Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV19759, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV19759    Hearing Date: March 6, 2025    Dept: 34

 

1.     Defendant 1500 South Los Angeles Street, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED.

 

2.     Defendant 1500 South Los Angeles Street, LLC’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

 

3.     Defendant Continental Elevator Services, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part.

 

4.     Defendant Continental Elevator Services, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

 

5.     Defendant Terani Couture Corp.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

 

The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.

 

Background

 

            On August 6, 2024, Plaintiff Jeanette Holmes (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants 1500 South Los Angeles Street, LLC (“1500 South Los Angeles”), Terani Couture Corp. (“Terani Corp.”), Daryoush Tehrani (“Tehrani”), and Continental Elevator Services, Inc. (“Continental”) arising from Plaintiff’s injuries sustained while boarding an elevator alleging causes of action for:

 

1.               Negligence; and

2.               Product Liability.

 

On September 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against 1500 South Los Angeles, Terani Corp., Tehrani, Continental, and the City of Los Angeles (“City” and along with 1500 South Los Angeles, Terani Corp., Tehrani, and Continental as “Defendants”) alleging the same causes of action.

 

On November 15, 2024, 1500 South Los Angeles Street filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike to Plaintiff’s FAC. On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed oppositions. On January 8, 2025, 1500 filed replies. On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second opposition to 1500 South Los Angeles’ Demurrer. On February 24, 2025, 1500 South Los Angeles filed additional replies.[1]

 

On December 20, 2024, Continental filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike to Plaintiff’s FAC. On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Continental’s Motion to Strike. On February 27, 2025, Continental filed replies.

 

On January 29, 2025, Terani Corp. filed this Motion to Strike. On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On February 25, 2025, Terani filed a reply.

 

1.     Demurrer (1500 South Los Angeles Street, LLC)

 

Legal Standard

 

            “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

 

            When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pled or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

 

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

 

Discussion

 

            On March 16, 2024, Plaintiff was bartending for an event held at 1500 S. Los Angeles St., Los Angeles, California. (FAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that when she attempted to board the elevator found on the street level of the premises, the elevator door opened without an elevator car in the shaft causing Plaintiff to fall to the bottom. (Id., ¶ 16.)

 

            1500 South Los Angeles Street demurs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e), to the second cause of action in Plaintiff’s FAC for product liability, on the basis that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

 

            The elements of strict product liability are (1) products placed on the market; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the defect; (3) defect in the manufacture or design of the product, or failure to warn; (4) causation; and (5) injury. (Nelson v. Superior Court¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 689, 695.)

           

            1500 South Los Angeles Street argues that Plaintiff’s cause of action for strict product liability is not viable against it since it is not the manufacturer, distributor, or seller of the elevator involved. (Demurrer, at pp. 8-9.)

 

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC establish a basis for 1500 South Los Angeles Street’s liability on a common carrier theory as the landlord of the premises. (Opp., at p. 6.)  

            California’s strict products liability precedents have recognized “a bright-line legal distinction,” imposing liability only on those entities responsible for placing an injury-producing product into the stream of commerce. (Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 564, 576.) 

In Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185, the plaintiff was injured when she fell in a hotel bathtub. (Id., at 1189.) The Supreme Court of California concluded that it would be improper to impose strict liability on the hotel proprietor for injuries caused by an alleged defect in the hotel premises that the proprietor did not build or market. (Id., at 1188.) The Court further explained that “although many potentially defective products are used in hotel or restaurant setting, the mere circumstance that it was contemplated customers of these businesses would use the products ... or be benefited by them does not transform the owners of the business into the equivalent of retailers of the products. [Citation]” (Id., at pp. 1199-1200.) “The mere foreseeability of injury to users of a defective product was not sufficient justification for imposing strict liability outside the stream of commerce.” (O’Neil v. Crane Co., (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335, 349.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 1500 South Los Angeles Street, Terani Corp., and Continental “designed, manufactured, advertised, warranted, supplied, tested, rebuilt, repaired, distributed, and/or sold the malfunctioning elevator” located at the premises. (FAC, ¶ 25.) However, these allegations fail to establish that 1500 South Los Angeles Street falls within the category of “those entities responsible for placing an injury-producing product into the stream of commerce.” (Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 576.) It is clear that Plaintiff also alleges that 1500 South Los Angeles Street was the owner of the premises and elevator in the negligence cause of action but provides no other facts to transcend landlord liability to a strict product liability theory. Therefore, even if one assumes that the elevator was indeed defective, a strict product liability cause of action cannot be imposed on landlords such as 1500 South Los Angeles Street.  

