Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV04073, Date: 2024-09-13 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24STCV04073    Hearing Date: September 13, 2024    Dept: 34

Smith v. Yankee Hotel, et al. (24STCV04073)

1.         Defendants Single Room Occupancy Housing Corporation and Yankee Apartment LP’s Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action is GRANTED. The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.

2.         Defendants Single Room Occupancy Housing Corporation and Yankee Apartment LP’s is GRANTED. The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.

Background[1]  

Plaintiff Gregory Smith (“Plaintiff”) alleges as follows:

Defendants Yankee Hotel LP and Single Room Occupancy Housing Corporation (“Defendants”)  failed to properly repair and maintain Plaintiff’s residential unit located at 501 E. 7th Street, #213, Los Angeles, CA 90014 (“Subject Property”). The Subject Property was owned and/or managed by Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Property was uninhabitable due to water leaks, inoperable electrical outlets, and mold growth in his bathroom. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 21, 28.) He states he lived there from December 2019 until 2023, at which time he moved into another unit within the same building. (Compl., ¶¶ 8, 17.)

After approximately two (2) years of living in Unit 213, and when the mold growth was reported, Plaintiff allegedly “submitted multiple work orders to DEFENDANTS about the mold, but DEFENDANTS did not perform any mold remediation.” (Compl. ¶ 12.) Defendants allegedly received numerous complaints about the mold growth, yet allowed the uninhabitable condition to remain (Compl. ¶ 12, 14.)

Plaintiff further alleges that as a result of his frustrations from Defendants’ “refusal to remediate the mold at the Subject Property, and concerned for his health” Plaintiff contacted a mold specialist who recommended professional mold remediation, and that “[d]espite repeated notifications of the CONDITIONS, DEFENDANTS, refused to perform the necessary repairs and remediation, placing the health and safety of Plaintiff at risk.” (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 17.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants knew that failing to abate the mold growth in Plaintiff’s unit would cause Plaintiff to suffer humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional distress, and that this failure was unreasonable, reckless and with malicious disregard for Plaintiff’s mental and emotional wellbeing. (Compl. ¶ 47, 49 50.)

On February 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the following causes of action against Defendants:

1.               Breach of Contract

2.               Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability

3.               Nuisance

4.               Negligence

5.               Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

6.               Violation of California Civil Code section 1942.4

A Case Management Conference is set for September 13, 2024.

1.         Demurrer to SACC

Legal Standard

A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading, inter alia, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or are uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).)

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) “[A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].)

Discussion

Defendants demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), to the fifth cause of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint, on the basis it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and are uncertain.

Fifth Cause of Action (i.e., Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

A cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) requires proof of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual or proximate cause of the severe emotional distress.  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050; Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 878, 883 (“court may determine in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery”); Cross v. Bonded Adjustment Bureau (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 266, 283; and Alcorn v. Anbro Eng., Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499 (outrageous conduct is a fact question where reasonable minds may differ).) In order for conduct to be outrageous it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Christensen v. Sup.Ct. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)

Here, the court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged conduct “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Id.) The primary allegation for the IIED cause of action was that Defendants failed to abate the mold growth in the Subject Property. However, the allegations do not demonstrate that Defendants intended to inflict injury upon Plaintiff and the complaint does not allege that Defendants intentionally failed to remedy the mold growth in order to injure Plaintiff. Finally, Plaintiff also fails to allege the “high bar” that the emotional distress was of such “intensity and duration” as to constitute a cause of action for IIED. (Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d. 38, 51.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained.

2.         Motion to Strike Portions of SACC

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Discussion

Defendants move the court for an order striking out the following portions of the Complaint:

1.               Paragraph 38, in its entirety: “DEFENDANTS’ actions were oppressive and malicious within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code§ 3294 in that they have intentionally, and in conscious disregard for health and safety, subjected the PLAINTIFFS to cruel and unjust hardship by causing them to unreasonably live with the substandard and dangerous CONDITIONS at the SUBJECT PROPERTY thereby entitling the PLAINTIFFS to an award of punitive damages. DEFENDANTS’ actions constituting malice and oppression were authorized by an officer, director, or a managing agent of DEFENDANTS.”

2.               Paragraph 51, in its entirety: “DEFENDANTS’ actions were oppressive and malicious within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code§ 3294 in that they have intentionally, and in conscious disregard for health and safety, subjected the PLAINTIFFS to cruel and unjust hardship by causing them to unreasonably live with the substandard and dangerous CONDITIONS at the SUBJECT PROPERTY thereby entitling the PLAINTIFFS to an award of punitive damages. DEFENDANTS’ actions constituting malice and oppression were authorized by an officer, director, or a managing agent of DEFENDANTS.”

3.               At page 10, prayer for relief item “3” line 19, “For punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial.”

Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)

“Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

A “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice. . .’” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [emphasis added].)

Here, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met their burden. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants were cited for housing violations and failed to remediate the mold growth does not constitute conduct that is “vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched, or loathsome[.]” (American Airlines v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.th 1017, 1050-51.)

The motion is granted.