Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 23PSCV01127, Date: 2024-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Ricky Trujillo and Gina Trujillo’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production, Set One is DENIED in part (i.e., as to Request No. 38) and GRANTED in part (i.e., as to Request Nos. 10, 21, 22, 24, 26, 34, 35 and 37). GM is to provide further, Code-compliant responses within 20 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions are awarded in the reduced amount of $1,110.00 and are payable within 30 days of the date of the hearing.

Plaintiffs Ricky Trujillo and Gina Trujillo (“Plaintiffs”) allege as follows:

On April 16, 2022, Plaintiffs purchased a new 2022 Chevrolet Silverado, VIN No. 3GCUDFEDXNG532475 (“subject vehicle”). The subject vehicle suffers from various defects which have not been repaired within a reasonable number of attempts.

On April 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against General Motors, LLC (“GM”), Martin Automotive, Inc. dba Chevrolet of Glendora (“Glendora Chevrolet”) and Does 1-40 for:

“[T]he demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that. . . (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[,] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive [and/or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

The moving party must demonstrate a “reasonable and good faith attempt” at an informal resolution of each issue presented. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) “In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(3).)

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) If the moving party has shown good cause for the production of documents, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4^th 92, 98.)

Notice of the motion must be provided “within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.310, subd. (c).)

“[T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction. . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Plaintiffs move the court for an order compelling GM to serve further responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (i.e., Nos. 10, 21, 22, 24, 26, 34, 35, 37 and 38)[1] and to produce responsive documents. Plaintiffs also seek sanctions against GM and/or its counsel of record in the amount of $4,785.00.

Plaintiffs’ counsel Lamont Freeman Jr. (“Freeman Jr.”) represents, and/or the accompanying exhibits reflect, as follows:

On May 12, 2023, Plaintiffs propounded the subject discovery on GM. (Freeman Jr. Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. A.) On June 16, 2023, GM served unverified responses. (Id., ¶ 6, Exh. B). On July 15, 2023, GM served verifications. (Id., ¶ 7, Exh. C). On July 31, 2023, GM produced some responsive documents. (Id., ¶ 7, Exh. D).

On August 23, 2023, Freeman Jr. sent GM’s counsel a meet and confer letter, requesting therein that GM’s counsel provide a written response thereto by September 6, 2023. (Id., ¶ 8, Exh. E.) Freeman Jr. also requested, in an accompanying email, that the motion filing deadline be extended to September 13, 2023. (Id.) GM’s counsel agreed to the motion filing deadline extension but failed to respond to the August 23, 2023 meet and confer letter. (Id., ¶ 8). Freeman Jr. requested, on September 12, 2023 and again on September 13, 2023, a two-week extension as to the motion filing deadline (with an extension to Plaintiff to September 15, 2023 to respond to the August 23, 2023 meet and confer letter) but did not receive approval as to same from Plaintiffs’ counsel until 2:56 p.m. on September 13, 2023. (Id., ¶¶ 9 and 10, Exh. F). Freeman Jr. advised Plaintiffs’ counsel in a 4:38 p.m. response that day that he had already spent “all day” preparing the instant motion and would be filing it, but expressed a willingness to meet and confer thereafter. (Id.)

At the outset, the court notes that Freeman Jr.’s August 23, 2023 meet and confer letter does not specifically reference Requests No. 38; accordingly, the motion is summarily denied in this regard for insufficient meet and confer. The court otherwise determines that GM’s aforesaid correspondence constitutes a sufficient meet and confer effort under the Code.

Next, Plaintiffs’ counsel Alana Mellgren (“Mellgren”) represents, and/or the accompanying exhibits reflect, that on September 19, 2023, GM’s counsel Jonathan Shugart (“Shugart”) sent a letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel, advising therein, in relevant part, that GM would supplement its document production “to include other customer complaints within GM’s ESI database that are substantially similar to Plaintiff’s complaint(s) concerning the alleged defects for vehicles purchased in California of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle” subject to the entry of an attached proposed protective order (“SPO”). (Mellgren Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. H). Plaintiffs’ counsel signed the proposed SPO and returned same to GM’s counsel on September 25, 2023 (Id., ¶ 3, Exhs. I and J), but has yet to receive any supplemental production. The motion, then, is summarily granted as to Nos. 34, 35 and 37 on this basis.

The court addresses the remaining requests (i.e., Nos. 10, 21, 22, 24 and 26) as follows:

Request No. 10 seeks all documents related to any alleged misuse, abuse and/or lack of maintenance of the subject vehicle.

