Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV23164, Date: 2025-01-29 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24STCV23164    Hearing Date: January 29, 2025    Dept: 34

 

1.               Defendant Paparazzi LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is OVERRULED.

 

2.               Defendant Paparazzi LLC’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DENIED.

 

I.                Background

 

            On September 9, 2024, Plaintiff Monarch LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant Paparazzi LLC (“Defendant”) arising from an alleged Proposition 65 violation alleging causes of action for civil penalties and injunctive relief.

 

            On December 2, 2024, the court found case numbers 24STCV29988 and 24STCV23164 related.

 

            On December 9, 2024, Defendant filed this Demurrer and Motion to Strike. On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.

 

II.             Demurrer

 

A.              Legal Standard

 

            “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

 

            When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

 

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

 

B.              Discussion

 

1.               Request for Judicial Notice

 

            Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted. “A court may properly take judicial notice of its own records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (e).)” (Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 21.) Judicial notice may also be taken of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (c) and (h).)

 

            However, while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files. (In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314, quoting Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) But the finding itself may be a proper subject of judicial notice if it has a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent action. (Kilroy v. State of Calif. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 148.)

 

2.               Statute of Limitations

 

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claims under the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (“Proposition 65”) are time-barred by the statute of limitations. (Demurrer, at p. 14.)

 

 Enforcement claims under Proposition 65 generally have a one-year statute of limitations. (Health & Safety Code § 25249.7(d).) Defendant grounds their assertion on two Proposition 65 pre-suit notices given by Plaintiff on March 30, 2022, and February 7, 2024. (Demurrer, at p. 14.) Defendant argues, based on the prior notices, that Plaintiff was aware of the alleged violation as early as February 23, 2022 when Plaintiff acquired Defendant’s product named “Treasury Fund White Ring” that allegedly exposes consumers to cadmium and were sold without a warning which is greater than one year before the September 9, 2024 complaint. (Ibid.)

 

Plaintiff, in response, argues that Plaintiff has alleged a new violation committed on September 12, 2023, which refreshes the statute of limitations for each violation which is committed. (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 953, 981.)  

 

Defendant relies on Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967 for their statute of limitations argument. However, Shamsian does not support Defendant’s position. Although the Court of Appeal in Shamsian held that the plaintiffs’ claim under Proposition 65 was barred by the one year statute of limitations, the only issue before the Shamsian Court on that claim was whether the statute of limitations was one year, as the Court of Appeal found, or three years, which it rejected. (Shamsian, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 977-78.) The Court of Appeal specifically noted, in finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred, that they had offered no argument that the claim survived the one-year statute of limitations. (Id., at 978-79.) “An opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein.” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57.)  

 

Plaintiff has offered authority which directly supports its position that the Proposition 65 claims survive the one-year statute of limitations by way of the continuing violation doctrine, and Defendant has offered no valid authority to the contrary. (Consumer Advocacy Group, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at 981.) Moreover, if the court were to adopt Defendant’s position, the effective result would be to create a perverse incentive where a potential violator of Proposition 65 might best be served by doing nothing to correct the violation until the statute of limitations has lapsed with respect to that claimant, rather than correct the deficiencies identified by a notice. Such an outcome would be contrary to the express purposes of Proposition 65 on its face, and the court refuses to countenance that scenario. Defendant’s attack on the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations is not persuasive.  

 

3.               Injunctive Relief

 

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief in the complaint is moot as Defendant has already stopped the sale of the product at issue from Defendant’s website. (Demurrer, at p. 20.) Defendant contends that the product was only sold from November 26, 2018 to July 9, 2021 and Defendant has decided not to re-start the sale of the product. (Ibid.) Thus, Defendant argues that there is no pending controversy related to the continued sale of the product making Plaintiff’s demand for injunctive relief moot. (Ibid.)

 

            The court does not find that a demurrer is the proper method to rule on Defendant’s arguments regarding whether Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot. “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th 1315.)

 

4.               Collateral Estoppel

 

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff had previously filed suit on March 15, 2023 based on the allegations made in the March 30, 2022 notice but subsequently dismissed the action. (Demurrer, at pp. 12-13.) Defendant contends that collateral estoppel preempts Plaintiff from filing the instant action after dismissing its March 15, 2023 suit. (Id., at pp. 20-21.) However, Defendant concedes that not all elements of collateral estoppel are met. As such, the court will not entertain Defendant’s argument.

 

III.           Motion to Strike

 

A.              Legal Standard

 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

 

B.              Discussion

 

            Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s demands for civil penalties in the complaint on the grounds that they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Motion to Strike, at pp. 11-12.) Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s demand for injunctive relief on the grounds that such request is moot. (Id., at p. 16.)

 

            Defendant makes the same arguments as its demurrer to support its motion to strike. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is denied.  

 

IV.           Conclusion

 

1.               Defendant Paparazzi LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is OVERRULED.

 

2.               Defendant Paparazzi LLC’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DENIED.