As Plaintiff notes, the California Supreme Court has held that the owner of an elevator is a common carrier reasoning that “[p]ersons who are lifted by elevators are subjected to great risks to life and limb. They are hoisted vertically, and are unable, in case of the breaking of the machinery, to help themselves. The person running such elevator must be held to undertake to raise such persons safely, as far as human care and foresight will go. The law holds him to the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons, and responsible for the slightest neglect.” (Treadwell v. Whittier (1889) 80 Cal. 574, 591.) However, Treadwell did not involve a claim for strict product liability against a common carrier nor gave grounds for strict product liability to be imposed on common carriers. (Id. at 574 [“The action is based on the negligence of the defendants in using the elevator with broken, insecure, and insufficient machinery, in not taking proper care of such machinery, and in the running and operating of the elevator, in consequence of which the plaintiff, without any fault or negligence on his part, received the injuries of which he complains.”].)

Therefore, the court does not find sufficient grounds to deviate from the bright-line rule imposing strict product liability only on those entities responsible for placing a defective product into the stream of commerce simply because 1500 South Los Angeles Street is considered a common carrier. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege facts beyond the conclusory allegation that 1500 South Los Angeles Street somehow designed, manufactured, advertised, warranted, supplied, tested, rebuilt, repaired, distributed, and/or sold the malfunctioning elevator[.]” (FAC, ¶ 25.) Such allegations are conclusions in fact and are not considered by the court.

As such, the demurrer is sustained.

2.     Motion to Strike (1500 South Los Angeles Street, LLC)

 

Legal Standard

 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

 

Discussion

 

            Defendant 1500 South Los Angeles Street, LLC (“1500”) seeks to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. 

 

Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)

 

“Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

 

1500 South Los Angeles Street argues that Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is premised on a negligence theory for which punitive damages are not generally available while the product liability cause of action is not actionable for the reasons articulated in 1500’s demurrer papers. (MTS, at p. 5.) It also argues that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the requisite elements of malice, oppression, and/or fraud required to maintain a punitive or exemplary damage claim in this case. (Id., at pp. 7-10.) It contends that the claim and prayer for punitive damages is further barred given that the allegations fail to comply with the requirements of Civil Code section 3294(b). (Id., at pp. 6-7.)

 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the FAC sufficiently alleges facts to support a claim for punitive damages. (Opp., at pp. 2-4.) Plaintiff also alleges that the allegations are sufficient to meet the requirements of section 3294(b). (Id., at p. 4.)

 

            The court finds that Plaintiff has not pled facts that 1500 South Los Angeles Street’s conduct, or that of Defendants for that matter, was despicable. Plaintiff makes many allegations speaking to the negligence and disregard of Defendants, but none of the behavior appears to rise to the level of outrage required to support punitive damages claim. Allegations of willful failure to repair do not equate to allegations that a defendant acted with a wrongful personal intent to injure or in reckless disregard of the rights of other. (McDonell v. American Trust Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296, 300.) Plaintiff may be able to allege facts which would constitute despicable behavior, but they have not done so here.  

 

            As such, the court grants 1500 South Los Angeles Street’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

 

3.     Demurrer (Continental Elevator Services, Inc.)

 

Legal Standard

 

            See above.

 

Discussion

 

            Defendant Continental Elevator Services, Inc. (“Continental”) demurs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), to both causes of action in Plaintiff’s FAC for negligence and product liability, on the basis that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and are uncertain. Continental also demurs to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages arguing that the request is uncertain.

