Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV11548, Date: 2024-09-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV11548    Hearing Date: September 24, 2024    Dept: 34

Erica Arias, et al. v. Hector Rodriguez, et al. (24STCV11548)

Defendants Hector Rodriguez and Maria J. Oaks’ Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED in part as to Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action; and OVERRULED in part as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action. The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Erica Arias and Michael Arias (“Plaintiffs”) allege as follows:

On May 30, 2013, Esperanza Rodriguez (“Decedent”) executed the Esperanza Rodriguez Living Trust (“Trust”), a pour-over will, and a quitclaim deed which transferred her property located at 600 W. 9^th street, #1006, Los Angeles, California 90015 (“Property”) into the Trust which was recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder on June 21, 2023.

On February 21, 2018, Decedent executed a grant deed that transferred the Property out of her Trust and into her individual name which was recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder on April 4, 2018.

During Decedents lifetime, Decedent had a close relationship with her nephew, Sergio Rodriguez (“Sergio”), who was a physician. As a result, Decedent expected that Sergio provided caregiving services to her as she became older and required assistance. Nevertheless, Sergio never provided any caregiving services when Decedent later required them.

In November 2018, Decedent began to require caregiving services. Due to Sergio’s unavailability, Plaintiffs and Decedent entered into an oral contract whereby Plaintiffs would provide the necessary caregiving services and in exchange Decedent would give Plaintiffs the Property, unless Sergio took over the caregiving as Decedent hoped he would.

As a result, Plaintiffs provided caregiving services to Decedent until her death on February 23, 2023. Plaintiffs provided in-home care to Decedent which included taking care of Decedent, providing assistance with her daily tasks, and maintaining the Property. Plaintiffs also drove Decedent to medical appointment and to any necessary shopping. In all, Plaintiffs provided an average of seventy-five hours of caregiving services to Decedent per month for a total of 3,900 hours. Additionally, Plaintiffs used their own personal funds to make purchases for Decedent’s necessities. Throughout this time, Decedent repeatedly told Plaintiffs that they would receive the Property if Sergio did not help.

Plaintiffs relied on Decedent’s oral agreement to grant them her home in exchange for their assistance. As such, on July 21, 2022, Decedent handwrote a document in Spanish memorializing her intent and the terms of her oral agreement with Plaintiffs.

After Decedent’s death, Defendants Hector Rodriguez and Maria J. Oaks (“Defendants”) were named co-executors of Decedent’s estate and succeeded Decedent as successor co-trustees of the Trust. Letters Testamentary were issues to Defendants on February 29, 2024.

On February 21, 2024, Plaintiffs served an amended creditor’s claim on Defendants to preserve their rights. Defendants rejected Plaintiffs’ amended creditor’s claim on February 26, 2024.

On May 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint asserting the following causes of action against Defendants and Does 1-10:

1.           Breach of Contract; and

2.           Common Counts – Services Rendered.

On June 28, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting the following causes of action against Defendants and Does 1-10:

1.           Breach of Contract;

2.           Promissory Estoppel; and

3.           Common Counts – Services Rendered.

On August 23, 2024, Defendants filed this Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ FAC. On September 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ Demurrer. On September 17, 2024, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

DISCUSSION

Defendants demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), to all causes of action in Plaintiffs’ FAC, on the basis that they each fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendants also demur, per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), to all causes of action on the basis that they are uncertain for failure to provide legal authority.

First Cause of Action (Breach of Contract)

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) 

Plaintiffs allege that Decedent and Plaintiffs entered into an oral agreement where Plaintiffs would provide the necessary caregiving services to Decedent. (FAC, ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs allege that, in return, Decedent would compensate Plaintiffs by giving them her Property. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege that such agreement was then memorialized by Decedent in a handwritten document which provides in relevant part as follows:

1.- Sergio Rodriguez to give me the necessary care or 100% percent for my health and personal care that he promised in the Trust.

2.- If Sergio does not comply, I give Erica and Michael Arias The Power of Attorney to sell the condominium

3.- Pay Sergio the money he invested in the condominium with an adequate interest rate.

4.- After paying Sergio if there are any acquired expenses Erica and Michael Aria can keep the money left over from the sale.

            No Nursery Home Erica remember.

(FAC, Exh. E.)

