Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV13570, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24STCV13570    Hearing Date: October 9, 2024    Dept: 34

Defendant Sheila Turner’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff Deon Jones’ Complaint is GRANTED. The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted. 

Background

Plaintiff Deon Jones (“Plaintiff”) sustained injuries in a May 21, 2024 motor vehicle collision at the intersection of Western Avenue and Explosion Boulevard located in Los Angeles, CA 90018.

On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting a Motor Vehicle Negligence cause of action against Defendant Sheila Turner (“Defendant”) and Does 1-25.

On July 17, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint.

On August 6, 2024, Defendant filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendant’s Motion. As of September 30, 2024, no opposition has been filed by Plaintiff.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Discussion

Defendant moves the court for an order striking out the following portions of Plaintiff’s complaint:

1.               Pages 4-5, Paragraph 17, Lines 28-3 (i.e., “The acts of defendants were willful, reckless, malicious and done with the intent to injure plaintiff, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages in the amount sufficient to punish them, against each of the defendants.”

2.               Page 5, Prayer for Relief, Item 8, Line 16 (i.e, “Puntive and exemplary damages, according to proof[.]”

Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)

“Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

A “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice. . .’” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to include factual allegations demonstrating any malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct by Defendant that would give rise to an award of punitive damages. (Motion to Strike, 3:15-21.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff has only alleged the negligence of Defendant but nevertheless seeks punitive damages. (Id., 6:6-8.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff bases his request for punitive damages on conclusory allegations as seen in paragraph 17 of the complaint:

The acts of defendants were willful, reckless, malicious and done with the intent to injure plaintiff, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages in the amount sufficient to punish them, against each of the defendants.

(Complaint, ¶17.)

Defendant further argues that an alleged car accident alone without specific facts of outrageous conduct cannot support the awarding of punitive damages. (Motion to Strike, 6:21-26.)

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Defendant’s Motion.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant drove her vehicle in a negligent manner as to cause the vehicle collision and Plaintiff’s injuries. (Complaint, ¶9.) As argued by Defendant, Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant acts were willful, reckless, and malicious in paragraph 17 of his complaint. There are no additional facts alleged that demonstrate what conduct would showcase punitive damages should be awarded. Plaintiff’s conclusory characterization that Defendant’s conduct was willful, reckless, and malicious is insufficient to support his claim for punitive damages.

Conclusion

Defendant Sheila Turner’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff Deon Jones’ Complaint is GRANTED. The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.