Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV28388, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV28388 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: 34
1.
Defendant Trader Joe’s Company’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is
MOOT.
2.
Defendant Trader Joe’s Company’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s
Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Background
On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff Alondra Sanchez
(“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant Trader Joe’s Company
(“Defendant”) arising from Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant alleging
causes of action for:
1. Associational
Discrimination In Violation of The California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(“FEHA”);
2. Failure
To Engage In The Interactive Process In Violation of FEHA;
3. Failure
To Provide Reasonable Accommodations In Violation of FEHA;
4. Retaliation
In Violation of FEHA;
5. Failure
To Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation In Violation of FEHA;
6. Retaliation
In Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5; And
7. Wrongful
Termination In Violation of Public Policy.
On January 2, 2025, Defendant filed this Demurrer and
Motion to Strike. On February 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Strike. On February 10, 2025, Defendant filed a reply. On
February 13, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendant’s
Demurrer.
On February 14, 2025, the court entered Plaintiff’s
Request for Dismissal of her Sixth Cause of Action for Retaliation In Violation
of Labor Code Section 1102.5.
1.
Demurrer
Legal Standard
“The
party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by
demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or
more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
When considering demurrers, courts
read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent
on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer
tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab,
Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)
As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pled or
implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where
a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a
reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court
that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC
(2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable
possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to
sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation
Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
Discussion
Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s sixth
cause of action for Retaliation In
Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 430.10, subdivision (e), on the grounds that it does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff
requested to dismiss the sixth cause of action. As such, Defendant’s Demurrer
is moot.
2. Motion to Strike
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time
in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out
all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws
of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a
motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from
any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437.)
Discussion
Defendant
moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages and prejudgment
interests on the grounds that they are improper as a matter of law. (Motion, at
p. 5.)
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be awarded in an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and
convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Malice” is defined as “conduct which
is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
“Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel
and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code
§ 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the
intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd.
(c)(3).)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
complaint lacks any factual allegations to support her claims demonstrating
Defendant's malice, oppression, or fraud. (Motion, at p. 11.) Defendant
contends that Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and boilerplate, and
Plaintiff does not allege a single instance of malicious conduct directed
toward her by Defendant, pleads no facts showing that Defendant acted with a
conscious disregard of her rights, and does not allege that Defendant engaged
in any fraudulent conduct. (Ibid.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s
claim that Defendant committed an intentional tort is not sufficient to warrant
punitive damages. (Ibid.) Additionally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff
is only be able to recover punitive damages from Defendant, a corporate entity,
if she can demonstrate misconduct by its officers, directors, or managing
agents which Plaintiff failed to do. (Id., at p. 13.)
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that the complaint pleads sufficient facts demonstrating
oppression, fraud, or malice by Defendant as Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
refused to grant Plaintiff a short amount of leave as a reasonable
accommodation to care for her dying mother who was riddled with cancer who died
within weeks of Plaintiff’s termination, continued to repeatedly bother
Plaintiff while they knew she was caring for her terminally ill mother,
pressured Plaintiff into resigning from her employment while Plaintiff was
caring for her terminally ill mother instead of providing her with an
accommodation, then left her a message telling her she was terminated while
they knew she was with her dying mother. (Opp., at pp. 8-11.) Plaintiff also
contends that Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant’s store manager, Santos Gandara,
engaged in the acts described above and ultimately terminated Plaintiff’s employment.
(Id., at p. 12.) As such, Plaintiff argues that for the pleading stage Plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to seek punitive damages against Defendant. (Id.,
at p. 13.)
The
court finds that the allegations do not support a claim for punitive damages
against Defendant. “An employer shall not be liable for [punitive]
damages. . . based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the
employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed
him or her with a conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others, or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded,
or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code §
3294, subd. (b).) “[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is
based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the
fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co.
(1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do
not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or
deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore
must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does
not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the
punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate
leaders: the ‘officer[s], director[s], or managing agent[s].’” (Cruz
v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167 (citation omitted).) As
to ratification, “[a] corporation cannot confirm and accept that which it does
not actually know about.’” (Id. (citing to College Hospital,
supra, at 726 (for ratification sufficient to justify punitive damages against
corporation, there must be proof that officers, directors, or managing agents
had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct and its outrageous character).)
There
are no allegations to show that either Defendant’s officers, directors, or
managing agents engaged in the purported wrongful conduct or that they
authorized or ratified such conduct. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations do
not show malice. The allegations do not show that Defendant intended to harm
Plaintiff. Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that Defendant’s actions “were
willful, intentional and malicious and done with the intent to vex, injure and
annoy Plaintiff and warrant the imposition of exemplary and punitive damages in
an amount sufficient to punish said Defendants and to deter others from
engaging in similar conduct.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 22, 30, 39, 46, 55, 62, and 70.)
As it stands, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Gandara are insufficient to
impose punitive damages onto Defendant.
Defendant’s
motion is granted as to punitive damages.
Prejudgment Interests
Defendant seeks to strike Plaintiff’s
request for “prejudgment interest pursuant to California Civil Code section
3287 and/or California Civil Code section 3288 and/or any other provision of
law providing for prejudgment interest[.]” (Motion, at p. 15; Complaint, Prayer
for Relief, ¶ 2(e).) Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to
prejudgment interest as her damages are not certain, nor are they capable of
being made certain as Plaintiff fails to allege a sum certain of damages
intended to be recovered. (Motion, at pp. 15-16.) As such, Defendant contends
that Plaintiff cannot seek prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287
as a matter of law. (Id., at p. 16.) Similarly, Defendant argues that Civil
Code section 3288 does not permit an award of interest where the claim is for
something other than the loss of property or where the damages claimed are
intangible, such as damages for emotional or mental distress. (Ibid.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that
section 3287 does not require Plaintiff to identify a specific sum at the
pleading stage to be awarded prejudgment interest, instead if Plaintiff’s
recoverable damages are “certain or capable of being made certain by
calculation,” Plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to prejudgment interest
from the date the right to recover vested. (Opp., at p. 13.) As such, Plaintiff
contends that Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as her damages are
capable of being made certain by calculation. (Id., at p. 14.)
The court finds that Plaintiff seems
to concede that section 3288 does not provide grounds to request prejudgment
interests. As such, Defendant’s motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s request
under section 3288.
As to section 3287, a plaintiff is
entitled to recover damages that are certain, including prejudgment interest on
these damages. (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (a).) Damages are only certain for
this purpose if the defendant actually knows the amount of damages or could
compute that amount from information that is reasonably available to the
defendant. (Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140,
150–151.) Damages are not certain if they must be judicially determined
based on conflicting evidence. (St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Mountain West
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 645, 665; Uzyel v.
Kadisah (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 866, 919.) Thus, the general rule is that
damages are unascertainable when the amount of damages depends on disputed
facts, or the available information is insufficient to determine the amount;
damages are ascertainable when the only impediment to determining the amount is
a legal dispute about liability or the measure of damages. (Cheema v. L.S.
Trucking, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1151; Collins, supra,
205 Cal.App.4th at 151.)
The court finds that the damages on Plaintiff’s
complaint are uncertain but are ascertainable. Therefore, Defendant’s motion is
denied as to Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interests under section 3287.
Conclusion
1.
Defendant Trader Joe’s Company’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is
MOOT.
2.
Defendant Trader Joe’s Company’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s
Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.