Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 23PSCV01085, Date: 2023-09-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 23PSCV01085, Date: 2023-09-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV01085 Hearing Date: November 7, 2023 Dept: K

Defendant Ha Le’s Demurrer to Verified Complaint is SUSTAINED in part (i.e., as to the first and third causes of action) and OVERRULED in part (i.e., as to the second and fourth through eighth causes of action). The court will hear from counsel for Plaintiff as to whether leave to amend is requested, and as to which cause(s) of action, and will require an offer of proof if so.

Background

Plaintiff Nam Tuan Ngo (“Plaintiff”) alleges as follows:

Plaintiff told Ha Le (“Le”) in December 2013 that she wanted to purchase a manufactured home commonly known as 901 S. Sixth Avenue, Space 284, Hacienda Heights, CA 91745 (“Manufactured Home.”) Le told Plaintiff that she would be unable to hold title to same because she was in the United States on a student visa. Plaintiff asked Le to assist her with the purchase of the Manufactured Home by holding title on her behalf. Le agreed. Plaintiff thereafter purchased the Manufactured Home from David Davila (“Seller”) and Seller transferred title to Le. Plaintiff has lived in the Manufactured Home since April 2014 and has paid the lot rent and property taxes. From 2018-2020, Plaintiff gave money to Le to invest in the stock market on her behalf. Le subsequently told Plaintiff that her monies had been lost due to the investments’ poor performance. Le has refused to transfer title to the Manufactured Home and all assets obtained with Plaintiff’s entrusted funds to Plaintiff. On March 2, 2023, Plaintiff found papers taped to the door of the Manufactured Home which stated that Li Wang (“Wang”) was the new owner of the Manufactured Home, that Wang was Plaintiff’s landlord, that Wang would be inspecting the Manufactured Home on March 4, 2023 and that Plaintiff’s alleged tenancy was terminated.

On April 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Le, Wang, all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiff’s title, or any cloud upon Plaintiff’s title thereto and Does 1-20 for:

1. Action to Establish Resulting Trust

2. Action to Quiet Title

3. Breach of Contract

4. Promissory Estoppel

5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

6. Conversion

7. Trespass to Chattels

8. Action for Accounting

On August 8, 2023, Wang’s default was entered.

A Case Management Conference is set for November 7, 2023.

Legal Standard

A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading, inter alia, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) “[A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].)

Discussion

Le demurs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivision (e), to the first through eighth causes of action on the basis that they each fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action.

At the outset, the court notes that Le’s demurrer references numerous alleged facts which are extrinsic to the face of Plaintiff’s complaint and thus improper for consideration on demurrer. Counsel for Le is admonished in this regard.

Merits

Statute of Limitations

Le asserts that all of Plaintiff’s causes of action are time-barred. “A general demurrer based on the statute of limitations is only permissible where the dates alleged in the complaint show that the action is barred by the statute of limitations.” (Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 315, 324.) “The running of the statute must appear ‘clearly and affirmatively’ from the dates alleged. It is not sufficient that the complaint might be barred. If the dates establishing the running of the statute of limitations do not clearly appear in the complaint, there is no ground for general demurrer.” (Id. at 324-325 [citation omitted].)

Plaintiff has alleged, in relevant part, that in December 2013, Plaintiff communicated to Le that he intended to purchase the subject property (Complaint, ¶ 6); that Le told Plaintiff that Plaintiff would be unable to hold title to the subject property because Plaintiff was in the United States on a student visa (Id., ¶ 7); that Plaintiff, relaying on Le’s statement, asked Le to assist with Plaintiff’s purchase of the subject property by holding title to same on Plaintiff’s behalf, which Le agreed to do (Id., ¶ 8); that Plaintiff paid the full purchase price of the subject property to seller in February 2014 (Id., ¶ 11); that seller thereafter transferred title to the subject property to Le in or about April 2014 (Id., ¶ 12); that Plaintiff has resided in the subject property from April 2014 to the present and has paid the lot rent and local property taxes during said time (Id., ¶¶ 14, 16 and 17); that beginning in 2018 and continuing through 2020, Plaintiff and Le agreed that Le would invest Plaintiff’s money in the stock market on Plaintiff’s behalf (Id., ¶¶ 18 and 19); that upon Plaintiff’s subsequent inquiry to Le regarding how his investments were performing, Le stated that Plaintiff’s entrusted funds had been lost due to the investments’ poor performance (Id., ¶ 21); that following the alleged loss of Plaintiff’s entrusted funds to Le, Plaintiff demanded that Le transfer title to the subject property and remaining stocks identified in Paragraph 23 to Plaintiff, but Le failed to do so (Id., ¶ 24); and that on March 2, 2023, Plaintiff found papers taped to his door which indicated that Wang was the new owner of the subject property and Plaintiff’s landlord, that Wang would be inspecting the subject property on March 4, 2023 and that Plaintiff’s alleged tenancy was terminated. (Id., ¶ 26).

