Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 23STCV15034, Date: 2024-10-17 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23STCV15034    Hearing Date: October 17, 2024    Dept: 34

Defendant County of Los Angeles’ Motion For Summary Adjudication is DENIED in full. 

 

Background

 

Plaintiffs Linda Anton, Jeannette Beeson, William Beeson, Katherine Christopherson, Christopher Stone, Allaire Koslo, Chloe Koslo, Colette Pondella, Paul Pondella, Michael Glick, Tim Redmond, Jessica Byers, Joshua Byers, Lou Royce, Jacquie Royce, Dustin Booth, Emily Fradenburgh, and Robin Harrison (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) allege as follows:

 

The Lake fire was a wildfire that burned during the 2020 California wildfire season in the Angeles National Forest in Los Angeles County. The fire was first reported on August 12, 2020 and burned 31,089 acres near Lake Hughes, California.

 

After the Lake fire, the County of Los Angeles held community meetings with Lake Hughes residents to discuss a concern that the bridge located at 19217 Pine Canyon Road, Lake Hughes, California (“Bridge”) would act like a dam diverting water and debris from a heavy downpour onto property adjacent to the wash. 

 

After the meeting, County employees were taken on a tour of the Bridge and the access road to the property of Plaintiff Linda Anton to show trouble spots. The owners of the land adjacent to the wash asked for permission to construct a berm to protect their property from flooding, but the County denied their request. The County also fail to take any action to address the peril created by the Bridge and the lack of a berm on property adjacent to the wash.

 

On September 11, 2022, a mudslide occurred in the burn area from the Lake fire. The debris flow overwhelmed the Bridge causing mud, debris, and flood waters to cross Plaintiffs’ properties causing extensive damage. Similar accidents occurred on January 9 and 10, 2023.

 

On June 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting causes of action against the Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Defendant” or “County”) and Does 1-100 for:

 

1.               Inverse Condemnation;

2.               Trespass; and

3.               Nuisance.

 

On September 8, 2023, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint. On September 14, 2023, Defendant filed its first amended answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint.

 

On August 2, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion for Summary Adjudication. On October 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Defendant’s motion. As of October 9, 2024, no reply has been filed.

 

Legal Standard

 

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119 [emphasis theirs].)

 

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one of more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

 

“On a motion for summary judgment[/adjudication], the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) “A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) “Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

 

Discussion

 

Defendant moves the court for an order granting summary adjudication in its favor and against Plaintiffs on each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action for (1) inverse condemnation, (2) trespass, and (3) nuisance.

 

1.               Request for Judicial Notice

 

Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice in opposition to Defendant’s motion is denied. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301 (“[J]udicial notice . . . is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.”].)

 

2.               Evidentiary Objections

 

The court declines to rule on Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 437c, subdivision (q) (i.e., “[i]n granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion”).

 

3.               First Cause of Action (Inverse Condemnation)

 

Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.”  Pursuant to this provision, where private property is wrongfully damaged or destroyed by government action, a private party may claim an inverse condemnation action to establish the owner's damages.  (Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296, 301–303; see also Rose v. City of Coalinga (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1627, 1631.)  To state a  claim for inverse condemnation, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that plaintiffs own or have a similar property interest in real property; (2) the property was taken or damaged; (3) by a public project; (4) and causation.  (Martin, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1024; City of Oroville v. Superior Court (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1091 (“Oroville”); Odello Bros. v. City. of Monterey (1998) 63 Cal. App. 4th 778.)

 

To establish causation, a plaintiff must first show that “[a] ‘deliberate action’ undertaken by a public entity ‘in furtherance of public purposes’—including . . . a public improvement such as a water system or a flood control—” triggered the inverse condemnation action.  (Oroville, supra, 7 Cal. 5th at 1103.)  Plaintiffs must then show the causal nexus between an “inherent risk” in the design or construction of the public improvement and the harm in question, whether it was intentional or the result of negligence by the public entity.  (Oroville, supra, 7 Cal. 5th at 1103–1104 .)  “A link to one of the aforementioned “inherent risks” is necessary, but not sufficient, for a successful inverse condemnation claim. . .” a showing of “substantial causation” is also required.  (Id. at 1107.)  “Liability depends on whether some element of physical, but-for causation is present to link the public improvement and the damage.  The damage must be the “‘necessary or probable result’ of the improvement, or if ‘the immediate, direct, and necessary effect’ thereof was to produce the damage. [Citation.].” (Id. at 1108.)    

