Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 23STCV08341, Date: 2025-06-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08341 Hearing Date: June 9, 2025 Dept: 34
Plaintiff Jason Robert
Luther’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part. Fees and
costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the reduced
amount of $28,253.37.
Background
On April 14, 2023, Plaintiff Jason
Robert Luther (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant FCA US LLC
alleging causes of action for:
1.
Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the
Song-Beverly Warranty Act;
2.
Breach of Express Warranty Obligations under the
Song-Beverly Warranty Act; and
3.
Violations of Song-Beverly Warranty Act Section 1793.2.
On
June 6, 2023, Defendant filed an answer.
On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed
this Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. On May 27, 2025, Defendant filed an
opposition. On May 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply.
Legal
Standard
A prevailing party is entitled to
recover its attorney’s fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See
CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a
prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for
attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman
v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)
Discussion
1.
The Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff moves the court to award $34,496.87,
which is comprised of $29,585.00 in attorney’s fees, $1,953.37 in costs, and $2,958.50
in a 1.1 lodestar multiplier. (Motion, at p. 1.)
In opposition, Defendant concedes
that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonably incurred attorney’s fees and
costs. (Opp., at pp. 1-3.) However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s requested
fees and costs should be substantially reduced. (Ibid.)
In reply, Plaintiff argues that the
fees requested are recoverable and reasonable. (Reply, at pp. 1-2.)
2.
Authority for Fees & Prevailing Party
a.
Legal Standard
Attorneys’ fees are allowed as costs
when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd.
(a)(10)(B).) In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s
fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (Civ.
Code, § 1794(d).)
Section 1794 provides: “If the buyer
prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the
court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of
costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended,
determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in
connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, §
1794.)
Thus, the statute includes a
“reasonable attorney’s fees” standard. The attorney bears the burden of proof
as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).)
This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the
services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.)
“Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case
is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the
absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.)
b.
Discussion
On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff
accepted Defendant’s Section 998 Offer to Compromise. (Kohen Decl., ¶¶ 3-4,
Exh. 3.) Plaintiff contends that the terms of the settlement agreement and
Civil Code section 1794 entitle Plaintiff to recover his attorney’s fees and
costs as the prevailing party in this action. (Motion, at p. 3.)
Defendant appears to concede that
Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Opp.,
at pp. 1-2.)
As
such, Plaintiff is a prevailing party and is entitled to recover his attorney’s
fees and costs under the settlement agreement and section 1794(d).
3.
Method of Calculation for Fees
a.
Legal Standard
In determining a reasonable attorney
fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia
Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then
be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at
the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These
facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the
skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent
nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)
b.
Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the lodestar
adjustment method should be used to calculate the award for attorney’s fees.
(Motion, at pp. 3-4.)
Defendant does not dispute this or
propose a different method.
The court uses the lodestar
adjustment method to calculate fees.
4.
Reasonableness of the Fees Claimed
a.
Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates
i. Legal
Standard
“The courts repeatedly have stated
that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by
the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of
the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its
calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the
legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney
requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that
skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing
fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East
County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 426, 437, citations omitted.)
ii. Discussion
Plaintiff’s counsel claims the following hourly rates: (1) $550.00 per hour
for Counsel Isaac Kohen; and (2) $295.00 per hour for Counsel Tamara R. Imber. (Motion,
at p. 1.)
In opposition, Defendant argues that
the court should apply the rates from the most recent Real Rate Report of
$495.00 per hour for a senior attorney and $295.00 for an associate attorney. (Opp.,
at pp. 4-5.)
After considering the information
provided, the court finds that the appropriate hourly rate for (1) Counsel Isaac Kohen is $500.00 per hour, and (2) Counsel
Tamara R. Imber is $250.00 per hour.
b.
Reasonableness of the Number of Hours
i. Legal
Standard
“Under the lodestar adjustment
methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended
and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances¿of the case the amount
of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time
expended are reasonable. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited
to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill
exhibited and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant
bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary
to¿the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. It follows
that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the
time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, then
the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser
amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240,
247 [cleaned up].)
ii. Discussion
Plaintiff’s counsel claims the
following hours were incurred: (1) 49.60 hours by Counsel Isaac Kohen, and (2) 6.00 hours by Counsel Tamara R. Imber. (Motion, at p. 5.)
In opposition, Defendant argues that
the hours requested should be reduced by at least forty percent due to
duplicative and unreasonable entries. (Opp., at p. 5-7.)
The declaration and billing records
provided by Plaintiff’s counsel are sufficient to meet the burden of proving
the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To
satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be
presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case
was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the
reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)
Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on
55.70 hours Counsel spent litigating this case through the instant motion. (Motion, at pp. 5-6; Kohen Decl., ¶¶
37-40; Exh. 1.) The fees
incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing records submitted to this
court. Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and
descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case.
Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under
California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the
absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board
of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359,
396.)
Accordingly, the court grants
Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $26,300.00 for 55.70
hours at the hourly rates established above.
c.
Reasonableness of Multiplier
i. Legal
Standard
Relevant
factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in
presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded
other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.
(Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
ii. Discussion
Plaintiff requests that a multiplier
of 1.1 be applied to the combined lodestar for an additional $2,958.50 in
recovery. (Motion, at pp. 1, 9-10.) Plaintiff argues that the application of
each factor strongly favors applying a multiplier in this case. (Id., at
p. 9.)
In opposition, Defendant argues that
a multiplier is not warranted in this case as the action did not present any
complex issues. (Opp., at p. 8.)
The court denies Plaintiff’s request
for a 1.1 lodestar multiplier. Given the routine work done in this case and the
results obtained, a multiplier is not appropriate. The
contingent risks, preclusion of other work, skill, and difficulty counsel
assert are absorbed by counsel’s hourly rates. (Robertson v. Fleetwood
Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.) As
such, any contingency risk factor is already accounted for in the hourly rates.
5.
Reasonableness of the Costs Claimed
Plaintiff lists $1,953.37 in costs
and expenses incurred in litigating this matter. (Motion, at pp. 1, 11; Kohen Decl., ¶ 41, Exh. 2.) Plaintiff
argues that section 1794(d) entitles Plaintiff to recover all of the expenses
that were reasonably incurred in prosecuting the case. (Ibid.)
In opposition, Defendant contests Plaintiff’s
$900.00 expense for a mechanical expert fee. (Opp., at p. 2.) However,
Defendant fails to provide any argument to support striking such an expense.
The
court also notes that as a prevailing party, Plaintiff can obtain costs
pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d). Thus, the court finds that these costs are reasonable and allowable
under at least one of the cost statutes.
The
court will award $1,953.37 in
costs and expenses.
Conclusion
Plaintiff
Jason Robert Luther’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part.
Fees and costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the
reduced amount of $28,253.37.