GM, in response, asserts that it has already produced responsive documents. (Opp., 4:23-5:5). Plaintiffs’ reply brief appears to be silent in this regard. Page 5 of GM’s September 19, 2023 letter identifies certain Bates stamped documents as responsive to this request. GM, however, should provide a further response incorporating this information. The motion, then, is granted as to No. 10.

Request No. 21 seeks all documents related to GM’s rules, policies or procedures since 2018 concerning its compliance with the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

Request No. 22 seeks all documents related to procedures used by GM since 2018 for responding to complaints by consumers regarding vehicles manufactured or distributed by GM.

Request No. 24 seeks all documents that relate to policies, procedures and/or instructions since 2018 that GM’s employees should follow in responding to customer complaints regarding failure to repair vehicles under GM’s warranty.

Request No. 26 seeks all documents describing any training provided by GM to its authorized repair facilities in California regarding the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

Defendant’s policies are relevant to a determination of Defendant’s good faith. (See e.g. Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105 (finding car manufacturer’s internal policy relevant to whether it evidenced an “unreasonable and not a good faith effort to honor its statutory obligations to repurchase defective cars.”).) The documents are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding whether Defendant knew of the defects at issue yet failed to repurchase the subject vehicle. A defendant’s knowledge of the defect is relevant to whether Defendant willfully violated the statute. (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186 [“A decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.”].)

GM refused to produce any documents in response to Requests Nos. 21, 22, 24 and 26 on the basis that the requests were overbroad, burdensome, oppressive, irrelevant, sought confidential, proprietary and trade secret information and sought information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine.

GM also refused to produce documents in response to many of the aforesaid requests on the basis that certain terms contained therein (i.e., “relat[e]/ing to,” “concerning,” and “complaints,” “describe, refer, or relate to,” “failure to repair vehicles” and “training”) were vague and ambiguous. The court disagrees.

The court agrees that the requests are overbroad as to time. Plaintiffs purchased the subject vehicle on April 16, 2022. (Complaint, ¶ 10). The requests, then, are limited in time from April 16, 2021 to April 17, 2023 (i.e., the date Plaintiffs filed their complaint). The court also agrees that Requests Nos. 22 and 24 are overbroad as to scope, inasmuch as they are not limited to the defects and vehicle type at issue for California consumers. The Song-Beverly Act and its lemon law provisions limits its application to goods sold in California and has certain provisions that afford protections greater than the requirements of the federal Magnuson Moss Act. (See Civil Code §§ 1792, 1792.1; Atkinson v. Elk Corp of Texas (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 212, 231.) As the statute’s application to lemon law is for vehicles “sold in this state” such phrase is interpreted to restricting the scope to goods sold in California. (California State Electronic Ass’n v. Zeos Int’l Ltd. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277.) The court determines that such a limitation is warranted.

GM claims that the requests are overly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of this matter. However, “[t]he objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) GM has not provided any such evidence. At any rate, the court determines that GM’s concerns of overbreadth and undue burden have been sufficiently addressed via the limitations imposed above.

GM claims that documents Plaintiffs are seeking are confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive trade secrets. Objections based on confidentiality are not proper grounds for withholding responsive information. (See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Superior Court (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 23 [“We know of no case holding that this is a proper ground for objection to an otherwise proper interrogatory. Assuming that the information called for by this interrogatory is of a confidential nature which defendants do not want to have included in a public record, they presumably could have applied for a protective order. . .”].) Further, GM did not seek a protective order. The court believes that any confidentiality concerns may be adequately safeguarded by the stipulated protective order Plaintiffs represent has been signed in this case. (Reply, 6:2-3).

Finally, although GM interposed an objection on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine, GM has not met its burden of justifying this objection. Any documents withheld from production on this basis must be accompanied by a privilege log.

Further responses to Nos. 21, 22, 24 and 26 are warranted, subject to the limitations identified above.

The motion, then, is granted in part (i.e., as to Requests Nos. 10, 21, 22, 24, 26, 34, 35 and 37), subject to the limitations set forth herein, and denied in part (i.e., as to Request No. 38). GM is to provide further, Code-compliant responses within 20 days from the date of the notice of ruling.

Plaintiffs seek sanctions against GM and/or its counsel in the amount of $4,785.00 [calculated as follows: 7 hours preparing motion, plus 2 hours preparing reply, plus 1.5 hours attending hearing at $450.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee].

Utilizing a Lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,110.00 (i.e., 3 hours at $350.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee). Sanctions are imposed against GM and its counsel on a joint and several basis and are payable within 30 days of the date of the hearing.

[1] Plaintiffs have failed to identify Requests Nos. 27 and 28 in the notice of motion. The court declines to consider Plaintiffs’ arguments re: same on this basis.