Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: 24STCV26279, Date: 2025-01-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV26279, Date: 2025-01-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV26279 Hearing Date: January 15, 2025 Dept: 34

Plaintiff Champion Echo Park, LLC’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part. Fees and costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the reduced amount of $11,147.91, comprised of $9,500.00 in attorney’s fees and $1,647.91 in costs and expenses.

Background

On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff Champion Echo Park, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Defendant Pineapple, Inc. (“Defendant”) based on Defendant’s failure to pay rent according to the lease for the property located at 1485 West Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90026.

On October 21, 2024, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.

On November 27, 2024, the court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. On January 2, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition. On January 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply.

On December 18, 2024, the court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

Legal Standard

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(10); Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)

Discussion

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff moves the court to award him $17,804.91, which is comprised of $16,157.00 in attorney’s time billed, and $1,647.91 in costs and expenses associated with litigation. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 5; Memorandum of Costs, at p. 1.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs was filed prematurely under California Rules of Court 3.1702 and should be denied. (Opp., at p. 2.) Additionally, Defendant argues that the amount requested by Plaintiff is unreasonable. (Id., at pp. 2-3.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party nor that Plaintiff is entitled to recover fees and costs. (Reply, at p. 2.) Plaintiff also argues that rule 3.1702 only provides the statutory deadline for filing this motion and does not create a window before the motion can be filed. (Ibid.) As such, Plaintiff contends this motion is timely. (Ibid.)

As an initial matter, the court finds that Plaintiff’s motion is not premature under California Rules of Court 3.1702(b)(1). “A notice of motion to claim attorney’s fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case or under rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702, subd. (b)(1).) Generally, the deadline for filing notices of appeal is 60 days after notice of entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104, subd. (a).) As Plaintiff’s motion was filed within 60 days after notice of entry of judgment, it is timely.

B. Authority for Fees & Prevailing Party

1. Legal Standard

A prevailing party in a lawsuit includes “the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1032(a)(4).)

2. Discussion

The court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on November 27, 2024 and entered judgement for Plaintiff and against Defendant on December 18, 2024. As such, Plaintiff is the prevailing party entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

3. Method of Calculation for Fees

Plaintiff uses the lodestar adjustment method to calculate his request for attorney’s fees. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 10, Exh. A.)

Defendant does not dispute using the lodestar method nor proposes a different method.

The court uses the lodestar adjustment method to calculate fees.

4. Reasonableness of the Fees Claimed

a. Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates

i. Legal Standard

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437, citations omitted.)

ii. Discussion

Counsel for Plaintiff, Andrew V. Jablon (“Jablon”), has an hourly rate of $535.00 per hour. (Jablon Decl., ¶ 4.) Jablon graduated from Georgetown University Law Center and has practiced as an attorney for over 10 years. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that the amount requested by Plaintiff is patently unreasonable and outrageous as only a motion for summary judgment was filed with limited discovery. (Opp., at p. 3.)

In reply, Plaintiff contends that Defendant does not argue that the work billed was unnecessary or took an undue amount of time. (Reply, at p. 4.) As such, Plaintiff argues that the fees requested are reasonable. (Ibid.)

After considering the information provided, the court finds that the appropriate hourly rate for Counsel Jablon is $475.00 per hour.

b. Reasonableness of the Number of Hours

i. Legal Standard

“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances¿of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to¿the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [cleaned up].)

ii. Discussion

Counsel Jablon claims that 30.20 total hours were incurred in litigating this matter. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 10, Exh. A.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees are unreasonable and outrageous as only a motion for summary judgment was filed with limited discovery. (Opp., at p. 3.)

In reply, Plaintiff continues to argue that the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable. (Reply, at p. 4.)

In this case, the declaration provided by Plaintiff’s counsel is sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on 30.20 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent litigating this case. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 10, Exh. A.) The court agrees, in part, with Defendant that the only substantive portion of this case involved the filing of a Motion for Summary Judgment on a fairly limited issue. As a result, the court finds the fees incurred are unreasonable, as captured in the billing entries submitted, and will adjust them accordingly. The court understands the submission of Plaintiff’s time records is not necessary under California law and “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) However, in this case, given the nature of the case and the work involved, the court finds a reduction in the amount of hours is necessary.

Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $9,500.00 for 20.00 hours at $475.00 per hour.

5. Reasonableness of the Costs Claimed

Plaintiff lists $1,647.91 in costs and expenses as seen evidenced in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs. (Memorandum of Costs, at p. 1.)

The court notes that as a prevailing party, Plaintiff can obtain costs. Accordingly, the court finds that all of these costs are reasonable and allowable under at least one of the cost statutes.

The court will award $1,647.91 in costs and expenses.

Conclusion