Le argues that “Plaintiff has failed to plead dates” in the complaint so as “to avoid time bars.” (Demurrer, 6:20-21 [see also 7:13-16 [“specific dates were not provided in the complaint . . .[n]o specific dates were provided in order to determine the applicable statute”]; 10:10-11 [“Plaintiff fails to plead dates as to when such breach occurred”]; 11:2-3 [“Plaintiff failed to state when such funds specifically were entrusted and when such were lost”). Le, however, does not point to any dates alleged in the complaint which “clearly and affirmatively” reflect that any statutes of limitations have run.

Further, Le’s argument that Plaintiff’s quiet title action is time-barred because it commenced running from April 4, 2014 (i.e., the date as of which the determination is sought) (see Complaint, ¶ 48) is nonsensical because, as Plaintiff states, the statute of limitations could not have commenced running before the time Plaintiff’s property rights were allegedly violated (Opp., 8:23-26). “An outstanding adverse claim, which amounts only to a cloud upon the title, is a continuing cause of action, and is not barred by lapse of time, until the hostile claim is asserted in some manner to jeopardize the superior title. So long as the adverse claim lies dormant and inactive the owner of the superior title may not be incommoded by it and has the privilege of allowing it to stand indefinitely. Each day's assertion of such adverse claim gives a renewed cause of action to quiet title until such action is brought.” (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5^th 1110, 1122 [internal quotations and citation omitted].) Plaintiff has alleged that the hostile claim was asserted on March 2, 2023 when Plaintiff received notice of Wang’s claim to the subject property. (Complaint, ¶ 26).

The court, then, overrules Le’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds.

The court addresses Le’s other arguments as follows:

First Cause of Action (i.e., Action to Establish Resulting Trust)

Le next argues that a resulting trust is not a cause of action. Le is correct; a resulting trust is not a cause of action, but a remedy. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 76.) Le’s demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained on this basis.

Second Cause of Action (i.e., Action to Quiet Title)

Le argues that Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for quiet title.

A cause of action for quiet title requires (1) a legal description and street address of the subject property; (2) the title of the plaintiff as to which a determination is sought and the basis of the title; (3) the adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought and (5) a prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) The complaint must also be verified. (Id.)

At a minimum, Plaintiff has set forth the above elements in Paragraphs 43-48 and Paragraph 3 of the prayer. Plaintiff’s complaint is verified. Le’s demurrer to the second cause of action is overruled.

Third Cause of Action (i.e., Breach of Contract)

Le argues that Plaintiff’s third cause of action fails to identify whether the agreement was written or oral and that it also violates the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff’s first argument is essentially a Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivision (g) argument. The court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to allege whether or not Plaintiff and Le’s agreement regarding Le’s investment of Plaintiff’s monies in the stock market was oral or written. Le’s demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained on this basis. The court disagrees, however, with Le’s Statute of Frauds argument, in that the allegations do not necessarily reflect that the agreement was “such that its terms may not be completed within a year.”

Fourth Cause of Action (i.e., Promissory Estoppel)

“The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 901 [citation and internal quotations omitted].)

Le has addressed only the first element of this cause of action, i.e., that there was no “clear and unambiguous” promise by Le. This allegation, however, is set forth in Paragraph 57. Le’s demurrer, then, is overruled.

Fifth Cause of Action (i.e., Breach of Fiduciary Duty)

“The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach.” (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 483.)

Le argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead when or how a fiduciary duty was established. Not so. Plaintiff has alleged that Plaintiff and Le agreed “[o]n or about December 2013” that Le “would act as Plaintiff’s agent. . .” (Complaint, ¶ 65). Le’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action is overruled.

Sixth Cause of Action (i.e., Conversion)

The elements of conversion are “(1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) the defendant's disposition of the property in a manner that is inconsistent with the plaintiff's property rights; and (3) resulting damages.” (Regent Alliance Ltd. v. Rabizadeh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1181 [citation and internal quotations omitted].)

Le argues that Plaintiff has not pled any wrongful acts by Le which are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s property rights. Plaintiff, however, has alleged that Le continues to possess certain stock belonging to Plaintiff (identified as “Remaining Assets”) and refuses Plaintiff’s demand to transfer them to him. (Complaint, ¶¶ 23, 24 and 76-79). Le’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action is overruled.

Seventh Cause of Action (i.e., Trespass to Chattels)

Trespass to chattel “lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused injury.” (Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal.App.4^th 1559, 1566.)

Le argues that Plaintiff has not pled interference. This is incorrect, at least as it relates to the Remaining Assets. (Complaint, ¶¶ 85-88). Le’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action is overruled.

Eighth Cause of Action (i.e., Action for Accounting)

Le argues, without more (i.e., in addition to the statute of limitations addressed above), that Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action is subject to demurrer on the basis that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and that a “[l]ack of writing violates Statute of Frauds.” (Demurrer, 4:11-16). Le’s position is unsupported by any further analysis of legal argument. Le’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action is overruled.