Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV18158, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV18158    Hearing Date: June 4, 2025    Dept: 34

1.     Defendants American Continental Bank and Lorinda Yang’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED.

2.     Defendants First General Bank, Jennifer Ku, and Cliff Hsu’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED.

The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.

Background

            On July 24, 2024, Plaintiffs U.S. Longton, Inc. and Dr. Ji Li (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants First General Bank, American Continental Bank, Chris Hsu, and Lorinda Yang arising from the foreclosure of the property located at 314 East Mission Road, San Gabriel, CA 91778 (“Subject Property”) alleging causes of action for:

1.           Quiet Title; and

2.           Constructive Trust.

On October 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants First General Bank, American Continental Bank, Cliff Hsu (erroneously sued as Chris Hsu), Lorinda Yang, and Jennifer Ku (“Defendants”).

On March 5, 2025, Defendants American Continental Bank and Lorinda Yang filed this Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ FAC. On March 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On March 26, 2025, Demurring Defendants filed a reply.

On April 11, 2025, Defendants First General Bank, Jennifer Ku, and Cliff Hsu filed this Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ FAC. On May 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition.[1] On May 28, 2025, Demurring Defendants filed a reply.

1.     Demurrer (Defendants American Continental Bank and Lorinda Yang)

Legal Standard

            “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

            When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pled or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Discussion

            Defendants American Continental Bank (“ACB”) and Lorinda Yang (“Yang) (collectively as “Moving Defendants”) demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 subdivisions (e) and (f), to the first and second causes of action in Plaintiffs’ FAC on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and that they are uncertain.

1^st Cause of Action – Quiet Title

            An action for quiet title seeks “to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a).) In an action for quiet title, Plaintiff must plead (1) “[a] description of the property that is the subject of the action,” specifically the location of tangible personal property and the legal description and street address or common designation of real property, (2) “[t]he title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title,” (3) “[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought,” (4) “[t]he date as of which the determination is sought,” and (5) “[a] prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) 

            Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege an actual claimed title to the Subject Property, the adverse claims of Defendants to the title of the Subject Property, a clear date upon which the determination is sought, and a prayer for the determination of his claims against the adverse claims. (Demurrer, at p. 7.) Moving Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ FAC is uncertain as Plaintiffs fail to clearly allege that Moving Defendants have an adverse claim to the title of the Subject Property. (Id., at p. 8.)

            In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Moving Defendants may not rely on material facts outside of the four corners of the FAC to demur against it. (Opp., at pp. 2-3.) Plaintiffs also argue that there are sufficient allegations to provide Moving Defendants with sufficient information regarding Plaintiffs’ claim for quiet title against them, citing multiple paragraphs. (Id., at pp. 3-4.) Plaintiffs contend that because their quiet title action seeks declaratory relief demanding the recission of the foreclosure proceedings and restoring title to Plaintiffs over the Subject Property, Moving Defendants’ demurrer should be overruled. (Id., at pp. 5-6.)

            Upon review of the FAC, the court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state facts sufficient to allege a quiet title cause of action against Moving Defendants. First, Plaintiffs fail to plead any of the necessary allegations, besides the address for the Subject Property. The lack of such vital facts is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs’ FAC merely alleges Defendants purported fraudulent behavior without distinction between them. (FAC, ¶¶ 29-32.) Clumping all Defendants together and failing to allege each element of a quiet title claim makes Plaintiffs’ FAC overly uncertain. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not provide any authority for the court to overlook the lack of facts against Moving Defendants solely because Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief.

            The demurrer is sustained.

2^nd Cause of Action – Constructive Trust

            Moving Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action arguing that a constructive trust is a remedy, not a cause of action. (Demurrer, at pp. 8-9.) Moving Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claim is fatally in uncertain. (Id., at p. 9.)

            Case law frequently treats a claim for a constructive trust as a standalone cause of action. (See Higgins v. Higgins¿(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 648, 659, fn. 2, citing Davies v. Krasna¿(1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 515; Day v. Greene¿(1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 411; Flores v. Arroyo¿(1961) 56 Cal.2d 492, 494; Olson v. Toy¿(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 818, 823.) “Three conditions must be shown to impose a constructive trust: (1) a specific, identifiable property interest, (2) the plaintiff's right to the property interest, and (3) the defendant's acquisition or detention of the property interest by some wrongful act.” (Higgins v. Higgins, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th, at p. 659.)

            As such, the court rejects Moving Defendants’ contention that imposition of a constructive trust is not an independent cause of action. Plaintiffs, however, fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust. (FAC, ¶¶ 33-37.) Plaintiffs have not alleged a specific identifiable property interest and their right to the property interest. Although Plaintiffs have alleged fraudulent behavior by Moving Defendants, this only meets a partial requirement for their claim. (Id., ¶¶ 12-14, 23-24.)

            The demurrer is sustained.

2.     Demurrer (Defendants First General Bank, Jennifer Ku, and Cliff Hsu)

Legal Standard

            See above.

Discussion

Request for Judicial Notice

            Moving Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted. Judicial notice may be taken of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (c) and (h).)

Merits

            Defendants First General Bank, Jennifer Ku, and Cliff Hsu ( “Moving Defendants”) demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 subdivisions (e), to the first and second causes of action in Plaintiffs’ FAC on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action.

            The court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action for quiet title and constructive trust against Moving Defendants for similar reasons as above.  Plaintiffs have not alleged the nature of their own title nor what title they claim. Plaintiffs have also not alleged what adverse claim each Defendant purportedly makes against the Subject Property nor the date as of which the determination is sought. As it stands, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim to quiet title with sufficient certainty as to each Moving Defendant. As to the constructive trust claim, Plaintiffs also fail to allege a specific identifiable property interest and their right to the property interest.

             The demurrer is sustained.

Conclusion

1.     Defendants American Continental Bank and Lorinda Yang’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED.

2.     Defendants First General Bank, Jennifer Ku, and Cliff Hsu’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED.

The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.