 

Relevant here, “when a public flood control improvement fails to function as intended, and properties historically subject to flooding are damaged as a proximate result thereof, plaintiffs’ recovery in inverse condemnation requires proof that the failure was attributable to some unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant public entities.” (Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 567.)  A failure attributable to unreasonable conduct has been found to include the public entities’ drainage improvements on upstream property that caused damage (flooding) to downstream plaintiffs' property.  (Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 337; see Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist., supra, 47 Cal.3d 550, (involving the unintended breach of a flood control levee); see also Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 432 (the water district's dikes and levees failed, causing damage).) 

 

Defendant argues that the decision in Oroville established that damages to a private party must be substantially caused by the inherit risks associated with the design, construction, or maintenance of a public improvement. (MSA, at 9.)

 

First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the County’s road and bridge were the substantial cause of their damages. (Id., at 10.) Defendant contends that the County is not authorized to construct flood control measures on private property in Lake Hughes since flood control is the exclusive function of the Los Angeles County Flood Control District (“District”) under the Flood Control Act. (Id., at 14-15.) Defendant argues that the County cannot do private flood control favors for private property owners since the County cannot use District funds to build flood control facilities on private property. (Ibid.) Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs Lou and Jacquie Royce allowed the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works (“DPW”) to store the mud, rock, and debris it had to clear from the road following Tropical Storm Kay on September 11, 2022 on their property which was upstream relative to the Bridge. (Id., 6:25-28.) Defendant argues that the County storing this material on Plaintiffs’ property does not convert the County into the District nor does it constitute a “public project” for which inverse condemnation liability can attach. (Id., at 10.) As such, Defendant argues that Tropical Storm Kay overwhelmed the banks Pine Canyon Creek which was not able to hold the mudslides regardless of whether there was a roadway and bridge in the area. (Ibid.) Defendant argues that the severe flooding cause by the storm and the burn scars left by the Lake fire simply overwhelmed the Bridge and there was nothing for the County to do to prevent the damage to Plaintiffs’ properties. (Ibid.) Defendant contends that the Bridge and roadway infrastructure operated as intended. (Ibid.)

 

Second, Defendant argues that the Bridge created no inherit risks and it was not a public improvement that could have substantially caused Plaintiffs’ damages. (Id., at 11.) Defendant contends that the Bridge was designed to function as a part of transportation infrastructure not as a flood control measure. (Ibid.) Defendant also contends that the area in which the Bridge is situated is not within the jurisdiction of the District which prohibits the County from using any flood control funds. (Ibid.) Defendant argues that since the storms created extreme natural conditions that combined with burn scars from the Lake fire, Plaintiffs’ damages would have occurred even if the Bridge was not present. (Id., at 12.)

 

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Lake Hughes floods on September 11, 2022 and January 9, 2023 were substantially caused by the design and maintenance of the Bridge and bridge channel. (Opp., at 8.) First, Plaintiffs allege that the waters of Pine Canyon Creek breached the banks of the creek upstream from the Bridge on the night of the storm. (Id., 10-23.) Plaintiffs contend that their civil engineer expert asserts that the flooding on Plaintiffs’ properties would not have occurred if the Bridge and bridge channel had been properly designed and maintained at the time of the flood concluding that the Bridge was the substantial cause of loss. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs refer to Belair to argue that Defendant’s actions were unreasonable since the County had been warned for decades that the Bridge would divert water onto Plaintiffs’ properties in the event of heavy rain and the County failed to maintain the Bridge by cleaning out debris from under the Bridge. (Id., at 11.) Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant increased the risk of harm by placing fire debris in Pine Canyon Creek, placing k-rails on the Bridge, and by failing to maintain a berm it built on adjacent land. (Id., at 12.)

 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s reliance on Oroville is misplaced. (Id., at 12.) Plaintiffs distinguish the instant case from Oroville since there was nothing that Plaintiffs’ could have done to prevent their damages. (Id., at 14.) Plaintiffs argue that the County prevented Plaintiffs from building a berm which could have prevented the flood. (Ibid.) As such, Plaintiffs contend that the policy reasons behind Oroville do not apply where plaintiffs were not in a position to avoid the harm caused by the government entity’s unreasonable conduct. (Ibid.) As such, Plaintiffs contend that there are triable issues of fact as to whether the County’s design, construction, and maintenance of the Bridge and bridge channel were the substantial cause of Plaintiffs’ damages. (Ibid.)

