Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 23STCV20938, Date: 2025-04-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 23STCV20938, Date: 2025-04-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV20938 Hearing Date: April 16, 2025 Dept: 34

Plaintiff Juana Silva’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part. Fees and costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the reduced amount of $48,557.15.

Background

On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff Juana Silva (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging causes of action for:

1. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act;

2. Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Act;

3. Fraudulent Concealment; and

4. Violation of Civil Code Section §1750 et seq. (Consumers Legal Remedies Act).

On January 12, 2024, the court overruled Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint and denied Defendant’s Motion to Strike.

On January 19, 2024, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.

On December 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement.

On February 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Attorney’s Fees. On April 3, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition. On April 9, 2024 Plaintiff filed a reply.

Legal Standard

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)

Discussion

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff moves the court to award $68,382.02, which is comprised of $56,382.50 in attorney’s fees, $3,542.15 in costs, and $8,457.37 in a 0.15 lodestar multiplier. (Motion, at pp. 1-2.)

In opposition, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonably incurred attorney’s fees. (Opp., at p. 1.) However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s requested fees and costs should be substantially reduced. (Ibid.)

2. Authority for Fees & Prevailing Party

a. Legal Standard

Attorneys’ fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).) In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)

Section 1794 provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794.)

Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard. The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.)

b. Discussion

On November 22, 2024, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s Section 998 Offer to Compromise. (Barry Decl., Exh. 3.) Plaintiff contends that the express terms of the settlement agreement and Civil Code section 1794 entitle Plaintiff to recover her attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party in this action. (Motion, at pp. 4-5.)

Defendant appears to concede that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Opp., at pp. 5-6.)

As such, Plaintiff is a prevailing party and is entitled to recover her attorney’s fees and costs under the settlement agreement and section 1794(d).

3. Method of Calculation for Fees

a. Legal Standard

In determining a reasonable attorney fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)

b. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the lodestar adjustment method should be used to calculate the award for attorney’s fees. (Motion, at p. 5.)

Defendant does not dispute this or propose a different method.

The court uses the lodestar adjustment method to calculate fees.

4. Reasonableness of the Fees Claimed

a. Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates

i. Legal Standard

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437, citations omitted.)

ii. Discussion

Plaintiff’s counsel claims the following hourly rates: (1) $675.00 per hour for Counsel David N. Barry; (2) $500.00 per hour for Counsel Debora Rabieian; (3) $400.00 per hour for Counsel Logan G. Pascal; and (4) $350.00 per hour for Counsel Brian J. Kim. (Motion, at p. 17.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to meet its burden to establish the reasonableness of their hourly rate. (Opp., at pp. 12-14.) Defendant contends that counsel’s time has been billed at their current hourly rates rather than the rates charged at the time the work was performed. (Ibid.)

After considering the information provided, the court finds that the appropriate hourly rate for (1) Counsel David N. Barry is $550.00 per hour; (2) Counsel Debora Rabieian is $400.00 per hour; (3) Counsel Logan G. Pascal is $300.00 per hour; and (4) Counsel Brian J. Kim is $200.00.

b. Reasonableness of the Number of Hours

i. Legal Standard

“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances¿of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to¿the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [cleaned up].)

ii. Discussion

Plaintiff’s counsel claims the following hours were incurred: (1) 23.10 hours by Counsel David N. Barry; (2) 77.70 hours by Counsel Debora Rabieian; (3) 1.70 hours by Counsel Logan G. Pascal; and (4) 3.60 hours by Counsel Brian J. Kim. (Motion, at p. 17.)

The declaration and billing records provided by Plaintiff’s counsel are sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on 106.10 hours Counsel spent litigating this case through the instant motion. (Berry Decl., ¶ 15, Exhs. 4, 6.) The fees incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing records submitted to this court. Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case. Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $45,015.00 for 106.10 hours at the hourly rates established above.

c. Reasonableness of Multiplier

i. Legal Standard

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

ii. Discussion

Plaintiff requests that a multiplier of 0.15 be applied to the combined lodestar for an additional $8,457.37 in recovery. (Motion, at pp. 8-9.) Plaintiff argues that as counsel was able to obtain an exceptional result despite Defendant’s efforts to obstruct litigation, a multiplier is warranted. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that there is no basis to award a multiplier as this case did not present any difficult issues. (Opp., at pp. 10-12.)

The court denies Plaintiff’s request for a 0.15 lodestar multiplier. Given the routine work done in this case and the results obtained, a multiplier is not appropriate. The contingent risks, preclusion of other work, skill, and difficulty counsel assert are absorbed by counsel’s hourly rates. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.) As such, any contingency risk factor is already accounted for in the hourly rates.

5. Reasonableness of the Costs Claimed

Plaintiff lists $3,542.15 in costs and expenses incurred in litigating this matter. (Motion, at pp. 16-17; Barry Decl., Exh. 6.) Plaintiff argues that section 1794(d) entitles Plaintiff to recover all of the expenses that were reasonably incurred in prosecuting the case. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that costs should be reduced by $2,525.28 as Plaintiff seeks to recover costs that are not actually or reasonably incurred. (Opp., at p. 15.)

The court notes that as a prevailing party, Plaintiff can obtain costs pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d). Thus, the court finds that these costs are reasonable and allowable under at least one of the cost statutes.

The court will award $3,542.15 in costs and expenses.

Conclusion

Plaintiff Juana Silva’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part. Fees and costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the reduced amount of $48,557.15.

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