023, Thomas sent Defendant’s counsel a meet and confer letter, requesting therein that Defendant’s counsel provide a response thereto by December 22, 2023. (Id., ¶ 10, Exh. D.) Defendant’s counsel did not respond to this letter. (Id., ¶ 11). On December 28, 2023, Thomas sent a second letter, requesting therein that Defendant’s counsel provide a response thereto by January 4, 2024. (Id., ¶ 12, Exh. E). On January 11, 2024, Defendant’s counsel Claudia Gavrilescu (“Gavrilescu”) sent a response letter to Thomas, promising to produce certain documents subject to a protective order but otherwise standing on Defendant’s responses. (Id., ¶ 13, Exh. F). On January 12, 2024, Defendant signed and served the LASC Model Stipulated Protective Order. (Id., ¶ 14). On January 18, 2024, Defendant sent some documents subject to the protective order. (Id.) On January 29, 2024, the court held an Informal Discovery Conference; that same day, Thomas sent an email to Defendants’ counsel, requesting documents responsive to Nos. 37-41 and verified supplemental responses to Nos. 16, 19-32 and 37-41 by February 5, 2024. (Id., ¶ 17, Exh. G). Defendant’s counsel has not responded to this email; as such, this motion followed, on February 7, 2024. (Id., ¶ 17).
The court determines that an adequate good faith meet and confer was conducted and that Plaintiff has sufficiently shown good cause.
Plaintiff represents that Nos. 16 and 19-32 seek documents related to Defendant’s general repurchase or replacement policies and procedures and that Nos. 37-41 seek documents that would explain the various codes used as a shorthand in the repair orders and other internal documents produced by Defendant.
The court addresses these categories as follows:
Corporate Policies and Procedures (i.e., Requests Nos. 16 and 19-32)
Request No. 16 seeks Defendant’s warranty claims policy and procedure manual(s) from 2019 to the present.
Request No. 19 seeks documents since 2019 describing the procedures used by Defendant for evaluating and responding to complaints by California consumers regarding vehicles Defendant manufactured or distributed.
Request No. 20 seeks all documents since 2019 describing policies and procedures that Defendant’s employees and agents should follow when evaluating a customer request for a refund on a motor vehicle manufactured or distributed by Defendant. Request No. 31 seeks all documents since 2019 describing policies and procedures that Defendant’s authorized repair facilities should follow regarding customer requests for a refund of the price paid for a vehicle pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.
Request No. 21 seeks all documents since 2019 describing Defendants, policies, procedures or guidelines for determining whether a vehicle is eligible for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.
Request No. 22 seeks all training materials since 2019 regarding the handling of consumer requests for a vehicle repurchase in California.
Request No. 23 seeks all training materials since 2019 for Defendant’s employees or agents tasked with determining whether a vehicle is eligible for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.
Request No. 24 seeks all scripts and flow charts Defendant has used since 2019 in handling California consumer requests for a vehicle repurchase or replacement.
Request Nos. 25-28 seek all documents since 2019 describing Defendant’s policies, procedures, and parameters for determining what constitutes a repair presentation/“non-conformity”/ “substantial impairment” of a vehicle’s use, value, or safety/“reasonable number of repair attempts” (respectively) to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.
Request No. 29 seeks all documents since 2019 describing Defendant’s policies, procedures, and parameters for establishing the turn-around time to respond to a vehicle repurchase request pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.
Request No. 30 seeks all documents since 2019 Defendant has used to determine whether a vehicle is eligible for a repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.
Request No. 32 seeks all documents since 2019 describing policies and procedures for proactively complying with the Song-Beverly Act in California by offering a repurchase or replacement of a qualifying vehicle without a consumer request to do so.
Defendant initially refused to produce any documents in response to Requests Nos. 16 and 19-32 on the basis that the requests were overbroad, irrelevant, burdensome and oppressive, sought confidential, proprietary and trade secret information and sought information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. Defendant also objected that certain terms (i.e., “describe”/“describing” in Request Nos. 19-21, 31 and 32, “regarding” in Request No. 22, “training materials” and “tasked with determining” in Request No. 23, “utilize” in Request Nos. 24 and 30, “handling” in Request Nos. 22 and 24, “describing” and “parameters for determining/[establishing]” in Request Nos. 25-29, “non-conformity” in Request No. 26, “evidence” in Request No. 31 and “proactively complying with” in Request No. 32) were vague and ambiguous.
The court disagrees with Defendant’s vague and ambiguous objections pertaining to the terms above. “Indeed, where the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.)
The court disagrees that the requests are overbroad as to time, inasmuch as Plaintiff has alleged that he entered into the warranty contract with Defendant on April 20, 2019. (Complaint, ¶ 15). The court, however, agrees that the requests are overbroad as to scope as to Requests Nos. 16 and 20, inasmuch as Request No. 16 is not limited to warranty claims policy and procedure manual(s) for the vehicle type at issue and Request No. 20 is not limited to vehicles sold in California. The Song-Beverly Act and its lemon law provisions limits its application to goods sold in California and has certain provisions that afford protections greater than the requirements of the federal Magnuson Moss Act. (See Civil Code §§ 1792, 1792.1; Atkinson v. Elk Corp of Texas (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 212, 231.) As the statute’s application to lemon law is for vehicles “sold in this state” such phrase is interpreted to restricting the scope to goods sold in California. (California State Electronic Ass’n v. Zeos Int’l Ltd. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277.) The court determines that such a limitation is warranted.
