Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 24STCV04316, Date: 2024-09-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV04316, Date: 2024-09-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV04316 Hearing Date: September 5, 2024 Dept: 34

Joshua Dewey Stockton v. Los Angeles County (24STCV04316)

Defendant Los Angeles County’s Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED. The court will hear from the parties whether leave to amend is warranted.

Background

On February 21, 2024, Plaintiff Joshua Dewey Stockton (“Plaintiff”), in propria persona, filed an action against Defendant Los Angeles County (“Defendant” or “County”). Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on March 4, 2024. Subsequently, following stipulation by the parties, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on May 3, 2024, which is the operative pleading in this action. Plaintiff’s complaint arises from criminal proceedings brought against him in Los Angeles County and allegations that he sustained damages as a result of these proceedings.

On June 21, 2024, Defendant County filed a Demurrer to the Complaint. On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Demurrer, erroneously titled as Motion to Quash Opposition to Defendant’s Demurrer. Plaintiff filed another Opposition to Demurrer on August 26, 2024. On August 27, 2024, Defendant filed a Reply.

On July 1, August 1, and August 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the following Motions:

(1) Motion to Quash Opposition to Demurrer (as an Opposition to Defendant’s Demurrer);

(2) Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint;

(3) Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint;

(4) Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed on July 1, 2024;

(5) Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed on August 1, 2024;

(6) Motion for Sanctions;

(7) Motion to Compel Discovery;

(8) Motion for Mandatory Settlement Conference.

On August 21, 2024, Defendant filed oppositions to Plaintiff’s Motions. On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Quash Defendant’s Oppositions.

On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed several redundant “oppositions” to Defendant’s oppositions and replies.

Demurrer

A. Legal Standard

A demurrer is a pleading that may be used to test the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in the complaint. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) There are two types of demurrers – general demurrers and special demurrers. (See McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 77.)

General demurrers can be used to attack pleadings for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); McKenney, 167 Cal.App.4th at 77.) Such demurrers can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable; evidence or extrinsic matters are not considered. (Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the Court admits “all material facts properly pleaded” and “matters which may be judicially noticed,” but does not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation].” (Blank, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) It gives these facts “a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Ibid.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) "If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence." (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.)

Special demurrers can be used to attack the pleadings on grounds that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible, or in a contract case, for failure to allege whether a contract is oral or written. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so unclear that the responding party cannot reasonably determine what issues to admit or deny or what counts and claims are directed toward the responding party. (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695.)

Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

When a demurrer is sustained, the court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) When a plaintiff “has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Generally, the court will allow leave to amend on at least the first try, unless there is absolutely no possibility of overcoming the issue. (See Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227 ("Denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint shows on its face it is incapable of amendment. [Citation.] Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.").)

B. Meet and Confer

The court finds Counsel Megan Lieber’s Declaration detailing her attempts to meet and confer with Plaintiff regarding the instant Demurrer sufficient to satisfy the meet and confer requirement. (See Lieber Decl.)

C. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice of the following matters is GRANTED:

1. Exhibit A - Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BA482518 Minute Order dated November 15, 2019;

2. Exhibit B - Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BA482518 Minute Order dated August 11, 2021;

3. Exhibit C - Certified Transcript of Preliminary Hearing in Case No. BA482518 on August 11, 2021;

4. Exhibit D - Claim for Damages to Person or Property submitted by Plaintiff to County on August 23, 2023.

D. Analysis

a. Motion

Defendant demurs to the Second Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

First, Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution is barred because the County is immune from liability where the individual government employees would be immune from liability, pursuant to Government Code sections 815.2, subdivision (b). (Mot. pp. 5-6.) Given that any individual County employee, including a prosecutor, would be immune from liability caused by “instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceedings within the scope of employment,” the County is also immune from liability for claims alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. (Ibid.; Gov. Code § 821.6.) Defendant also argues that despite this immunity, the district attorney in the underlying criminal proceedings did not take any actions without probable cause as the Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge and proceed with trial. (Mot p. 6; RJN – Ex. B at p. 2, Ex. C at p. 39.)

