Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 23STCV01630, Date: 2025-01-03 Tentative Ruling

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Defendant Ha-Rakhamon Farhod Azizi’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication, is DENIED.

On January 25, 2023, Plaintiffs Eliyaho Schefres (“Schefres”) and Ramish Manglani (“Manglani”) filed their complaint against Defendant Ha-Rakhamon Farhod Azizi (“Azizi”) (erroneously sued as Azizi Ha Rakhamon Farhod) arising from a fire that originated in Azizi’s property damaging Schefres’ properties alleging causes of action for:

On May 24, 2023, Azizi filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Peter Velasquez Hernandez, Daniel Anselmo Arroyo, and Cali Exotic Rentals.

On January 5, 2024, by request of Schefres and Manglani, the Clerk’s Office dismissed Manglani with prejudice from the complaint.

On February 22, 2024, Azizi filed this Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication.

On March 20, 2024, the court granted the parties’ Ex Parte Application to continue the hearing on Azizi’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

On December 20, 2024, Schefres filed an opposition to Azizi’s motion. On December 26, 2024, Azizi filed a reply.

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. The motion may be made at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (1)(a).)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, citation omitted.)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 850; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474, [applying the summary judgment standards in Aguilar to motions for summary adjudication].)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839, citation omitted.)

“The trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a fact finder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Binder, supra, at p. 840, citations omitted; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

The court declines to rule on Schefres and Azizi’s evidentiary objections found in the opposition and reply to Azizi’s Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (q) (i.e., “[i]n granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion”).

Azizi’s request for judicial notice is granted. “A court may properly take judicial notice of its own records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (e).)” (Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 21.) Judicial notice may also be taken of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (c), (h).)

On September 5, 2022, a fire originated in the property located at 2843 E. 11th St., Los Angeles, CA 90023 (“2843 property”), owned by Azizi, affecting the properties located at 2833 and 2835 E. 11th St., Los Angeles, CA 90023 (“2833-2835 properties”), owned by Schefres and occupied by Manglani. (Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”), Nos. 1-3.) Schefres alleges that the fire was caused by the operation of an “illegal marijuana grow business” at the 2843 property. (Id., No. 8.)

Azizi moves for summary judgment against Schefres’ complaint arguing that no triable issue of material facts exists. In the alternative, Azizi moves for summary adjudication against each cause of action brought by Schefres.

The elements of a negligence claim are duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 411.)[1]

Azizi argues that he did not breach any duty of care owed to Schefres under the first cause of action for negligence. (MSJ, at p. 9.) Azizi contends that the portion of the 2843 property where the fire originated was leased to and under the exclusive control of Azizi’s tenant, Daniel Arroyo Anselmo (“Anselmo”). (Ibid.; Azizi Decl., ¶¶ 9, 11, Exh. H.) Additionally, Azizi argues that he had no knowledge of any “illegal marijuana grow business” or any other dangerous activity at the 2843 property. (MSJ, at p. 9; Azizi Decl., ¶¶ 16, 19.) Azizi argues that as landowner of the 2843 property, Azizi owed no duty of care to a third party, like Schefres, as Schefres was injured when Anselmo was the sole tenant in possession, absent notice of a dangerous condition. (MSJ, at pp. 9-10.) “[B]efore liability may be thrust on a landlord for a third party's injury due to a dangerous condition on the land, the plaintiff must show that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition.” (Ibid., quoting Salinas v. Martin, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 412 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).) In addition, Azizi argues that he also did not owe the duty to inspect, which arises only if the landowner had some reason to know there was a need for an inspection. (Id., at p. 10, relying on Garcia v. Holt (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 600, 605.) Thus, as Azizi had no knowledge of any “illegal marijuana grow business” in the 2843 property, Azizi did not owe Schefres any duty that could be breached. (Id., at p. 10.)

Based on the evidence presented by Azizi, the court finds that it creates the inference that Azizi did not have any actual notice of a dangerous condition that triggered a duty owed to Schefres. Therefore, Azizi has met his initial burden to show that there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether Azizi had a duty and breached. Consequently, the burden now shifts to Schefres to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Azizi had a duty and breached it.

