Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 24STCV04917, Date: 2025-02-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV04917, Date: 2025-02-11 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24STCV04917 Hearing Date: February 11, 2025 Dept: 34

Plaintiff Gabriel Alejandro Lugo Molina’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part. Fees and costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the reduced amount of $30,830.68.

Background

On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff Gabriel Alejandro Lugo Molina (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Kia America, Inc. and Car Pros Kia Glendale (“Defendants”) arising from violations of the Song-Beverly Act alleging causes of action for:

1. Violation of The Song-Beverly Act – Breach Of Express Warranty;

2. Violation of The Song-Beverly Act – Breach Of Implied Warranty;

3. Violation of The Song- Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b); and

4. Violation of The Song- Beverly Act Section 1796.5.

On March 19, 2024, Defendant Kia America Inc. filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.

On April 15, 2024, Defendant Car Pros Kia Glendale filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.

On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Conditional Settlement between the parties.

On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Memorandum of Costs. On January 29, 2025, Defendants filed an opposition. On February 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply.

Legal Standard

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)

Discussion

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff moves the court to award him $44,005.68, which is comprised of $42,285.00 in attorney’s fees, and $1,720.68 in costs pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement between the parties. (Motion, at p. 2.)

In opposition, Defendants concede that Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs but argues that the requested fee amount is unreasonable as the case settled before trial. (Opp., at p. 1.)

2. Authority for Fees & Prevailing Party

a. Legal Standard

Attorneys’ fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).) In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)

Section 1794 provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794.)

Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard. The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.)

b. Discussion

On September 30, 2024, the court received Plaintiff’s Notice of Settlement between the parties. Plaintiff contends that the express terms of the settlement agreement and Civil Code section 1794(d) entitled Plaintiff to recover his attorney’s fees and costs. (Motion, at pp. 4-6.)

Defendants appear to concede that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Opp., at p. 1.)

As such, Plaintiff is a prevailing party and is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs under the settlement agreement and section 1794(d).

3. Method of Calculation for Fees

a. Legal Standard

In determining a reasonable attorney fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)

b. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the lodestar adjustment method should be used to calculate the award for attorney’s fees. (Motion, at p. 7.)

Defendants do not dispute this or propose a different method.

The court uses the lodestar adjustment method to calculate fees.

4. Reasonableness of the Fees Claimed

a. Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates

i. Legal Standard

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437, citations omitted.)

ii. Discussion

Plaintiff’s counsel claims the following hourly rates: (1) $695.00 per hour for Counsel Michael Saeedian; (2) $695.00 per hour for Counsel Courtney Perdue; (3) $525.00 per hour for Counsel Christopher Urner; (4) $350.00 per hour for Counsel Jorge L. Acosta; (5) $300.00 for Counsel Sergo Aivazov; and (6) $250.00 for Paralegal Wojciech Kowalczyk. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff contends that the hourly rates of Plaintiff’s counsel are in line with the Laffy Matrix justifying the rates requested by counsel. (Motion, at pp. 11-12.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that the hourly rates requested are unreasonable as Plaintiff’s counsel has provided no evidence as to the prevailing rate for attorneys conducting similar lemon law litigation. (Opp., at p. 5.) Defendants also argue that the Laffey Matrix has no relevance to California lemon law cases. (Ibid.) Defendants request that the court sets a blended hourly rate of no more than $300.00 per hour for all of Plaintiff’s counsel. (Id., at p. 6.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that the requested hourly rates are reasonable and support the work performed in this case and the same hourly rates charged in this case have been recently awarded in full in many recent Los Angeles Song-Beverly cases. (Reply, at pp. 8-9.)

After considering the information provided, the court finds that the appropriate hourly rate for (1) Counsel Michael Saeedian is $500.00 per hour; (2) Counsel Courtney Perdue is $500.00 per hour; (3) Counsel Christopher Urner is $400.00 per hour; (4) Counsel Jorge L. Acosta is $200.00; and (5) Counsel Sergo Aivazov is $200.00. Furthermore, the court finds that attorney’s fees should not be awarded for services provided by Paralegal Wojciech Kowalczyk. (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312.)

b. Reasonableness of the Number of Hours

i. Legal Standard

“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances¿of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to¿the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [cleaned up].)

ii. Discussion

Plaintiff’s counsel claims the following hours were incurred: (1) 1.10 hours by Counsel Michael Saeedian; (2) 16.60 hours by Counsel Courtney Perdue; (3) 35.60 hours by Counsel Christopher Urner; (4) 26.40 hours by Counsel Jorge L. Acosta; (5) 3.70 hours by Counsel Sergo Aivazov; and (6) 2.60 hours by Paralegal Wojciech Kowalczyk. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 22.)

The declaration and billing records provided by Plaintiff’s counsel are sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on 86 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent litigating this case through the instant motion. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 22, Exh, A.) The fees incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing records submitted to this court. Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case. Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

However, the court will not grant attorney’s fees on 2.60 hours spent as the court finds that attorney’s fees should not be awarded for services provided by Paralegal Wojciech Kowalczyk. (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312.)

Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $29,110.00 for 83.40 hours at the hourly rates established above.

5. Reasonableness of the Costs Claimed

Plaintiff lists $1,720.68 in costs and expenses as seen evidenced in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs. (Memorandum of Costs, at p. 1.)

Defendants do not oppose the reasonableness of these costs.

The court notes that as a prevailing party, Plaintiff can obtain costs pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d). Accordingly, the court finds that these costs are reasonable and allowable under at least one of the cost statutes.

The court will award $1,720.68 in costs and expenses.

Conclusion