Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 23PSCV02976, Date: 2024-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Oscar Espinoza (“Oscar”) and Carter Espinoza, a minor, by and through Oscar Espinoza, Guardian Ad Litem (“Carter”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) sustained injuries in a January 19, 2022 motor vehicle collision on the I-210 westbound near Grand Avenue in Glendora.

On September 26, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Guilmer’s Trucking Inc. “Guilmer’s”), Efrain Ramos Leon (“Leon”) and Does 1-50 for:

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Guilmer’s and Leon move the court for an order striking out the following portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint:

1. Page 7, Lines 2-3 (i.e., “Leon fled the scene of the collision with a conscious and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of Mr. Espinoza and his son, Carter”);

2. Page 7, Lines 3-4 (i.e., Mr. Leon knowingly fled the scene of the violent collision”);

3. Page 7, Lines 17-21 (i.e., “Leon acted with malice, which conduct was despicable and was undertaken with a willful and knowing disregard of the rights or safety of Plaintiffs. Leon was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct and yet he deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. Leon’s conduct was so vile, base, and/or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people”);

4. Page 8, Lines 4-7 (i.e., “an officer, director, or managing agent of Guilmer s Trucking had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of Leon and employed him with a knowing disregard of the rights or safety of others”);

5. Page 8, Lines 7-11 (i.e., an officer, a director, or a managing agent of Guilmer s Trucking knew of Leon’s wrongful conduct and adopted or approved the conduct after it occurred”);

6. Page 10 (i.e., the words “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress”);

8. Page 10 (i.e., the word, “Defendants intended to cause Plaintiffs emotion distress, and/or Defendants acted with reckless disregard of the probability that Plaintiff would suffer emotion distress, knowing that Plaintiffs were present when the conduct occurred”); and

9. Page 3, paragraph 14 (i.e., “punitive damages” and “according to proof”).

At the outset, Plaintiffs assert that the court should summarily deny the instant motion on the basis of untimeliness. Plaintiffs have not articulated any prejudice they have suffered as a consequence. Further, Defendants represent that “[c]ounsel for Defendants met and conferred with Counsel for Plaintiffs and reviewed potential settlement of the lawsuit with insurance carrier for Defendants prior to determining the Motion to Strike was necessary.” (Reply, 2:4-6). The court elects to entertain the motion on the merits.

Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)

“Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

A “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice. . .’” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that on January 19, 2022 Oscar was driving westbound in the HOV lane on the I-210 in Glendora at approximately 45-50 miles per hour with Carter in the vehicle (Complaint, p. 5, ¶ GN-1); that at the same time, Leon was driving one lane to the right of Plaintiffs’ vehicle when he “suddenly, and without warning” swerved his vehicle to the left side of the HOV lane causing a “violent collision” with the right side of Plaintiffs’ vehicle (Id.); that, after the collision, Leon’s vehicle pinned Plaintiffs’ vehicle against the median concrete barrier, resulting in a second collision to Plaintiffs’ vehicle (Id.); that Leon did not stop but kept driving after the collision (Id., p. 7, ¶ 2); that Oscar pursued Leon approximately 8.5 miles until he finally compelled Leon to pull over (Id.); that during this time Oscar followed Leon's vehicle and called the police to get Leon to pull over (Id.); that, also during this time, while Oscar was honking at Leon, attempting to get him to pull over, the passenger of Leon’s vehicle was flipping off and being visibly aggressive with Plaintiffs (Id.); and that approximately 8.5 miles west of the initial collision, Oscar was able to get Leon to pull his vehicle over to the right hand shoulder of the freeway (Id., ¶ 3).

Defendants’ argument that Leon did not stop because he was not aware the accident occurred is beyond the face of the complaint and is thus not considered.

Plaintiffs have also alleged that Leon “was an officer, a director, or a managing agent” and “was at all times relevant herein acting on behalf of” Guilmer’s. (Id., p. 8, ¶ 5).

[1] The motion was filed on May 1, 2024 (served via email April 30, 2024) and originally set for hearing on May 30, 2024. On May 14, 2024, a “Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order” was filed, wherein the May 30, 2024 scheduled hearing was continued to June 3, 2024; notice was given to counsel.