Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV17197, Date: 2024-12-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV17197 Hearing Date: December 10, 2024 Dept: 34
1.
Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association’s Demurrer to Plaintiff
Benzeen, Inc’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED. Consequently, this action
is held in abeyance until the Related Case has concluded.
2.
Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association’s Motion to Strike
Portions of Plaintiff Benzeen, Inc’s First Amended Complaint is DENIED as moot.
Background
On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff Benzeen, Inc. (“Plaintiff”)
filed a complaint against Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association
(“Defendant”) and Does 1-100 arising from a dispute over real property located
at 3243 Iredell Lane, Studio City, CA 91604 alleging causes of action for:
1.
Wrongful Foreclosure;
2.
Vacate and Set Aside Foreclosure Sale; and
3.
Cancellation of Trustee’s Deed upon Sale.
On August 5,
2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging causes of
action for:
1.
Wrongful Foreclosure;
2.
Unfair Business Practices;
3.
Vacate and Set Aside Foreclosure Sale; and
4.
Cancellation of Trustee’s Deed upon Sale.
On September
26, 2024, the court found case 19STCV07167 (“Related Case”) related to the
present action.
On September
30, 2024, Defendant filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s FAC. On
November 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's motions. On
December 3, 2024, Defendant filed replies to Plaintiff's oppositions.
On September
30, 2024, Defendant also filed a Notice of Errata regarding its Request for
Judicial Notice in Support of its Demurrer and Motion to Strike.
1.
Demurrer
Legal Standard
“The
party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by
demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or
more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
When considering demurrers, courts
read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent
on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer
tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab,
Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)
As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or
implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where
a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a
reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court
that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC
(2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable
possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to
sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation
Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
Discussion
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant’s
Request for Judicial Notice is granted.
Plaintiff’s
Request for Judicial Notice is also granted.
Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff’s
evidentiary objections to Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice are
overruled.
Defendant’s
evidentiary objections to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice are also overruled.
Special Demurrer for Abatement
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(c)
Defendant
demurs to Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
430.10(c). (Demurrer, at p. 6.)
Code
of Civil Procedure section 430.10(c) provides that a demurrer may be brought on
grounds that “[t]here is another action pending between the same parties on the
same cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(c).) A plea in abatement
requires absolute identity of parties, causes of action, and remedies sought. (Plant
Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788.) Whether
the causes of action are identical involves a comparison of the facts alleged
which show the nature of the invasion of plaintiff’s primary right. (Bush v.
Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384.) A plea in abatement may
only be maintained where a judgment in the first action would be a complete bar
to the second action. (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224
Cal.App.3d at 787-88.)
“Where
a demurrer is sustained on the ground of another action pending, the proper
order is not a dismissal, but abatement of further proceedings pending
termination of the first action.” (Plant Insulation Co., supra,
224 Cal.App.3d at 788; Branson v. SunDiamond Growers (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 327, 335 n.2.)
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff seeks the same relief in its FAC as it did in the Related
Case. (Demurrer, at p. 7; Defendant’s RJN, Nos. 2, 4.) Defendant contends that
Plaintiff’s inclusion of an unfair business practice claim in the present FAC
seeking “restitution and disgorgement” does not change the analysis for
abatement as the claims seeks the same result of reversing the foreclosure and
restore title of the subject property to Plaintiff. (Demurrer, at p. 7.) Additionally,
Defendant argues that the determination of the Related Case will be preclusive
of the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s FAC as they are premised upon the same
primary rights. (Ibid.)
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that CCP section 430.10(c) does not apply as
different primary rights are involved in the present case in comparison to the
Related Case. (Opp., at p. 4.) Plaintiff relies on Bush v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1384, to argue that there is not another action
pending on the same causes of action because different primary rights and facts
are involved. (Opp., at p. 5.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that the Related Case
does not have any preclusive effect on Plaintiff’s FAC which makes abatement inapplicable.
(Ibid.)
In
reply, Defendant contends that Bush is inapposite as the Court of Appeal
determined that section 430.10(c) did not apply because one lawsuit was by an
injured party against physicians for medical malpractice, and the second
lawsuit was by the injured party, standing in the shoes of the insurance
company, against the physicians for indemnity. (Reply, at p. 5.) Defendant
further argues that Bush distinguished the “right to freedom from bodily
harm caused by negligence” (malpractice action) and the “right to freedom from
disproportionate liability for damages attributable to the negligence of
concurrent tortfeasors” (indemnity). (Ibid.) Thus, Defendant argues that
no distinction can be drawn here when comparing the Related Case with the
instant case in which Plaintiff asserts harms associated with an alleged
wrongful foreclosure. (Ibid.) As such, Defendant contends that the
primary right involved in this case is the same as the one in the Related Case which
are subject to section 430.10(c). (Ibid.)
There
are various formulations of what constitutes the “same cause of action” under
section 430.10. The Second District stated that the test is “whether a final
judgment in the first action could be pleaded in bar as a former adjudication.”
(Kamei v. Kumamoto (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 381, 384.) More recently, the
Third District stated that “the analysis focuses on identifying a primary right
of the plaintiff and the defendant's breach of a corresponding primary duty”
while simultaneously observing that the issue of what constitutes a single
cause of action is a “highly abstract formulation” that “no one really
understands.” (Pitts v. City of Sacramento (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 854,
856.) The First District put it simply: abatement of the second action is
appropriate when “the court determines there is another action pending raising
substantially the same issues between the same parties.” (Leadford v.
Leadford (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 571, 574.)
After
a review of the two judicially noticed first amended complaints, the court
finds that a side-by-side comparison demonstrates identicalness of the same
causes of action against Defendant. Plaintiff’s claims in the Related Case
arise from the same issues between the same parties. Plaintiff claims that the
subject was wrongfully foreclosed, and title was improperly granted over to
Defendant in both the Related Case and the instant action. Therefore, because Plaintiff’s
claims in the instant action are not distinctive from those asserted in the Related
case, a stay is necessary pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(c).
The
court need not reach Defendant’s additional demurring arguments.
2.
Motion to Strike
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time
in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out
all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws
of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a
motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from
any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437.)
Discussion
Defendant
seeks to strike the entirety of Plaintiff’s FAC on the grounds that it is a
sham pleading. (MTS, at p. 7.) In the alternative, Defendant seeks to strike:
(1) paragraphs 13, 15-16, 18, 22, 24, 25, 28, 35, and 43; (2) the first, third,
and fourth causes of action; and (3) prayer for relief paragraphs 1(b), 2(b),
and 7. (Id., at pp. 8-13.)
In
accordance with the court’s above ruling of abating the action until the
Related Case has concluded, the court denies Defendant’s Motion to Strike as
moot.
Conclusion
1.
Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association’s Demurrer to
Plaintiff Benzeen, Inc’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED. Consequently,
this action is held in abeyance until the Related Case has concluded.
2.
Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association’s Motion to Strike
Portions of Plaintiff Benzeen, Inc’s First Amended Complaint is DENIED as moot.