Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV22102, Date: 2025-03-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV22102 Hearing Date: March 17, 2025 Dept: 34
Specially Appearing
Defendant Sealy Ecommerce LLC’s Motion to Quash Service is GRANTED.
Background
On
August 29, 2024, Plaintiff Daryl Levings Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint
against Defendant Sealy Ecommerce LLC (“Sealy”) arising from Plaintiff’s use of
Defendant’s website alleging a cause of action for violation of the California
Invasion of Privacy Act.
On
February 14, 2025, Sealy filed this Motion to Quash Service of Summons. On
March 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On March 10, 2025, Sealy filed a
reply.
Legal Standard
“A defendant, on or before the last day
of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for
good cause allow, may service and file a notice of motion . . . [t]o quash service
of summons[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.10(a).) Generally, a responsive pleading
is due within thirty days after service of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §
412.20(a)(3).) “A defendant, . . . may serve and file a notice of motion…to
quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court
over him or her.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §¿418.10(a)(1).)
Discussion
Sealy moves to quash service of Plaintiff’s summons and complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction. (Motion, at p. 7.)
Request for Judicial Notice
Sealy’s
request for judicial notice is granted. This court may take judicial notice of
the records of any court of record of the United States. (Evid. Code §§ 452,
subd. (d).)
Evidentiary Objections
Sealy’s evidentiary
objections are overruled.
General Personal Jurisdiction
“California courts may
exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitutions
of California and the United States. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)” (Pavlovich
v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268.) “The exercise of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with these Constitutions ‘if
the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of
jurisdiction does not violate “‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“Personal jurisdiction
may be either general or specific.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at pp. 268-269.) An
individual is subject to general jurisdiction in the state of their domicile;
while for a corporation it is where it is “fairly regarded as home.” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 924.) This is where
the corporation’s contacts are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render
[the defendant] essentially at home in the forum state.” (Daimler AG v.
Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 139.) In Goodyear and Daimler AG, for corporations,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that general jurisdiction exists only in the
defendant’s (1) state of incorporation and (2) principal place of business. (Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 294; Daimler
AG, supra, 571 U.S at p. 137.)
Sealy argues that general jurisdiction does not exist over Sealy as it is
not “at home” in California. (Motion, at p. 11.) Sealy contends that it is a
Delaware limited liability company with its headquarters and principal place of
business in Lexington, Kentucky. (Id.; Millar Decl., ¶ 3.)
In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute
Sealy’s place of incorporation nor the location of its principal place of
business.
As such, the court finds that Plaintiff has not presented evidence
to demonstrate that general jurisdiction over Sealy exists. (Goodyear,
supra, 564 U.S. at p. 294; Daimler AG, supra, 571 U.S at p.
137.)
Specific Personal Jurisdiction
The California Supreme Court has held that
three requirements must be met before specific jurisdiction may be exercised:
(a) defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum benefits, (b) the
controversy is related to or arises from defendant’s contacts with California,
and (c) the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and
substantial justice. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.) “A plaintiff opposing a
defendant’s motion to quash service has the burden of establishing factor Nos.
(1) (the defendant’s purposeful availment) and (2) (lawsuit relates to the
defendant’s contacts with state).” (People ex rel. Harris v. Native
Wholesale Supply Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 357, 362, citing Bridgestone
Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 767, 774].) “If the plaintiff
does so, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show factor No. (3), that
the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Ibid.)
Sealy argues that it has neither purposefully
availed itself of the benefits and protections of California law nor
purposefully directed its activities to California. (Motion, at p. 13.) As
such, Sealy contends that Plaintiff’s sole basis for jurisdiction over Sealy is
the allegation that Sealy owns and/or operates the website that Plaintiff
alleges contained tracking software and generates revenue from. (Id., at
p. 14.) Sealy provides record evidence that it is not the owner of the website,
nor did Sealy create, operate, or maintain it. (Id., at p. 15; Millar
Decl., ¶ 4.) Moreover, Sealy argues that it does not have offices in
California, does not sell products directly to consumers in the United States,
and does not advertise products to consumer in California. (Millar Decl., ¶ 6.)
Lastly, Sealy does not have any record of transacting with Plaintiff. (Id.,
¶ 8.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the
“California Privacy Notice” on the website at issue here, provides that “[t]he legal names under which we
conduct business online are Tempur Sealy International, Inc., Sealy
E-Commerce, LLC and Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC[.]” (Opp., at pp. 7-8;
Ferrell Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. 2 [emphasis added].) As such, Plaintiff argues that Sealy
is identified as one of the three entities that conduct’s business via the
website. (Opp., at p. 8.) Plaintiff also argues that in Sealy’s Statement of
Information filed with the California Secretary of State identifies Sealy’s
business as an online mattress retailer which creates a triable issue of fact
regarding whether Sealy either owns or operates the website. (Id.;
Ferrell Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. 5.)
In
reply, Sealy argues that the website’s privacy notice does not assert that
Sealy conducts business online on the website at issue, rather it is a
generalized notice that is not intended for the website alone and functions as
a shared notice for the three entities. (Reply, at p. 5.) Sealy also argues
that its registration with the California Secretary of State cannot show that
Sealy owns, operates, or maintains the website at issue. (Id., at p. 7.)
The court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to carry the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that Sealy has sufficient contacts with California that relate to Plaintiff’s
claim to justify jurisdiction. Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to
establish that the Sealy owns, operates, or maintains the website which is
alleged to have violated the California Invasion of Privacy Act. From a plain reading into the privacy
notice, there is no assertion that Sealy owns or controls the website to
conduct its business but rather states that Sealy is affiliated with the other
entities. This connection alone is insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction
over Sealy. (Healthmarkets,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1168.) Additionally, as noted
by Sealy, being registered with California’s
Secretary of State does not show that Sealy owned or control the website at
issue. As such, the court does not find that Sealy purposefully
availed itself of the forum benefits. Thus, no specific personal jurisdiction
exists over Sealy.
Jurisdictional
Discovery
“A plaintiff attempting
to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is entitled to an
opportunity to conduct discovery of the jurisdictional facts necessary to
sustain its burden of proof[.]” (Hardell v. Vanzyl (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 960, 975-976; Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 894.) However, “In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance
for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery
is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing
jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135
Cal.App.4th 100, 127)
Plaintiff requests that the
court alternatively defer ruling on the instant motion until Sealy has provided
full and forthright responses to Plaintiff’s jurisdictional discovery. (Opp.,
at p. 17.) However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that discovery will lead to
the production of evidence showing that Sealy owns or controls the website at
issue here. This court has “discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to
quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the
plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” (HealthMarkets,
supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 1173.) As such, the court declines to exercise
its discretion to continue the hearing on this motion.
Conclusion
Specially
Appearing Defendant Sealy Ecommerce LLC’s Motion to Quash Service is GRANTED.