 

Plaintiffs also argue that Oroville held that a public entity may be held liable for inverse condemnation when it fails to maintain a public improvement and damage to private property results, which is what happened in this case. (Id., at 14.) Plaintiffs contend that the County’s design and maintenance of the Bridge posed an inherent risks of flooding of which the County was aware. (Id., at 16.) Plaintiffs argue that the County’s assertion that the temporary storage of materials in Plaintiffs’ property was designed and constructed to be a derm as it was constructed in 1969, which the County failed to maintain. (Id., at 17.)

 

Plaintiffs refute Defendant’s argument that because of the Flood Control Act prohibits it from using public resources for flood control where there is no flood control district. (Id., 17:10-14.) Plaintiffs instead argue that even if the County did not have a duty to build or maintain a flood control system, it does have a duty to maintain its own roads and bridges. (Id., 17:15-23.) Plaintiffs contend that the County’s poor design and lack of maintenance of the Bridge were the substantial cause of Plaintiffs’ damages. (Id., 18:15-20.) Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the County worsened the situation when it dumped fire debris into Pine Canyon Creek, failed to maintain the berm it built on Plaintiffs’ property, and placed k-rails on the Bridge at the time of the storm. (Ibid.)

 

The court finds that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the Bridge’s design or maintenance substantially caused Plaintiffs’ damages. Additionally, there is a dispute whether the storms were a superseding cause for Plaintiffs’ damages even if Defendant’s conduct was unreasonable.

  

The parties provided contradicting declarations of experts regarding key issues involved in Plaintiffs’ cause of action for inverse condemnation. This evidence raises disputed facts as to the reasonableness of Defendant’s conduct.

 

In sum, disputed material facts exist about the cause of the loss, which precludes summary adjudication. 

 

4.               Second Cause of Action (Trespass)

 

To set forth a cause of action for trespass, Defendants must allege (1) Defendants’ lawful possession or right to possession of real property; (2) Plaintiffs’ wrongful, intentional, reckless, or negligent act of trespass on the property; (3) Defendants did not give permission for the entry or scope of permission was exceeded; and (4) damage to Defendants caused by the trespass. (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.)  

 

Defendant argues that the County did not intentionally, recklessly, or negligently cause the mudslides that entered Plaintiffs’ properties. (MSA, at 12-14.) Defendant contends that unprecedented natural storms combined with the burn scars from the Lake fire were beyond the County’s control and were the primary causes of the mudslides. (Id., at 14-15.) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ alleged damage would have occurred even if the Bridge was not there, thus Plaintiffs cannot show the necessary casual connection between the County’s conduct and Plaintiffs’ injuries since the County’s conduct did not foreseeably lead to the severe natural events. (Id., at 15.)

 

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the County negligently caused the mudslides that damaged Plaintiffs’ properties by improperly designing and maintaining the Bridge, by dumping fire debris in Pine Canyon Creek, failing to maintain the berm it constructed in Plaintiffs’ property, and placing k-rails on the Bridge. (Opp., at 19.) Plaintiffs contend that the County’s acts and omissions were the substantial cause of Plaintiffs’ damages.

 

For the same reasons as above, the court finds that there is a triable issue of fact of whether Defendant’s conduct was negligent and whether it was the cause for Plaintiffs’ damages.

 

As disputed material facts exist, summary adjudication cannot be granted.  

 

5.               Third Cause of Action (Private Nuisance)

 

To establish an action for private nuisance, (1) “the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property”; (2) “the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage”; (3) “the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-263, citations, italics, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.) 

 

Defendant argues that as a matter of law no public nuisance exists. (MSA, 16:4-16.)

 

Since Plaintiffs’ cause of action for nuisance rests on a private nuisance theory, Defendant’s arguments regarding a public nuisance are irrelevant.

 

Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish the requirement that it was the County’s actions which created the nuisance. (MSA, 17:13-28.) Defendant contends that the interference and obstruction which Plaintiffs complain about was the result of severe natural weather events, not the result of Defendant’s conduct. (Ibid.)

 

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the County’s acts and omissions, as explained above, were the substantial cause of Plaintiffs’ damages. (Opp., 19:18-23; 20:1-2.)

 

Due to the court’s finding that disputed material facts exists in the previous two causes of action, the issue remains for Plaintiffs’ cause of action for private nuisance.

 

As such, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is denied.

 

Conclusion

 

Defendant County of Los Angeles’ Motion For Summary Adjudication is DENIED in full.