Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 24STCV32255, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV32255    Hearing Date: April 22, 2025    Dept: 34

Defendants Julie Kang, SJPE Associates, LLC, and Beverly Normandy Center, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is OVERRULED.

 

Background

 

            On December 6, 2024, Plaintiffs Ronald Dettman and Jina Dettman (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Julie Kang, SJPE Associates, LLC, and Beverly Normandy Center, LLC (“Defendants”) arising from Plaintiffs’ tenancy in Defendants’ property located at 1001 W. Beverly Blvd., Montebello, CA 90640 alleging causes of action for:

 

1.                 Breach of Contract;

2.                 Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;

3.                 Violation of CA Business & Professional Code §17200, et seq.;

4.                 Fraud;

5.                 Intentional Misrepresentation;

6.                 Negligent Misrepresentation;

7.                 Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; and

8.                 Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.

 

On January 23, 2025, Defendants filed this Demurrer. On February 10, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On February 18, 2025, Defendants filed a reply. On February 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply.

 

Legal Standard

 

            “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

 

            When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pled or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

 

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

 

Discussion

 

            Defendants demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, to all causes of action in Plaintiffs’ complaint.

 

1st Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

 

            To state a cause of action for breach of contract, plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) 

 

            Defendants note that Plaintiffs allege the lease agreement between the parties conferred “all such furniture, fixtures and equipment at the subject premises” but also that the escrow documents for purchasing the restaurant from the previous tenant conferred such items. (Demurer, at p. 3.) Thus, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege how the breach of a prior escrow agreement resulted in a breach of the lease agreement. (Id., at p. 4.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs merely allege that it was “understood” by the parties that Plaintiffs obtained ownership of the “furniture, fixtures and equipment” but do not allege that such understanding was codified in the lease agreement. (Ibid.) Defendants take the position that if such agreement was reached between the parties, Plaintiffs could have attached supporting documentation to the complaint but failed to do so here. (Ibid.)

 

            In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants attempted to claim ownership over the restaurant assets when Defendant Julie Kang (“Kang”) attempted to add an addendum provision into the lease agreement to be signed by the buyer asserting that the restaurant assets constituted fixtures belonging to Defendants and not Plaintiffs. (Opp., at pp. 7-10.)

 

            The court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a breach of contract claim. If a breach of contract claim “is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also “plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Here, Plaintiffs allege the existence of a lease agreement by pleading its legal effect of conferring a lease to the subject property and recognizing that the restaurant assets belong to Plaintiffs due to prior transactions. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 6.) Such allegations properly plead the existence of a contract. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Kang’s actions of attempting to assert ownership over the restaurant assets constituted a breach of the lease agreement. (Id., ¶¶ 26-27.) Lastly, Plaintiffs claimed damages as a result of the breach. (Id., ¶ 28.)

 

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action.  

 

2nd Cause of Action – Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

 

            The elements for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are: (1) existence of a contract between plaintiff and defendant; (2) plaintiff performed his contractual obligations or was excused from performing them; (3) the conditions requiring defendant’s performance had occurred; (4) the defendant unfairly interfered with the plaintiff’s right to receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s conduct. (Merced Irr. Dist. V. County of Mariposa (E.D. Cal. 2013) 941 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1280 [discussing California law].) 

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails as there is no underlying contract in breach. (Demurrer, at p. 4.) However, for the reasons stated above, the court has found that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege the existence of a contract and Defendants’ breach.

 

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action.  

 

3rd Cause of Action – Violation of CA Business & Professional Code §17200, et seq.

 

            To set forth a claim for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL”), plaintiff must establish defendant was engaged in an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” and certain specific acts. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) A cause of action for unfair competition “is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.) 

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is not pleaded with sufficient particularity as Plaintiffs’ allegations are broad and conclusory merely incorporating the allegations of the preceding claims. (Demurer, at p. 5.)

 

            In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the complaint sufficiently alleges Defendants’ conduct constituting unfair business practices which interfered with the business purchase sales transaction between Plaintiffs and the buyer. (Opp., at p. 11.)

 

            The court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a UCL claim. Plaintiffs make clear allegations that Defendants engaged in unfair business practices including “(1) tortious interference with Plaintiffs purchase sales transactions of their restaurant business through their illicit and improper claims of ownership to the restaurant equipment items and non-permanent fixtures, (2) attempting to get the new buyer to sign off on a lease addendum acknowledging as such, (3) attempting to hold Plaintiffs responsible for additional business rent from November 1 through November 15, 2024.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 34.) Taking the allegations of the complaint as a whole, Plaintiffs have alleged such unfair business practices with particularity.

 

            Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action.

 

4th – 6th Causes of Action – Fraud, Intentional Misrepresentation, and Negligent Misrepresentation

 

            The elements of fraud and intentional misrepresentation are “(a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294; see also Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166.) The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) 

 

The elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation include “[m]isrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, and with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented; ignorance of the truth and justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party to whom it was directed; and resulting damage.” (Hydro-Mill Co., Inc. v. Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154, quotation marks omitted.)

 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allege Defendants committed fraud and misrepresentation by “tortiously interfering” with the sale of Plaintiffs’ business without the required specificity to sustain such claims. (Demurrer, at p. 6.)

 

The court disagrees and finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged their fraud and misrepresentation claims. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, specifically Kang, made the misrepresentation that Defendants had ownership over Plaintiffs’ restaurant equipment and non-permanent fixtures at the subject leased premises. (Complaint, ¶ 44, 50, 58.) Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants knew this to be false due to their previous understanding that the restaurant assets belonged to Plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 6.) Thus, such misrepresentation induced reliance from the new restaurant buyer as intended by Defendants when attempting to amend the lease agreement resulting in damage to Plaintiffs. (Id., ¶¶ 44, 50, 58.)

 

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiffs’ fourth through sixth causes of action.

 

7th – 8th Causes of Action – Intentional and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

 

The elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage include “(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional or negligent acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” (Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404, citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.)

 

“The elements of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage are (1) the existence of an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party containing the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s knowledge (actual or construed) that the relationship would be disrupted if the defendant failed to act with reasonable care; (4) the defendant’s failure to act with reasonable care; (5) actual disruption of the relationship; and (6) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.” (Redfearn v. Trader Joe’s Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 989, 1005.) 

 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to allege Defendants would have leased the subject property to the prospective buyer when the new lease agreement was still under negotiations and Defendants were under no obligation to lease to the prospective buyers. (Demurrer, at p. 7.)

 

The court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently pled their interference with prospective economic advantage claims. The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs reached an agreement with a buyer for the sake of their restaurant business, including all restaurant assets, for a total price of $32,500.00. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Such economic relationship was known to Defendants. (Id., ¶¶ 10-11.) Defendants, specifically Kang, made informed Plaintiffs’ agent and the restaurant buyer that Defendants agreed to enter into a new lease. (Ibid.) Subsequently, Defendants asserted ownership over the restaurant assets when attempting to amend the lease agreement. (Id., ¶ 13.) This caused the restaurant buyer to reduce the purchase price to $15,000.00. (Id., ¶ 14.) Although Plaintiffs continued with the sale at the reduced price, Defendants canceled the lease agreement with the restaurant buyer following a dispute regarding the security deposit with Plaintiffs’ original lease. (Id., ¶¶ 15, 17.)

 

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiffs’ seventh and eighth causes of action.

 

Conclusion

 

Defendants Julie Kang, SJPE Associates, LLC, and Beverly Normandy Center, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is OVERRULED.





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