Plaintiffs allege that Sergio failed to provide any care to Decedent and that Sergio did not invest any money into Decedent’s Property. (FAC, ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs allege that due to Sergio’s failure to provide care to Decedent, in reliance of their oral agreement with Decedent, and at Decedent’s request, Plaintiffs spent a substantial amount of time caring for Decedent and used their personal funds to make purchases for Decedent. (Id., ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, as successors in interest to Decedent, have breached the oral agreement between Plaintiffs and Decedent by failing to transfer title to the Property to Plaintiffs or sell the Property and distribute the proceeds. (Id., ¶ 25.) As such, Plaintiffs allege that they have been harmed in an approximate amount of $600,000.00 which is believed to be the equity in the Property. (Id., ¶ 26.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of contract is uncertain making it subject to a demurrer since (1) the statute of frauds bars oral contracts regarding the transfer of real property, and (2) Decedent’s handwritten note is not a contract. (Dem., 7:4-9.) Defendants argue that since Decedent is no longer able to testify regarding the existence or terms of an oral contract, there is not much to prevent Plaintiffs from falsely claiming that a contract exists. (Id., 8:6-13.) Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not describe the details surrounding the execution of their oral contract with Decedent in their FAC making it unlikely that an oral contract actually exists. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, Defendants argue that even if an oral contract exists, it would be barred by the statute of frauds since it requires that contracts for the transfer of real property be in writing. (Ibid.) Additionally, Defendants argue that Decedent’s handwritten note is not a written contract since it lacks the essential elements required by California Civil Code section 1550 and those required for a contract involving the sale or purchase of land. (Id., 8:15-25.) Lastly, Defendants argue that Decedent intended her handwritten note to act as a power of attorney and not a contract for the transfer of her Property. (Id., 9:19-28.) Defendants argue, however, that the note is still invalid as a power of attorney since it is not notarized nor witnessed and even if valid during Decedent’s lifetime, it expired upon her death. (Ibid.; Id., 10:1-4.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their FAC alleges breach of oral contract under California law. (Opp., 5:25-28.) Plaintiffs contend that Decedent’s handwritten note shows that her intention was not to create a real estate contract but to give Plaintiffs the power of attorney to sell the Property and gave directions as to how the proceeds will be distributed. (Id., 6:1-7.) Plaintiffs also argue that they are not asserting in their FAC that Decedent’s handwritten note is a written contract but instead that an oral contract exists. (Id., 6:8-10.)

In reply, Defendants argue that the oral agreement Plaintiffs claim to exist is not enforceable because it is barred by the statute of frauds since one cannot transfer real property by means of an oral contract. (Rep., 3:11-23.) Defendants argue that since Plaintiffs cannot refute the statute of frauds requirement, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that an oral contract exists. (Ibid.) Additionally, Defendants highlight that Plaintiffs admit that Decedent’s handwritten note is not a contract, thus no written contract exists. (Id., 3:25-28.) Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have contended that Decedent’s handwritten note is not a contract but rather a “directive” to Plaintiffs authorizing them to sell the Property. (Id., 4:6-22.)

Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to assert a breach of contract cause of action. Plaintiffs allege that an oral contract exist between them and Decedent, but do not provide any supporting facts that showcase an oral agreement was actually created with Decedent.

Nevertheless, even if the court finds that Plaintiffs has alleged sufficient facts to assert that an oral contract exists, Plaintiffs failed to overcome the statute of frauds issue that comes with the oral contract involving Decedent’s Property. A contract coming within the statute of frauds is invalid unless it is memorialized by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged.¿(Cal. Civ. Code §1624; Secrest v. Security Nat. Mortg. Loan Trust 2002-2, (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 544, 552.) The statute of frauds applies to contracts for the sale the sale of real property, or for an interest therein. (Cal. Civ. Code §1624; Hall v. Wallace (1891) 88 Cal. 434.) Plaintiffs allege that Decedent and Plaintiffs entered into an oral agreement where Plaintiffs would provide the necessary caregiving services to Decedent, and, in return, Decedent would compensate Plaintiffs by giving them her Property. (FAC, ¶ 21.) As such, Plaintiffs did not address the presumption that their oral contract is invalid to allege sufficient facts to assert that contract exists for a breach of contract cause of action.

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Second Cause of Action (Promissory Estoppel)

“The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) the reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” (Flintco Pacific, Inc. v. TEC Management Consultants, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 727, 734, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) 

