Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24PSCV00619, Date: 2024-07-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24PSCV00619 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: K
1. Defendants Maral Chorbajian’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED [see below].
2. Defendants Abraham Chorbajian’s, Eli Chorbajian’s and Maral Chorbajian’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
Background
Legal Standard
A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading, inter alia, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) “[A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].)
Discussion
Abraham, Eli and Maral (together, “the Chorbajians”) demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivision (e), to Plaintiff’s FAC, on the basis that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Mercury or Maral.
At the outset, the Chorbajians may not demur on behalf of Mercury, nor may Eli and Abraham demur on behalf of Maral. The court’s analysis is limited to Maral only as the moving party.
The demurrer is overruled. Maral argues that she is an improper party because she “is neither the driver nor the owner of the defendant’s vehicle.” (Motion, 2:13-15). Maral’s argument is extrinsic to the face of Plaintiff’s FAC. Plaintiff has identified Maral as a “defendant[] who operated a motor vehicle.” (FAC, ¶ MV-2).
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
Discussion
The Chorbajians move the court for an order striking out Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages (i.e., FAC, ¶ 14(a)(2).).
Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined as
“despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)
“Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment
of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the
defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or
otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)
A “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice. . .’” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)
Plaintiff’s FAC is devoid of any factual allegations whatsoever showing
that the Chorbajians’ conduct was malicious, oppressive and/or fraudulent to
support a claim for punitive damages. The motion is granted.