Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV31945, Date: 2025-04-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV31945 Hearing Date: April 15, 2025 Dept: 34
1. Defendants Miguel Casillas and
Natividad Casillas’ Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is SUSTAINED as to the
eighth cause of action.
2. Defendants
Miguel Casillas and Natividad Casillas’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’
Complaint is GRANTED.
The court will inquire at the
hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.
Background
On December
4, 2024, Plaintiffs Gerardo Vera Ruiz and Vanessa Vera (“Plaintiffs”) filed a
complaint against Defendants Miguel Casillas and Natividad Casillas
(“Defendants”) arising from Plaintiffs’ tenancy in Defendants’ property located
at 5115 W. 136th St., Hawthorne, CA 90250 (“Subject Property”)
alleging causes of action for:
1. Statutory Breach of Warranty of Habitability (Civ.
Code §§1941, 1941.1);
2. Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability;
3. Negligence;
4. Breach of Contract;
5. Nuisance;
6. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment;
7. Breach of The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing;
8. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
9. Violation of Civil Code 1950.5;
10. Constructive Eviction;
11. Violation of Civil Code 1942.4;
12. Violation of Civil Code 1942.5; And
13. Violation of The Los Angeles County Ordinance –
Harassment.
On February 28, 2025, Defendants
filed this Demurrer and Motion to Strike. On April 1, 2025, Plaintiffs filed
oppositions. On April 8, 2025, Defendants filed a reply.
1. Demurrer
Legal
Standard
“The party against whom a complaint
or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided
in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds
listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In
a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading
or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone,
and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes
the truth of the complaint’s properly pled or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.)
The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it
stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave
to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful
amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is
on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully.
(Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However,
“[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good
cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman
v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
Discussion
Defendants demur to the eighth
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Plaintiffs’
complaint pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), on the grounds that it does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
“The
elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme
and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the
plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous
conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of
that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek
(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, [citation and ellipses omitted].)
Defendants
argue that Plaintiffs’ complaint is devoid of facts alleging that Defendants’
conduct was extreme and outrageous. (Demurrer, at p. 6.) Defendants also argue
that the complaint does not allege facts that Plaintiffs suffered from extreme
or severe emotional distress. (Id., at p. 7.)
In opposition,
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ malicious failure to correct uninhabitable
conditions subjects Defendants to a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (Opp., at p. 5.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendants abused
their position as landlords and acted in an outrageous manner. (Id., at
pp. 5-6.)
Courts have found that
allegations of refusal to remediate mold and other harmful building conditions
can constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. In Burnett v. Chimney Sweep,
plaintiffs repeatedly complained of a mold issue and defendant landlord refused
to remediate. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057.)
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
without leave to amend. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding
that whether the landlord’s refusal to rectify the mold issue was extreme and
outrageous presented a factual question for the jury. (Id., at 1069,
citing Stoiber supra, 101 Cal.App.3d 903.)
Here, Plaintiffs allege
that the Subject Property suffers from a variety of defective conditions,
including water intrusion and mold. (Complaint, ¶¶ 23-24.) Plaintiffs further
allege that they repeatedly notified Defendants regarding these deficiencies. (Id.,
¶¶ 25-27.) Plaintiffs allege to have provided Defendants with written notice in
April 2024. (Ibid.) However, Plaintiffs’ allegations as to Defendants’
response are not clear. Plaintiffs solely allege that “Defendants failed and/or
neglected to repair” the issues. (Id., ¶ 29.)
Plaintiffs’ pleadings
as to Defendants’ response are crucial because a failure to attempt to
remediate is not the legal equivalent of an outright refusal to remediate. Burnett
and Stoiber both dealt with landlords that refused to remediate. The
court finds that the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint fall short of those
required to find “extreme and outrageous” conduct, however Plaintiffs could add
facts to remedy this deficiency.
Accordingly, Defendants’
demurrer is sustained as to Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action.
2.
Motion to Strike
Legal
Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, “the court may, upon a
motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon
terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter
inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the
face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is
required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
Discussion
Defendants
seek to strike Plaintiffs’ demand for punitive damages. (Motion, at p. 9.)
Punitive damages may be awarded in
an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear
and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud,
or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Malice” is defined as “conduct
which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd.
(c)(1).) “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person
to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”
(Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code §
3294, subd. (c)(3).)
The court
finds that Plaintiffs have not pled facts that Defendants’ conduct was
despicable. Plaintiffs makes many allegations speaking to the failure and
disregard of Defendants to address the issues with the Subject Property, but
none of the behavior appears to rise to the level of outrage required to
support punitive damages. (Complaint, ¶¶ 29, 32, 33, 38.) Allegations of
willful failure to repair do not equate to allegations that Defendants acted
with a wrongful personal intent to injure or in reckless disregard of the
rights of other. (McDonell v. American Trust Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d
296, 300.) Plaintiffs may be able to allege facts which would constitute
despicable behavior, but they have not done so here.
As such, Defendants’
motion to strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages is granted.
Conclusion
1. Defendants Miguel Casillas and
Natividad Casillas’ Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is SUSTAINED as to the
eighth cause of action.
2. Defendants
Miguel Casillas and Natividad Casillas’ Motion to Strike Portions of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is GRANTED.
The court will
inquire at the hearing whether leave to amend should be granted.