Plaintiffs allege that Decedent promised Plaintiffs that if they provided he with the caregiving services she required, Decedent would then give Plaintiffs the Property. (FAC, ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs allege that Decedent had a reasonable expectation that her promise would induce Plaintiffs to rely on that promise. (Id., ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs allege that they actually relied on Decedent’s promise to their own detriment and in exchange spent a significant amount of time and personal money to care for Decedent. (Id., ¶  30.) Plaintiffs allege that it would be unjust if Decedent’s promise is not enforced, and Defendants are not ordered to comply. (Id., ¶ 31.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for promissory estoppel is uncertain, and that Plaintiffs fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Dem., 3:7-10; 18-20.) Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ cause of action is subject to a demurrer since it is also barred by the statute of frauds. (Id., 7:10-11.) Defendants argue that promissory estoppel cannot be applied to enforce Decedent’s oral promise to Plaintiffs since it is unenforceable under the statute of frauds as it involves real property. (Id., 10:6-23.) Defendants also contend that since Decedent’s handwritten note is also not an enforceable contract, promissory estoppel does not apply to that promise. (Ibid.) Lastly, Defendants argue that even if Decedent’s handwritten note was a contract, it does not explicitly state that the Property be transferred to Plaintiffs as payment for their caregiving services. (Ibid.) Thus, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were not justified in relying on any of the alleged contracts with Decedent. (Ibid.) Defendants cite to Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935 arguing that “the Court of Appeal analyzed whether promissory estoppel theory could be applied to a breach of promise involving a contract for real property. In its analysis, the Court of Appeal noted that the statute of frauds applies to contracts and thus, the party claiming promissory estoppel has the affirmative duty of overcoming the statute of frauds requirement.” (Ibid.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs allege that their FAC contains all the necessary allegation to support a cause of action for promissory estoppel by outlining a promise from Decedent, reliance by Plaintiffs, justification for that reliance, and the injury to Plaintiffs. (Opp., 7:6-11.) Plaintiffs argue that Jones does not apply in the present case since Jones did not involve a demurrer and was instead an appeal of a dismissal of a motion for summary judgement. (Id., 7:11-22.)

In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to show that there was a promise from Decedent. Defendants argue that the terms of the promise are not clear since Plaintiffs allege that Decedent gave them the “directive” to sell the Property in exchange for their caregiving services but also allege that Decedent intended to gift them the Property in exchange for their caregiving services. (Rep., 4:24-28.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs were not justified in relying on the alleged promise since Plaintiffs should have recognize that a transfer of real property must be in writing to be enforceable. (Id., 5:5-17.)

The court agrees with Defendants that it is unclear what Decedent’s promise was to Plaintiffs based off the facts alleged in the FAC. Thus, it is unclear to know whether Plaintiffs reliance was reasonable and foreseeable as required by the elements of promissory estoppel. As such, Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to support their cause of action for promissory estoppel.

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Third Cause of Action (Common Counts – Services Rendered)

The required elements of a common count claim are “(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment.” (Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460, citation and quotation marks omitted.) 

Plaintiffs allege that at Decedent’s request, Plaintiffs provided caregiving services to Decedent and used their own funds to make purchases for Decedent’s necessities. (FAC, ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs allege that they provided an average of 75 hours caregiving services to Decedent per month from November 2018 until Decedent’s death on February 23, 2023 for a total of 3,900 hours. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege that they were never paid for these services. (Id., ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs allege that at a reasonable and fair market value of $50.00 per hour, the reasonable value of Plaintiffs’ services to Decedent total $195,000.00. (Id., ¶ 35.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for common counts is uncertain, and that Plaintiffs fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Dem., 3:7-10; 22-25.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs common counts is not a cause of action since Plaintiffs cannot use a common counts claim to recover damages citing Weitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953) 40 Ca1.2d778, 793-794 and Zumbrun v. University of Southern California (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 14. (Id., 11:1-10.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs would recover double if they were to succeed d both on the legal theory and the common counts theory. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their FAC outlines the circumstances that give rise to their common counts claim also referred to as “quantum meruit.” (Opp., 9:1-7.) Plaintiffs argue that both Weitzenkorn and Zumbrun are factually dissimilar to the present case and thus do not support Defendants’ Demurrer. (Ibid.)

In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have pled a quantum meruit claim in their opposition but a common counts claim in their FAC which support Defendants’ argument that common counts is not a cause of action. (Rep., 5:19-28.)

This court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient fact to support their cause of action for common counts since Plaintiffs allege that they are indebted a total of $195,000.00 for Plaintiffs’ caregiving services to Decedent. Plaintiffs also allege the duties and expenditures that Decedent’s caregiving required from Plaintiffs. Lastly, Plaintiffs also allege that they have not received payment for the services rendered. All elements of a common count claim are sufficiently pled by Plaintiffs.  

The Demurrer is OVERRULED.

Lack of Authority

Defendants argue that this Demurrer should be sustained as to each cause of action since Plaintiffs fail to include any citation to statutory authority or case law for their cause of action. (Dem., 7:17-22.) Defendants argue that “[w]here no legal authority is provided, no legal relief can be provided.” (Ibid.)

Since Defendants do not provide any legal support for their contention that Plaintiffs’ lack of legal authority should sustain their Demurrer, the court will not consider Defendants’ argument.

CONCLUSION

Defendants Hector Rodriguez and Maria J. Oaks’ Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED in part as to Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action; and OVERRULED in part as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action. The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.