Defendant claims that the requests are overly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of this matter. However, “[t]he objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) Defendant has not provided any such evidence. At any rate, the court determines that Defendant’s concerns of overbreadth and undue burden have been sufficiently addressed via the limitation imposed above.
Next, Defendant’s policies and procedures are relevant to a determination of Defendant’s good faith. (See e.g. Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105 (finding car manufacturer’s internal policy relevant to whether it evidenced an “unreasonable and not a good faith effort to honor its statutory obligations to repurchase defective cars.”).) The documents are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding whether Defendant knew of the defects at issue yet failed to repurchase the subject vehicle. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 143, the appellate court upheld a trial court’s determination that evidence of “the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles” should not be excluded from trial as prejudicial in a Song–Beverly Act case brought by a single plaintiff. (Id. at 154.) Donlen thus provides a basis for permitting discovery to extend beyond Plaintiff’s specific vehicle. A defendant’s knowledge of the defect is relevant to whether Defendant willfully violated the statute. (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186 [“A decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.”].)
Defendant also claims that documents Plaintiffs are seeking are confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive trade secrets. Objections based on confidentiality are not proper grounds for withholding responsive information. (See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Superior Court (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 23 [“We know of no case holding that this is a proper ground for objection to an otherwise proper interrogatory. Assuming that the information called for by this interrogatory is of a confidential nature which defendants do not want to have included in a public record, they presumably could have applied for a protective order. . .”].) At any rate, Plaintiff signed and served Defendant’s Los Angeles Superior Court Model Stipulated Protective Order on January 12, 2024. (Thomas Decl., ¶ 14.) The court believes that any confidentiality concerns may be adequately safeguarded by the protective order and/or redaction of personally identifiable information.
Finally, although Defendant interposed an objection on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine, Defendant has not met its burden of justifying this objection. Any documents withheld from production on this basis must be accompanied by a privilege log.
Defendant now asserts that there is nothing for the court to compel with respect to Requests Nos. 16 and 19-32, because it has agreed to produce its “Warranty Policy & Procedure Manual and the policies and procedures used to evaluate lemon law claims and repurchase requests along with its California Customer Engagement Center training materials.” (Opp., 8:25-9:2). Plaintiff, however, points out that “Defendant’s confidential production consists of several hundred files, mostly in .pdf format, identified only by a bates number. Defendant served no supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs that identify which documents are responsive to which requests. Plaintiff therefore does not know whether Defendant’s responses to any of Plaintiff’s RFPs is complete.” (Reply, 1:19-24). This does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.280, subdivision (a) (i.e., “[a]ny documents or category of documents produced in response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall be identified with the specific request number to which the documents respond.”)
Further responses to Requests Nos. 16 and 19-32 are warranted, subject to the limitations identified above.
Explanation of Codes Documents (i.e., Requests Nos. 37-41)
Requests Nos. 37-39 seek documents sufficient to identify
all of Defendant’s OBDII/vehicle symptom/vehicle component repair codes,
respectively, for the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle.
Request No. 40 seeks documents sufficient to show all of Defendant’s customer complaint codes from 2019-present.
Request No. 41 seeks documents sufficient to show all labor operation codes provided by Defendant to its authorized dealerships from 2019-present.
Defendant initially refused to produce any documents in response to Requests Nos. 37-41 on the basis that the requests were overbroad, irrelevant, burdensome and oppressive, and sought confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. Defendant also objected that certain terms (i.e., “sufficient to identify/show” in Requests Nos. 37-41, “OBDII codes” in Request No. 37, “vehicle symptom codes” in Request No. 38, “vehicle component repair codes” in Request No. 39, “customer complaint codes” in Request No. 40 and “operation codes” in Request No. 41) were vague and ambiguous.
The court disagrees that the requests are overbroad as to time and/or scope, for the reasons set forth previously. The court also rejects Defendant’s remaining objections, for the reasons set forth previously.
Further responses to Requests Nos. 37-41 are warranted.
Sanctions
Again, Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $2,310.00 [calculated as follows: 2 hours preparing motion, plus 2 hours reviewing opposition and drafting reply, plus 1 hour attending hearing at $350.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee].
Utilizing a Lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $760.00 (i.e., 2 hours at $350.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee). Sanctions are payable within 30 days of the date of the hearing.
Conclusion
The motion, then, is granted, subject to the limitations set forth herein. Defendant is to provide further, Code-compliant responses within 20 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions are awarded in the reduced amount of $760.00 and are payable within 30 days of the date of the notice of ruling.