 

Punitive Damages

            Continental argues that Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is inadequately pled and uncertain. (Demurrer, p. 8.) However, requests for punitive damages are not subject to demurrer as they are part of the prayer and do not affect the pleading’s sufficiency. (Moropoulos v. C.H. & O.B. Fuller Co. (1921) 186 Cal. 679, 688; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. 9 [“[T]he adequacy of punitive damage allegations may not properly be tested by demurrer.”].)

As such, Continental’s demurrer is overruled on this ground.

Negligence

            Continental argues that Plaintiff’s FAC is uncertain and ambiguous as to its negligence cause of action. (Demurrer, at p. 5.) Continental contends that Plaintiff conflates special duties owed by possessors of property with the general duties owed for ordinary care. (Id., at p. 6.) Thus, Continental argues that Plaintiff extends liability for breaches of duties owed by property owners and possessors to those nonowners and non-possessors who owe only a duty of ordinary care, specifically, potential defendants who may only have maintained or serviced the premises. (Ibid.)

             A court will sustain a demurrer if the pleading is uncertain, including if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code of Civ. Proc § 430.10, subd. (f).) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc., (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) “Although inconvenient, annoying and inconsiderate, the lack of labels for plaintiff’s causes of action does not substantially impair [defendant]’s ability to understand the complaint.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 fn. 2.)

            The court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations supporting her claim for negligence are not so unintelligible that Continental is not appraised of the issues it must meet and could be remedied through discovery. Accordingly, the special demurrer for uncertainty is overruled. 

Strict Product Liability

            Continental argues that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state facts sufficient to claim a cause of action for strict product liability as Plaintiff makes contradictory allegations regarding Continental’s role in the incident or the basis for its liability regarding the defective elevator. (Demurrer, at pp. 9-10.)

            As Plaintiff failed to file an opposition, Plaintiff effectively consented to the court that Continental’s demurring arguments have merit. (Cal. R. Ct., 8.54(c) [“A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion.”]; Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Nevertheless, the court notes that in opposition to Defendant 1500 South Los Angeles Street’s demurrer, Plaintiff argued that Continental would be liable for any defective products they placed into the elevator as part of their servicing of the same or any modifications they made to the elevator which failed as a result of their work. (Opp., at p. 11.)

            It is clear that Plaintiff has specific knowledge regarding Continental’s liability in the incident. As such, Plaintiff could clarify any contradictory claims created with the general allegations that Defendants “owned, managed, operated, possessed, inspected, supervised, maintained, serviced, and/or controlled” the elevator and also “designed, manufactured, advertised, warranted, supplied, tested, rebuilt, repaired, distributed, and/or sold the malfunctioning elevator[.]” (FAC, ¶¶ 19, 25.) Such clarification is vital to properly allege a cause of action for strict product liability among multiple defendants.

As such, Continental’s demurrer is sustained as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for strict product liability.

4.     Motion to Strike (Continental Elevator Services, Inc.)

 

Legal Standard

 

See above.

 

Discussion

 

            Defendant Continental Elevator Services, Inc. (“Continental”) seeks to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. (MTS, at p. 4.) As reasoned above, the court finds that Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to allege that Defendants’ conduct warrants punitive damages. 

 

            Thus, the court grants Continental’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

 

5.     Motion to Strike (Terani Couture Corp.)

 

Legal Standard

 

See above.

 

Discussion

 

            Defendant Terani Couture Corp. (“Terani”) seeks to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. (MTS, at p. 3-6.) As discussed above, the court finds that Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to allege that Defendants’ conduct warrants punitive damages.  

 

            As such, the court grants Terani’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

 

Conclusion

 

1.               Defendant 1500 South Los Angeles Street, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED.

2.               Defendant 1500 South Los Angeles Street, LLC’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

3.               Defendant Continental Elevator Services, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part.

4.               Defendant Continental Elevator Services, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

5.               Defendant Terani Couture Corp.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

 

The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.



[1]              The court will only consider the most recently filed opposition and reply in its analysis.