In opposition, Schefres contends that Azizi owed a duty of care to manage his property in a manner that avoided creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others. (Opp., at p. 4.) Schefres argues that Azizi had a duty of care to manage, inspect, and address dangerous conditions on his property in a reasonable manner. (Id., at p. 5.) Schefres contends that Azizi retained possession and control of the 2843 property for his personal use as storage, evidenced through the lease agreement for the 2843 property and Azizi’s testimony. (Franco Decl., Exh. 2; UMF, No. 4.) Thus, Schefres argues that the 2843 property was not under the exclusive possession of Anselmo and, as an occupant of the property, Azizi had a duty to avoid exposing others to dangerous conditions that arise on the property under the landowner’s control. (Opp., at p. 6, relying on Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37 (holding that those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm).)

As such, Schefres argues that Azizi breached his duty by failing to keep the 2843 property in a reasonably safe condition, conduct inspections, and discover the hazardous grow operation. (Opp., at p. 6.) Schefres contends that Azizi admitted to have never inspected the 2843 property during Anselmo’s tenancy which Azizi had a duty to do as he retained possession of the property. (Id., at p. 8; Franco Decl., Exh. 2.) Schefres argues that had Azizi carried out his duty, Azizi would have discovered the hazardous condition and materials stored consistent with a marijuana grow operation present in the 2843 property as seen in the photos taken by the Los Angeles Fire Department forensic photographer, Harry Gavin. (Opp., at pp. 3, 7; Franco Decl., Exh. 4.) Additionally, Schefres provides evidence showing that such materials and conditions create a substantial fire hazard. (Franco Decl., Exhs. 3, 5; Rappaport Decl., ¶ 5.) Lastly, Schefres argues that Azizi did not require actual notice of the grow operation for a duty to arise since constructive notice is sufficient as Azizi retained possession of the 2843 property. (Opp., at p. 9.)

In reply, Azizi argues that Schefres did not present any evidence that the fire was caused or spread by an “illegal growth operation” at the 2843 property aside from the expert testimony of Robert Rappaport and deposition testimony by the Los Angeles Fire Department lead investigator, Robert McLoud. (Reply, at pp. 4-5.) Azizi also argues that the evidence shows that Azizi was not in possession or control of the 2843 property portion leased to Anselmo where the fire had likely originated from. (Id., at pp. 5-6.)

On summary judgment, the opposing party’s affidavits or declarations are liberally construed. (Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842, 851-852.) Therefore, the court finds that the evidence provided by Schefres creates a question of fact as to whether Azizi owed a duty to Schefres and breached it by retaining possession of the 2843 property and failing to inspect it. Schefres’ evidence also creates a question of fact as to whether Azizi had some form of notice regarding the alleged marijuana grow operation and whether it could have been the cause of the fire.

Moreover, Azizi moves for summary judgment on the ground that Schefres is unable to establish causation as a matter of law. (MSJ, at p. 10.)[2] However, as found above, the issue of whether Azizi owed a duty to Schefres and breached it are matters that are best left to be resolved by a jury. Consequently, the court is precluded from finding as a matter of law that Azizi was neither the direct cause nor the proximate cause of Schefres’ damages. Therefore, the court finds that Azizi has failed to meet its burden in showing that there are no triable issues of material facts as to whether Schefres is able to establish the element of causation.

Accordingly, the court denies Azizi’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Schefres’ causes of action is also denied as the questions of fact found above invertedly create triable issues of material facts pertaining to the remaining causes of action.

Defendant Ha-Rakhamon Farhod Azizi’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication, is DENIED.

[1] On January 5, 2024, by request of Schefres and Manglani, the Clerk’s Office dismissed Manglani with prejudice from the complaint and, in turn, dismissing the second cause of action for negligence by Manglani against Azizi.

[2] Although unclear, it appears the Azizi’s causation argument concerns not only the Negligence related causes of action, but the remaining ones as well.