Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV19259, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV19259    Hearing Date: November 7, 2024    Dept: 34

Defendants CorVel Corporation, CorVel Healthcare Corporation, CorVel Enterprise Comp., Inc., and Joseph Rupp’s Motion to Transfer Venue is DENIED. 

Background

            On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff Ronda Cruz (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants CorVel Corporation, CorVel Healthcare Corporation, CorVel Enterprise Comp., Inc., and Joseph Rupp (“Defendants”) on causes of action arising from Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants for:

1.               FEHA Employment Discrimination (Gov. Code §12940(a));

2.               FEHA Failure to Accommodate (Gov. Code §12940(m));

3.               FEHA Failure to Engage in Interactive Process (Gov. Code §12940(n));

4.               FEHA Retaliation (Gov. Code §§12940(h)(m), 12945.2);

5.               FEHA Harassment (Gov. Code §12940(j));

6.               FEHA Failure to Prevent/Remedy Discrimination, Harassment and/or Retaliation (Gov. Code §12940(k));

7.               Whistleblower Retaliation (Lab. Code 98.6, 1102.5);

8.               Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy;

9.               Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and

10.            Defamation.

On September 30, 2024, Defendants filed individual answers to Plaintiff’s complaint.

On October 2, 2024, Defendants CorVel Healthcare Corporation and Joseph Rupp filed this Motion to Transfer Venue. On October 2, 2024, Defendants CorVel Corporation and CorVel Enterprise Comp., Inc. filed a joinder to this motion. On October 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion. As of October 31, 2024, Defendants have not filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition.

Legal Standard

“The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases: (a) When the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 397, subd. (a).)

Venue rules depend on whether an action is “transitory” or “local.” In transitory actions, namely actions whose main relief is personal and does not involve land, proper venue is generally “the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a); Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 483.) This general rule of venue is subject to exceptions (“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law”). (Ibid.)

Where the plaintiff alleges two or more causes of action or joins two or more defendants governed by different venue provisions, venue must be proper as to all causes of action. “In cases with mixed causes of action, a motion for change of venue must be granted on the entire complaint if the defendant is entitled to a change of venue on any one cause of action.” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d 477, 488.) However, there are cases in which this “mixed action” rule is not followed for public policy reasons, such as those involving FEHA claims. (Ibid.; Malloy v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 543, 555-57.)

Venue where the plaintiff has chosen to file the action is presumed proper. (Battaglia Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 309, 313-14.) The burden is on the moving party to defeat the plaintiff’s presumptively correct choice of court. (Ibid.) If venue is proper in more than one county, the defendant must show more than mere residence in another county. The moving defendant has the burden of “negating the propriety of venue as laid on all possible grounds.” (Karson Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 7, 8-9.)

Discussion

            Defendants move to transfer venue for this action to Orange County arguing that Plaintiff improperly filed this action in Los Angeles County. (Motion, at p. 2.) Defendants argue that under California Code of Civil Procedure section 395(a), the general rule of venue requires that an action must be tried in the county of Defendants’ residence. (Id., at p. 4.) As such, Defendants contend that Defendant CorVel Healthcare Corporation is headquartered and has a principal place of business in Orange County, Defendant Joseph Rupp resides in Orange County, Defendant CorVel Corporation is incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Fort Worth, Texas, and Defendant CorVel Enterprise Comp., Inc. is incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Irvine, California. (Rupp Decl., ¶¶ 3-4; McCormick Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) Defendants argue that since Defendants reside in Orange County, Orange County is the proper venue for this action. (Motion, at p. 5.)

Defendants also argue that in cases involving FEHA, such as here, venue is governed by Government Code section 12965(a)(4) which provides that venue is proper in any county in which: (1) the unlawful practices are alleged to have been committed, (2) the relevant records are maintained and administered, or (3) the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful practice, in addition to the county of Defendants’ residence or principal office. (Ibid.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has only worked in CorVel Healthcare Corporation’s headquarters in Irvine, California and all pertinent events related to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Orange County. (Ibid.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has never listed an address in Los Angeles County and the only connection to Los Angeles County in this matter is the small percentage of Plaintiff’s clients located there. (Ibid.; McCormick Decl., ¶ 5.)

Defendants argue that none of the documents relevant to this action are located in Los Angeles County. (Motion, at pp. 5-6.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff was a remote employee based out of Orange County. (Id., at p. 6.) Lastly, Defendants argue that the court has discretion to change venue where justice would be promoted by the change under section 12965(a)(4) which is warranted here since Defendant Joseph Rupp resides in Orange County. (Id., at p. 6; Rupp Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.)

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion is untimely since Defendants CorVel Corporation, CorVel Healthcare Corporation, and CorVel Enterprise Comp., Inc. were to file their answers, demurrers, or motions by September 12, 2024, but did not file their respective answers until September 30, 2024, waiving their ability to seek a change in venue. (Opp., at pp. 4-5.) Plaintiff also argues that section 12965 provides for Los Angeles County to be a venue since the unlawful practices alleged here occurred at least in part in Los Angeles as Plaintiff worked from Los Angeles County on a weekly basis before her termination, and Plaintiff would have continued working from Los Angeles if not for her wrongful termination. (Id., at p. 6; Cruz Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.) Plaintiff also argues that since FEHA’s special venue provision provides for a wide range of venues for Plaintiff to bring an action in a convenient forum, transferring this action to Orange County would be inappropriate as Plaintiff has chosen Los Angeles as the convenient forum of their choice. (Opp., at p. 8.)

            The court finds that Defendants failed to meet their burden of negating Los Angeles County as a proper venue for Plaintiff’s Labor Code and FEHA Claims. Plaintiff has presented grounds to allow this action to be litigated in Los Angeles County. Plaintiff declares to have worked in Los Angeles County. (Cruz Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.) Defendants do not dispute this, but instead argue that Plaintiff only had a small percentage of clients in Los Angeles County. (Motion, at p. 5; McCormick Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s claims could be filed, inter alia, “in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked . . . but for the alleged unlawful practice.” (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (a)(4).) As such, but for her termination, Plaintiff would have continued working from and in Los Angeles County. (See Malloy, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th, 556.)

Defendants’ other argument that trying the case in Orange County would promote justice since Defendant Joseph Rupp resides in Orange County also fails. The convenience of parties themselves and of the parties’ employees are not considered even if they are to testify because only the convenience of nonparty witnesses matters on a change of venue motion. (Wrin v. Ohlandt (1931) 213 Cal. 158, 160; Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 17.) Because there are no material witnesses whose convenience would be promoted by transferring this case to Orange County, the court denies Defendants’ motion.

The court further observes that Defendants’ motion was not timely. (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (a).)

Additionally, Defendants request attorney’s fees and costs for filing this motion. (Motion, pp. 8-9.) “In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (b).) The court declines to award Defendants any attorney’s fees and costs due to the court’s findings above.

Conclusion

Defendants CorVel Corporation, CorVel Healthcare Corporation, CorVel Enterprise Comp., Inc., and Joseph Rupp’s Motion to Transfer Venue is DENIED.