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims for violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and claims for discrimination, bodily restraint in violation of California Civil Code section 43, and deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of California Civil Code section 52.3, are barred because they vary from the claims set forth in Plaintiff’s Notice of Claim. (Mot. pp. 6-8; Gov. Code § 910; RJN at Ex. D.) While the claim for malicious prosecution is presented in Plaintiff’s Government Claim, claims for violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as state law claims for discrimination, bodily restraint, and deprivation of constitutional rights are not part of the Government Claim. (Ibid.) Thus, all claims but the malicious prosecution claims should be dismissed with prejudice. (Ibid.)

Third, Plaintiff’s claims are so vague and ambiguous that Defendant cannot ascertain what is being alleged against it. (Mot p. 8.) The SAC contains very few factual allegations that identify what actions were taken by the County and how Plaintiff was harmed as a result. (Ibid.) Thus, the Court should sustain the Demurrer on the grounds of uncertainty. (Ibid.)

b. Opposition

Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the Demurrer, erroneously titled Motion to Quash Opposition to Defendant’s Demurrer. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has been thoroughly informed by the Plaintiff of the specific causes of action and “as a government administration, the defendant, Los Angeles County, should be construed as superior in legal assessments when discerning legal claims made against them” and thus, its lack of understanding of the complaint “is objectionable as an improper impeachment.” (Oppos. pp. 1-2, 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s reference to the criminal case is sufficient to make Defendant aware of what matters are at issue and to foresee the “result from making baseless accusations against the wrongfully incriminated.” (Id. at p. 2.) According to the doctrine of less particularly, because Defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, less particularity in the pleadings is sufficient. (Id. at pp. 9-10.) Finally, the exhibits filed by Defendant for Request for Judicial Notice contradict Defendant’s claim that the SAC is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible as Defendant is well aware of the circumstances of the criminal case. (Id. at p. 15.)

Moreover, Plaintiff argues that he has properly stated a cause of action for prosecutorial misconduct, as the SAC states that Defendant County violated state laws by “wrongly initiating and wrongfully maintaining that prosecution against Plaintiff Joshua Dewey Stockton.” (Oppos. p. 4; SAC p. 8.) Moreover, Defendant has plead sufficient facts for a malicious prosecution cause of action, as the SAC states that “damages to be remedied by this civil action began to accrue on November 14, 2019 and continued to accrue up to January 5, 2023 from the prosecution of plaintiff Joshua Stockton by defendant Los Angeles County in case BA482518.” (Oppos. p. 5; SAC p. 11.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not immune from liability because a public entity is liable for tortious acts committed by independent contractors in the employment of the public entity, pursuant to Government Code section 815.4. (Ibid.) Plaintiff also argues that he has pled sufficient facts to constitute causes of action for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, harassment, discrimination, excessive force, abuse of power, and assault and battery. (Oppos. pp. 6-7.)

Plaintiff also argues that governmental immunity is not grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10. (Oppos. pp. 9-11.) Moreover, the prosecutor in the instant case violated Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor and the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Legal Policies Manual, “Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information.” (Id. at pp. 12-13.)

Plaintiff also argues that the SAC does not fail due to uncertainty because it clearly states that the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office and the Los Angeles County Law Enforcement used special computer equipment and software to falsify, fabricate, and modify evidence. (Oppos. p. 13; SAC pp. 13-15.)

c. Reply

In its Reply, Defendant argues that immunity is a proper ground for a demurrer on the basis that Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 permits a demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Reply p. 1.) Here, any claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against County are barred as a result of the immunity provided by Government Code section 821.6. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) Other than stating that immunity is not properly raised in a demurrer, Plaintiff offers no explanation of why Defendant is not immune from its claims. (Id. at p. 3.) Given that the SAC explicitly states that Plaintiff is seeking damages caused by Defendant in prosecution of Plaintiff, these claims are precisely the types of claims that section 821.6 addresses. (Ibid.) Plaintiff also argues that Defendant is liable for the actions of the Los Angeles Police Department; however, the Los Angeles Police Department operates under the City of Los Angeles and Plaintiff cites no legal basis for his statement. (Ibid.)

