Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV15575, Date: 2025-02-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV15575 Hearing Date: February 5, 2025 Dept: 34
Specially Appearing Defendant
Kent Security Services, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Service is CONTINUED ninety (90)
days.
Background
On
June 21, 2024, Plaintiff Bianca Pulliam (“Plaintiff”) filed a PAGA
Representative Action complaint against Defendants Kent Security Services, Inc.
and Kent Security of California, Inc. (“Defendant”).
On December
23, 2024, Defendant Kent Security Services, Inc. (“KSS”) filed this Motion to
Quash Service and an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff
filed an opposition. On January 29, 2025, KSS filed a reply.
Legal Standard
“A defendant, on or before the last day
of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for
good cause allow, may service and file a notice of motion . . . [t]o quash
service of summons[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.10(a).) Generally, a responsive
pleading is due within thirty days after service of the complaint. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 412.20(a)(3).) “A defendant, . . . may serve and file a notice of
motion…to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
court over him or her.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §¿418.10(a)(1).)
Discussion
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff’s
request for judicial notice is granted. Judicial notice may be taken of
“[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are
capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of
reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (c) and (h).) This
court may also take judicial notice of the records of any court of record of
the United States. (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (d).)
Evidentiary Objections
KSS’s evidentiary objections
are overruled.
Personal Jurisdiction
KSS moves to quash service of
Plaintiff’s summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Motion,
at p. 1.)
“California courts may
exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitutions
of California and the United States. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)” (Pavlovich
v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268.) “The exercise of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with these Constitutions ‘if
the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of
jurisdiction does not violate “‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“Personal jurisdiction
may be either general or specific.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at pp. 268-269.) An
individual is subject to general jurisdiction in the state of their domicile;
while for a corporation it is where it is “fairly regarded as home.” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 924.) This is where
the corporation’s contacts are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render
[the defendant] essentially at home in the forum state.” (Daimler AG v.
Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 139.) In Goodyear and Daimler AG, for corporations,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that general jurisdiction exists only in the
defendant’s (1) state of incorporation and (2) principal place of business. (Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 294; Daimler
AG, supra, 571 U.S at p. 137.)
KSS contends that no constitutional basis exists for the court to
exercise general personal jurisdiction over it as KSS is registered to do
business in Florida, does not maintain an agent for service of process in
California, does not maintain offices in California, and does not have a
business license or pay takes in California. (Motion, at p. 7.) Additionally, KSS
argues that Defendant Kent Security of California, Inc.’s (“KCA”) operations in
California cannot be imputed to KSS for purposes of personal jurisdiction as KCA
is not a subsidiary of KSS. (Id., at p. 8.)
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that KSS’s contacts in California are substantial,
continuous, and systematic as KSS maintains a website that directly references
its services in California and maintains an office in Los Angeles. (Opp., at p.
10.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues that KSS markets KCA’s services in
California and KSS recruits employees for KCA to work in California. (Id.,
at p. 11.) Lastly, Plaintiff argues that under the representative service
doctrine, general jurisdiction exists as KSS uses KCA to expand KSS’s
marketplace into California. (Ibid.)
The court finds that Plaintiff has not presented evidence to
demonstrate that general jurisdiction of KSS exists as KSS’ state of
incorporation and its principal place of business is in Florida. (Neuman Decl.,
¶ 5; see Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 294; Daimler AG,
supra, 571 U.S at p. 137.)
The California Supreme Court has held that
three requirements must be met before specific jurisdiction may be exercised:
(a) defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum benefits, (b) the
controversy is related to or arises from defendant’s contacts with California,
and (c) the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and
substantial justice. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.) “A plaintiff opposing a
defendant’s motion to quash service has the burden of establishing factor Nos.
(1) (the defendant’s purposeful availment) and (2) (lawsuit relates to the
defendant’s contacts with state).” (People ex rel. Harris v. Native
Wholesale Supply Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 357, 362, citing Bridgestone
Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 767, 774].) “If the plaintiff
does so, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show factor No. (3), that
the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Ibid.)
