Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24PSCV00032, Date: 2024-07-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV00032    Hearing Date: July 11, 2024    Dept: K

1.         Defendant AltaMed Health Services Corporation’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is summarily GRANTED in part (i.e., as to the fifth, sixth and tenth causes of action) and otherwise DENIED in part (i.e., as to the eighth and ninth causes of action).

2.         Defendant AltaMed Health Services Corporation’s Motion to Strike is DENIED as MOOT.

Background    

Plaintiff Socorro Alegria (“Plaintiff”) alleges as follows: Plaintiff was sexually assaulted during her March 22, 2023 medical imaging appointment.

On January 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against AltaMed Health Services Corporation (“AltaMed”), Jose Luis Sanchez and Does 1-20 for:

1.               Negligent Hiring Retention, Supervision and Failure to Terminate (v. AltaMed only)

2.               Common Law Assault (v. Sanchez only)

3.               Common Law Battery (v. Sanchez only)

4.               Sexual Battery in Violation of Civil Code § 1708.5 (v. Sanchez only)

5.               Violation of Civil Code § 51.7

6.               Sexual Harassment in Violation of Civil Code § 51.9

7.               Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (v. Sanchez only)

8.               Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

9.               Negligence (v. AltaMed only)

10.            Violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act

A Case Management Conference is set for July 11, 2024.

1.         Judgment on the Pleadings

Legal Standard

The rules governing demurrers are generally applicable to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999; Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d) [“The grounds for motion. . . shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Where the motion is based on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. . ., the matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit”].)

A motion by a plaintiff may only be made on the grounds “that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).) A motion by a defendant may only be made on the grounds that (1) “[t]he court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint” or (2) “[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c).)

Although a nonstatutory motion “may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself” (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650 [quotation marks and citation omitted]), a statutory motion cannot be made after entry of a pretrial conference order or 30 days before the initial trial date, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (e).)

Discussion

AltaMed moves the court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 438, for judgment on the pleadings as to the fifth, sixth, and eighth through tenth (i.e., for Violation of Civil Code § 51.7, Sexual Harassment in Violation of Civil Code § 51.9, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligence and Violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, respectively) causes of action in Plaintiff’s complaint, on the basis that they each fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action.

At the outset, Plaintiff represents that she agrees to dismiss her fifth, sixth and tenth causes of action, without prejudice (Opp., 1:26-2:2); accordingly, in the event a “Request for Dismissal” is not on file by the time of the hearing, the court will summarily grant the motion in this regard.

The court’s following analysis, then, is limited to Plaintiff’s eighth and ninth causes of action, for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligence, respectively:

AltaMed asserts that these causes of action fail because it cannot be held vicariously liable for an alleged sexual assault by its employee. “[A]n employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment.” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296.) However, “[a]n employer will not be held liable for an assault or other intentional tort that did not have a causal nexus to the employee's work.” (Id. at 297).

The court construes Plaintiff’s eighth and ninth causes of action as sounding in direct negligence, rather than vicarious liability. Further, while AltaMed contends that these causes of action are “surplusage,” this argument was raised for the first time in the reply; as such, it is disregarded. The motion is denied in this regard.

2.         Motion to Strike

AltaMed moves the court for an order striking out the following language from Plaintiff’s complaint:

1.               Page 12, paragraph 68, lines 6-12;

2.               Page 13, paragraph 79, lines 9-15;

3.               Page 16, paragraph 102, lines 18-24;

4.               Page 17, paragraph 7, line 13;

5.               Page 17, paragraph 9, line 15;

6.               Page 17, paragraph 10, line 16.

AltaMed’s request is denied as moot. All of the allegations AltaMed seeks to have stricken pertain to the fifth, sixth and tenth causes of action, which Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss.