Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV24937, Date: 2025-02-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24937    Hearing Date: February 11, 2025    Dept: 34

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED. The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.

Background

            On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff M.O.S., a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, Moieshai Carter (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“Defendant”) alleging that Plaintiff was sexually molested by another student in Defendant’s school claiming causes of action for:

1.     Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Training, Retention, and/or Supervision of Unfit Employees;

2.     Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;

3.     Breach of Mandatory Statutory Duties Which Proximately Caused Plaintiff’s Sexual Assault and Battery; and

4.     Breach of Mandatory Statutory Duties Which Proximately Caused Plaintiff Additional Damages Separate and Distinct From His Sexual Assault And Batter.

On December 26, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint. On January 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On February 4, 2025, Defendant filed a reply.

Legal Standard

            The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.) “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) 

Discussion

            Defendant requests the court to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages and attorney’s fees as follows:

1.     Paragraph 80: “Plaintiff is informed, and believes and thereon alleges that the employees, officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendant LAUSD acted with malice and oppression, as their tortuous and unlawful acts were carried out with full knowledge of the extreme risk of injury involved, and with willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.”

2.     Paragraph 82: “In subjecting Plaintiff to the wrongful treatment herein described, Defendant LAUSD acted willfully and maliciously with the intent to harm Plaintiff, and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, so as to constitute malice and oppression under California Civil Code section 3294. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover severe emotional distress damages against Defendant LAUSD in a sum to be shown according to proof.”

3.     Paragraph 93: “Plaintiff is further entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 and any other applicable provision of law. Plaintiff’s action will result in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest – the enforcement of Penal Code statutes mandating school systems report child abuse allegations to the proper authorities. It is hard to imagine a more important and fundamental public right than the right of children to be free from child abuse and the promotion of that right by the systematic, fair, and proper reporting of child abuse allegations by the school system. A significant benefit will be conferred on the general public and, in particular the large class of children by this action. It is also necessary that this systemic failure by enforced privately, at great financial burden. A child abuse victim who has been deprived of his reporting rights by government authorities must seek private enforcement to ensure his rights and the rights of child abuse victims are enforced as the Legislature intended.”

4.     Paragraph 94: “Plaintiff is informed, and believes and thereon alleges that the employees, officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendants LAUSD and DOES 1 to 50 acted with malice and oppression, as their tortuous and unlawful acts were carried out with full knowledge of the extreme risk of injury involved, and with willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights. They also acted fraudulently, as they willfully concealed the fact that Plaintiff’s rights were being violated, with the intent to deprive him of his rights. Accordingly, an award of punitive damages is warranted.”

5.     Paragraph 103: “Plaintiff is further entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 and any other applicable provision of law. Plaintiff’s action will result in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest – the enforcement of Penal Code statutes mandating school systems report child abuse allegations to the proper authorities. It is hard to imagine a more important and fundamental public right than the right of children to be free from child abuse and the promotion of that right by the systematic, fair, and proper reporting of child abuse allegations by the school system. A significant benefit will be conferred on the general public and, in particular the large class of children by this action. It is also necessary that this systemic failure by enforced privately, at great financial burden. A child abuse victim who has been deprived of his reporting rights by government authorities must seek private enforcement to ensure his rights and the rights of child abuse victims are enforced as the Legislature intended.”

6.     Paragraph 104: “Plaintiff is informed, and believes and thereon alleges that the employees, officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendants LAUSD and DOES 1 to 50 acted with malice and oppression, as their tortuous and unlawful acts were carried out with full knowledge of the extreme risk of injury involved, and with willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights. They also acted fraudulently, as they willfully concealed the fact that Plaintiff’s rights were being violated, with the intent to deprive him of his rights. Accordingly, an award of punitive damages is warranted”

7.     Prayer, item 6: “For attorney's fees according to proof at time of trial;”

8.     Prayer, item 7: “For any and all statutory fees and/or damages.”

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)

“Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

            Defendant argues that it is immune from punitive damages pursuant to Government Code section 818. (Motion, at p. 2.) As such, Defendant contends that Plaintiff attempts to request punitive damages when making the prayer for “any and all statutory fees and/or damages.” When read in the context of paragraphs 80, 82, 94, and 104. (Ibid.)

            In opposition, Plaintiff concedes to withdraw the request for punitive damages  and allegations regarding conspiracy upon the court allowing Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. (Opp., at p. 4.) As to the prayer for statutory fees and damages, Plaintiff contends that the complaint could be amended to provide more details to inform Defendant what statutory damages are being claimed.

            In reply, Defendant argues that as the complaint does not support an award of punitive damages nor warrant an award of statutory fees or damages, its motion to strike should be granted. (Reply, at p.2.)

            As Plaintiff concedes to withdraw the allegations pertaining to punitive damages and that more detail should be provided to put Defendant on notice regarding what statutory damages are claimed, the court grants Defendant’s motion.

Attorney’s Fees

            “Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.)

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff improperly requests attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (Motion, at p. 3.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s complaint does not address a broadly applied policy and instead alleges that Defendant failed to protect Plaintiff from the harm suffered which does not constitute a public issue. (Id., at p. 4.)

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there are sufficient allegations in the complaint to recover attorney’s fees under section 1021.5 as Plaintiff alleges that this action “will result in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest – the enforcement of Penal Code statutes mandating school systems report child abuse allegations to the proper authorities.” (Opp., at p. 5; Complaint, ¶ 103.)

            In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to show that this action is enforcing any important public policy as this is a personal injury action seeking to recover solely for the individual Plaintiff and nothing more. (Reply, at pp. 2-3.)

            The complaint does not provide a basis to believe that this action will confer a significant benefit to the general public. Defendant’s alleged conduct does not appear to be part of a systemic pattern of behavior. If the mere commission of a tort against one individual, without more, supported a finding of public benefit, then section 1021.5 would expand to cover the vast majority of tort actions. The court finds that the present case, as currently pled, does not fall within Section 1021.5. Defendant’s motion is granted.

Conclusion

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED. The court will inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.