KSS argues that it has not purposely availed
itself of the rights and protections of California as KSS operates its business
entirely out of Florida. (Motion, at p. 8.) KSS also argues that Plaintiff
cannot impute KCA’s contacts with California onto KSS to justify the court’s
specific jurisdiction over KSS as Plaintiff fails to establish a theory of
agency between Defendants. (Id., at p. 9.) KSS contends that KSS does
not exercise any control over KCA, and the success of KSS’ business does not
rely on KCA’s services as Defendants are two different entities. (Ibid.)
Additionally, KSS argues that there is no substantial link between KSS,
California, and the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. (Id., at p. 10.) KSS
contends that KSS never employed Plaintiff nor exercised control over
Plaintiff’s employment with KCA which is the basis for Plaintiff’s complaint. (Ibid.) Lastly,
KSS argues that exercising specific personal jurisdiction over KSS would not
comport with the notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Ibid.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that KSS had
contacts with California as KSS marketed services, recruited multiple
employees, and litigated in California for years. (Opp., at p. 12.) Additionally,
Plaintiff argues that KSS maintains a website that reference services in
California and maintains an office in Los Angeles. (Ibid.) Plaintiff
also contends that KSS provides contracts to employees in California, including
arbitration agreements. (Id.; RJN, Exh. C, F-G.) Plaintiff contends that
KSS’ corporate officers hold similar positions within KCA and work out of the
same corporate office in Florida. (Id., at p. 13.) Plaintiff also argues
that Plaintiff’s claims are substantially connected to KSS’ California contacts
in that Plaintiff’s causes of action result from the work she performed in
California and KSS solicits customers for those services, recruits employees,
and enters into employment contracts with individuals in California. (Ibid.)
Lastly, Plaintiff claims that exercising jurisdiction over KSS is reasonable. (Id.,
at p. 14.)
The court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to carry her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that KSS has sufficient contacts with California that relate to Plaintiff’s
claim to justify jurisdiction. Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to
establish that the alleged misconduct in the complaint is related to or arises
out of KSS’ contacts with California. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not explain
how this controversy relates to California when Plaintiff believed that she was
a KSS employee but does not show evidence supporting that contention. Previous
litigation in California involving KSS and employment contracts with others do
not establish a connection between KSS, California, and the claims made by
Plaintiff.
Jurisdictional
Discovery
“A plaintiff attempting
to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is entitled to an
opportunity to conduct discovery of the jurisdictional facts necessary to
sustain its burden of proof[.]” (Hardell v. Vanzyl (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 960, 975-976; Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 894.) This court has “discretion to continue the hearing on a
motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow
the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” (HealthMarkets,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) However, “In
order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery,
the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the
production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re
Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127)
Plaintiff argues that she
presented sufficient evidence to show that further discovery may lead to the
production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction. (Opp., at p. 14.)
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that discovery could show that KSS employed
Plaintiff. (Id., at p. 13.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that
Plaintiff will seek discovery regarding Defendants’ policies,
interlocking directors and officers, representations made by or about KSS and
KCA, services performed for one entity by the other, assistance provided by one
entity to the other, interactions and communications between employees of each
entity, ownership or use of trademarks or logos, involvement in collective
bargaining, the capitalization of the entities, intercompany financial
transactions, and the like which will allow Plaintiff to establish
jurisdiction. (Id., at p. 16.)
As
such, the court finds that Plaintiff’s evidence shows that targeted and focused discovery may
lead to production of evidence of admissible facts establishing jurisdiction.
Therefore, KSS’ motion to quash service of summons and complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction is continued for ninety (90) days to permit time to
conduct targeted and focused jurisdictional discovery. Supplemental opposition
and reply are to be filed on statutory time.
Conclusion
Specially
Appearing Defendant Kent Security Services, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Service is
CONTINUED ninety
(90) days.