Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV24120, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24120    Hearing Date: January 28, 2025    Dept: 34

 

1.     Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is OVERRULLED in part as to the second and third causes of action and SUSTAINED in part as to the fourth cause of action.

 

2.     Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is MOOT.

 

The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.

 

Background  

 

            On September 18, 2024, Plaintiffs Michael Anthony Smith II and Sherika Jonae McGhee (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, County of Los Angeles, and Michelle Patrice Fairley (“Defendants”) arising from a vehicle collision alleging causes of action for:

 

1.                 Negligence;

2.                 Negligence Per Se – Violation of California Vehicle Code § 21658;

3.                 Negligence Per Se – Violation of California Vehicle Code § 22107;

4.                 Negligent Entrustment, Negligent Hiring, Negligent Undertaking, Negligent Retention, Negligent Supervision, and Negligent Training.

 

On December 12, 2024, Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”) filed this Demurrer and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ complaint. On January 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed oppositions.

 

1.     Demurrer

 

Legal Standard

 

            “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

 

            When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

 

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

 

Discussion

 

            Metro demurs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e), to the second, third, and fourth causes of action in Plaintiffs’ complaint, on the basis that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action. Metro also demurs to the three causes of action on the grounds that they fail to state a statutory basis under Government Code section 815(a).

 

2nd and 3rd Cause of Action – Negligence Per Se (Violation of California Vehicle Code §§ 21658, 22107)

 

            “The negligence per se doctrine, as codified in Evidence Code section 669, creates a presumption of negligence if four elements are established: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature of which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” (Spates v. Dameron Hospital Association (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 218, quotation marks omitted.)

 

            Metro argues that negligence per se is not a separate cause of action. (Demurrer, at p. 7.) Metro also argues that Plaintiffs’ causes of action for negligence per se fail to provide a statutory basis for liability as section 22107 and 21658 impose duties on individual drivers, but not their employees. (Id., at p. 8.)

 

            In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they are allowed to plead negligence per se as an alternative theory arising out of the same facts their first cause of action for negligence. (Opp., at p. 4.) Plaintiffs also argue that sustaining the demurrer would simply force Plaintiffs to amend the complaint and reallege the same facts of their negligence per se causes of action all under the first heading for negligence. (Id., at p. 6.)

 

            As Metro argues, “[t]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Johnson v. Honeywell International Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) 

 

            However, the California Supreme Court has also stated that “[a]lternative theories of common law negligence and statutory liability may be pleaded in a single count [citation] or in separate counts [citation]; or the statutory basis of liability need not be pleaded at [all], as the trial court is required to take judicial notice of acts of the Legislature (Evid. Code, s 451, subd. (a)).” (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 413 [emphasis added].) 

 

            Where Plaintiffs have asserted separate theories of negligence liability as separate causes of action, California courts have treated those theories as one cause of action. For example, in Turner, the California Court of Appeal (while reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer) “treat[ed] [the] plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth causes of action [for negligence and negligence per se, respectively] as alleging a single cause of action for negligence.” (Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534.) 

 

            In this case, rather than requiring the Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to combine the different theories of negligence, the court will proceed with the understanding that the Plaintiffs are asserting alternative theories of negligence.  

 

            Metro’s demurrer is overruled as to the second and third causes of action.

 

4th Cause of Action – Negligent Entrustment, Negligent Hiring, Negligent Undertaking, Negligent Retention, Negligent Supervision, and Negligent Training

 

            Metro argues that, as a public entity, it is not liable for an injury except as provided by statute under Government Code section 815(a). (Demurrer, at p. 5.) Moreover, Metro contends that common law claims may not be maintained against public entities such as Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action. (Id., at p. 6.) Metro also argues that Plaintiffs fail to state facts sufficient to support their cause of action. (Id., at pp. 6-7.)

            In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their fourth cause of action is not barred by the Government Claims act pointing to Government Code section 815.2(a) which provides for a public entity's liability to acts or omissions of its employees performed within the scope of employment, provided such acts would otherwise give rise to a cause of action against the employee. (Opp., at p. 7.) Plaintiffs also argue that they have plead sufficient facts to support the negligence claims as alleged in the fourth cause of action. (Id., at p. 8.)

 

            “A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, section 815(a).) A cause of action for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and the like imposes direct liability, not vicarious liability. (Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1112, disapproved of on other grounds by Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622.) Absent a special relationship between an employee and a plaintiff, there can be no individual liability by one employee for the negligent hiring of another employee, and hence no vicarious liability under Government Code section 815.2. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 877.)  

 

            The court finds that Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action cannot be brought under Government Code section 815.2(a) as claims of negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent undertaking, negligent retention, negligent supervision, and negligent training impose direct liability and not vicarious liability on to Metro. Plaintiffs’ complaint does not provide for any additional statutory basis to hold Metro liable.

 

            Metro’s demurrer is sustained as to the fourth cause of action.

           

2. Motion to Strike

 

Legal Standard

 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

 

Discussion

 

            Metro moves to strike paragraphs 12, 13, 20, 42, 60, 67, 68, 69, and 70 from Plaintiffs’ complaint arguing that they are irrelevant as they all pertain to Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent undertaking, negligent retention, negligent supervision, and negligent training. (Motion to Strike, at pp. 5-6.)

 

            As discussed above, Metro’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action is sustained. Therefore, Metro’s motion to strike allegations with respect to that cause of action is moot.

 

Conclusion

 

1.     Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is OVERRULED in part as to the second and third causes of action and SUSTAINED in part as to the fourth cause of action.

 

2.     Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is MOOT.

 

The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.