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s additional causes of action, including prosecutorial misconduct, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, harassment, discrimination, excessive force, abuse of power, assault, and battery, are derivative of the malicious prosecution claim and are also barred by immunity. (Reply p. 4.) Defendant notes that it does not find that these claims are properly pled in the SAC. (Ibid.)

d. Analysis

Having reviewed the SAC, Demurrer, Opposition, and Reply, the Court makes the following findings.

Under California Rule of Court, Rule 2.112: “Each separately stated cause of action, count, or defense must specifically state: (1) [i]ts number…(2) [i]ts nature.” Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, subdivision (a)(1), states that a complaint “shall” contain a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” Although a court, “must look to the allegations in the body of the complaint to determine whether a set of alleged facts constitutes a cause of action,” there must be some indication of what cause of action and elements are being pleaded. (People ex rel. Feuer v. Superior Court (Cahuenga’s the Spot) (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1376.)

A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so unclear that the responding party cannot reasonably determine what issues to admit or deny or what counts and claims are directed toward the responding party. (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695.) However, “[a]s the leading practical treatise advises, failure to comply with rule 2.112 presumably renders a complaint subject to a motion to strike (Code of Civ. Proc., § 436), or a special demurrer for uncertainty.” (Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1014 (citing Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: CPBT (Rutter Group 2016), ¶6:113). Similarly, a pleading is subject to a demurrer for uncertainty, when it is unintelligible by “attempt[ing] to state numerous causes of action in a very loose and rambling manner without any attempt at separately stating them.” (Craig v. City of Los Angeles¿(1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 71, 73.)

Here, the SAC does not clearly set forth each separately stated cause of action and allegations in support of these claims. Instead, Plaintiff cites to numerous state and federal laws along with factual statements scattered throughout the SAC without any systematic organization. Given that the Court cannot discern what specific causes of action are being asserted against Defendant and the fact that Defendant itself is making assumptions regarding the pleadings, the Court finds that the pleadings are uncertain.

Accordingly, the Court sustains Defendant’s Demurrer as to the entire Second Amended Complaint with 20 days leave to amend.

The Court rules
as follows as to the motions filed by Plaintiff Joshua Dewey Stockton:

(1)
Motion to Quash Opposition to Demurrer (as an
Opposition to Defendant’s Demurrer) is PLACED OFF CALENDAR.

(2)
Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint is
PLACED OFF CALENDAR AS MOOT.

(3)
Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint is
PLACED OFF CALENDAR AS MOOT.

(4)
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is PLACED
OFF CALENDAR AS MOOT.

(5)
Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is
PLACED OFF CALENDAR AS MOOT.

(6)
Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.

(7)
Motion to Compel Discovery is DENIED;

(8)
Motion for Mandatory Settlement Conference is
DENIED without prejudice.

Background

On February
21, 2024, Plaintiff Joshua Dewey Stockton (“Plaintiff”), in propria persona, filed
an action against Defendant Los Angeles County (“Defendant” or “County”). Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
on March 4, 2024. Subsequently,
following stipulation by the parties, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”) on May 3, 2024, which is the operative pleading in this
action. Plaintiff’s complaint arises
from criminal proceedings brought against him in Los Angeles County and
allegations that he sustained damages as a result of these proceedings.

On June 21,
2024, Defendant County filed a Demurrer to the Complaint. On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an
opposition to the Demurrer, erroneously titled as Motion to Quash Opposition to
Defendant’s Demurrer. Plaintiff filed
another Opposition to Demurrer on August 26, 2024. On August 27, 2024, Defendant filed a Reply.

On July 1,
August 1, and August 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the following Motions:

(1)
Motion to Quash Opposition to Demurrer (as an
Opposition to Defendant’s Demurrer);

(2)
Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint;

(3)
Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint;

(4)
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed on July 1,
2024;

(5)
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed on August 1,
2024;

(6)
Motion for Sanctions;

(7)
Motion to Compel Discovery;

(8)
Motion for Mandatory Settlement Conference.

On August 21, 2024, Defendant filed
oppositions to Plaintiff’s Motions. On
the same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Quash Defendant’s Oppositions.

On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed
several redundant “oppositions” to Defendant’s oppositions and replies.

Motion to Quash Opposition
to Demurrer

On
July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Demurrer, erroneously titled
Motion to Quash Opposition to Defendant’s Demurrer. This is not an independent motion, but rather
a responsive brief, and the Court addressed this brief in its ruling on the
Demurrer.

Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Opposition to Demurrer is placed off calendar.

Motions to Strike First Amended
Complaint and Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff
moves to strike the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed on March 4, 2024,
and Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), filed on May 3, 2024.

In
opposition, Defendant argues that a motion to strike is not permitted in
response to the party’s own pleading and there is no purpose or value in
striking prior complaints.

First,
there is no need to strike the FAC as a SAC was filed on May 3, 2024, following
stipulation of the parties. Second, the
Court has sustained Defendant’s Demurrer to the SAC. Plaintiff does not present any legal basis or
explanation that would warrant striking the FAC or SAC.

Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motions to Strike the First and Second Amended Complaints are
placed off calendar as moot.

Motions for Leave to Amend
Complaint

Plaintiff
has filed two motions for leave to amend the complaint, on July 1 and on August
1, 2024. Given that the Court has
sustained Defendant’s Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint and will hearing
from the parties at the demurrer hearing whether leave to amend should be
granted, Plaintiff’s motions are rendered MOOT and placed off calendar.

Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff
seeks sanctions against Defendant for the arguments presented in the
Demurrer. Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that it is entitled to sanctions as a result of Defendant’s improper use of a
demurrer to assert immunity to Plaintiff’s claims.

In
opposition, Defendant argues that sanctions are not warranted as Code of Civil
Procedure section 430.10 permits a demurrer for failure to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
A defense, such as governmental immunity, may be raised to show that the
facts are insufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is not
entitled to reimbursement of costs for preparing the motion as he is a
self-represented party and has not provided any proof of costs incurred.

The court
finds that Plaintiff has not presented any legal basis for seeking sanctions
against a party on the ground that the party asserted certain arguments in a
demurrer. Moreover, a government entity may
present the defense of immunity to show that the allegations in the complaint
are insufficient to constitute a cause of action, pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).

Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.

Motion to Compel Discovery

Plaintiff
moves for a court order compelling Defendant to produce the following
documents: court records and transcripts from cases BA433307, BA433875, and
BA482518, dated May 8, 2019 to August 19, 2022.

Defendant
opposes the Motion on the grounds that Plaintiff never submitted a formal
request to the County for these records, thus, the Motion is premature and
procedurally inappropriate. Moreover,
the requested records are available to the public and it would be equally
burdensome for County to obtain these records.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Motion constitutes misuse of the
discovery process and County will be compelled to pursue sanctions for any
further misuse of the discovery process.

The
court finds that Plaintiff has not presented any legal authority for the relief
it seeks or shown that it has attempted to propound this discovery request on
Defendant prior to filing the instant Motion.

Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery is DENIED.

Motion for Mandatory
Settlement Conference

Plaintiff
moves for a mandatory settlement conference pursuant to California Rules of
Court, Rule 3.1380, subdivision (a).
Plaintiff states that he does not wish to waste the Court’s time and
resources with a lengthy trial and instead, hopes to resolve the matter through
a settlement conference.

In
opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request is grossly premature as
the pleadings have not been finalized, a demurrer is set for hearing, and the
parties have not conducted any discovery.
Defendant argues that Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.245 states
that a mandatory settlement conference “shall be scheduled a sufficient time
after the exchange of appraisals to allow the parties to conduct expert
depositions and engage in settlement discussions.” The parties cannot engage in good faith
settlement discussions and address the issues in dispute at this stage in the
proceedings.

Given
that the court has sustained Defendant’s Demurrer to the SAC and no discovery
has taken place, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion is premature.

Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Mandatory Settlement Conference is DENIED without
prejudice.