Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 25STCV02740, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV02740 Hearing Date: June 4, 2025 Dept: 34
Defendant AllVoices Holding Co.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED.
Background
On January
31, 2025, Plaintiff Madeline Le (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against
Defendant AllVoices Holding Co. (“Defendant”) arising from Plaintiff’s
employment alleging causes of action for:
1. Discrimination on Based on Sex/Gender
[Gov. Code § 12940(a)];
2. Retaliation in Violation of the CFRA
[Gov. Code § 12945.2(l) and Gov’t Code §12940(h)];
3. Interference in Violation of the CFRA
[Gov. Code § 12945.1];
4. Failure to Prevent Discrimination
[Gov. Code §12940(k)];
5. Wrongful Termination in Violation of
Public Policy;
6. Retaliation in Violation of the FEHA
[Gov. Code §12940(h)]; and
7. Whistleblower Retaliation [Lab. Code
§1102.5].
On April 2, 2025, Defendant filed an answer.
On April 4, 2025, Defendant filed this
Motion to Compel Arbitration. On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On
May 8, 2025, Defendant filed a reply.
Legal Standard
“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the
existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to
the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the
petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines
that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or
(b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2,
subds. (a) and (b).)
The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the
evidence. (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 754, 761.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence a defense to enforcement (e.g., fraud,
unconscionability, etc.) (Ibid.) “In these summary proceedings, the
trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations,
and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the
court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)
“If a court of competent jurisdiction. . . has ordered arbitration of a
controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending
before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is
pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the
action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order
to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1281.4).
Discussion
Defendant moves to
compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims and staying all further judicial
proceedings in this action pending completion of arbitration.
Evidentiary Objections
Defendant’s evidentiary
objections to Plaintiff’s declaration filed in support of Plaintiff’s
opposition are overruled.
Existence of an Arbitration Agreement
Defendant contends that Plaintiff
entered into an arbitration agreement on August 31, 2023, as part of
Plaintiff’s employment agreement. (Wolff Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, Exh. A.) The
arbitration clause provides as follows:
“12. ARBITRATION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF
A. Arbitration. IN CONSIDERATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT WITH
THE COMPANY, ITS PROMISE TO ARBITRATE ALL EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DISPUTES WITH ME,
AND MY RECEIPT OF THE COMPENSATION, PAY RAISES, AND OTHER BENEFITS PAID TO ME
BY THE COMPANY, AT PRESENT AND IN THE FUTURE, I AGREE THAT ANY AND ALL
CONTROVERSIES, CLAIMS, OR DISPUTES THAT I MAY HAVE WITH ANYONE (INCLUDING THE
COMPANY AND ANY EMPLOYEE, OFFICER, DIRECTOR, SHAREHOLDER, OR BENEFIT PLAN OF
THE COMPANY, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SUCH OR OTHERWISE), ARISING OUT OF, RELATING
TO, OR RESULTING FROM MY EMPLOYMENT OR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPANY OR THE
TERMINATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT OR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPANY, INCLUDING ANY
BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT, SHALL BE SUBJECT TO BINDING ARBITRATION UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONS 1280 THROUGH 1294.2 (THE “CCP
ACT”) AND CALIFORNIA LAW. I UNDERSTAND THAT I MAY BRING A PROCEEDING AS A
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AS PERMITTED BY LAW. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
GOVERNS THIS AGREEMENT AND SHALL CONTINUE TO APPLY WITH FULL FORCE AND EFFECT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES SET FORTH IN THE CCP ACT
AND CALIFORNIA LAW. I AGREE TO ARBITRATE ANY AND ALL COMMON LAW AND/OR
STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER LOCAL, STATE, OR FEDERAL LAW, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
TO, CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, THE
OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT, THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING
NOTIFICATION ACT, THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, THE CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT
AND HOUSING ACT, THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT, THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY RIGHTS
ACT, THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE, CLAIMS RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT STATUS,
CLASSIFICATION AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPANY, AND CLAIMS OF HARASSMENT,
DISCRIMINATION, WRONGFUL TERMINATION, AND BREACH OF CONTRACT, EXCEPT AS
PROHIBITED BY LAW. I ALSO AGREE TO ARBITRATE (EXCEPT AS PROHIBITED BY LAW) ANY
AND ALL DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OR
APPLICATION OF THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE, BUT NOT DISPUTES ABOUT THE
ENFORCEABILITY, REVOCABILITY OR VALIDITY OF THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE OR ANY
PORTION HEREOF. WITH RESPECT TO ALL SUCH CLAIMS AND DISPUTES THAT I AGREE TO
ARBITRATE, I HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREE TO WAIVE, AND DO WAIVE, ANY RIGHT TO A
TRIAL BY JURY. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE ALSO
APPLIES TO ANY DISPUTES THAT THE COMPANY MAY HAVE WITH ME. I UNDERSTAND THAT
NOTHING IN THIS AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF ANY RIGHTS I MAY HAVE UNDER
APPLICABLE LAW, INCLUDING, BUT NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO, SECTION 7 OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OR THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, INCLUDING ANY RIGHTS
PROHIBITING COMPULSORY ARBITRATION. SIMILARLY, NOTHING IN THIS AGREEMENT
PROHIBITS ME FROM ENGAGING IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY, AS SET FORTH BELOW.”
(Ibid [emphasis in original].)
By having attached a copy of the
arbitration agreement with Plaintiff’s purported signature, Defendant has met
its initial burden in establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Condee
v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp.¿(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1330.) The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to challenge its
validity. (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219.)
In opposition, Plaintiff contends
that Defendant has not
established the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. (Opp., at p. 4.) Plaintiff
declares that she never signed an arbitration agreement with Defendant and that
she was not informed of its existence. (Le Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.) Plaintiff further argues
that the sole signature produced by Defendant in its motion references an “NDA”
and not the arbitration provision. (Opp., at pp. 4-5.)
The court finds that
Plaintiff has adequately challenged the validity of the arbitration provision
by declaring that she did
not sign it and that she was not presented with it. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto
Grp. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842-846 [inability to recall signing
arbitration agreement is sufficient to shift evidentiary burden back to moving
party]; Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 52,
citing
Gamboa v.
Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 [written
declaration from employee saying she did not sign the arbitration agreement is sufficient
to shift the evidentiary burden back to moving party].) Thus, Plaintiff shifts the burden back
to Defendant to provide additional evidence showing Plaintiff’s acceptance of
the arbitration provision.
The court finds that
Defendant has proven the validity of the arbitration agreement and Plaintiff’s
acceptance by a preponderance of the evidence. The supplemental declaration of
Bryan Wolff sets forth in detail the procedures that an employee would undergo during
the onboarding process. In reply, Defendant provides that new hire
documentation would be sent to employees directly through a workforce
management system called Rippling. (Supp. Wolff Decl., ¶ 2.) After an employee
signs an offer letter, Rippling sends an invitation to that employee’s personal
email to create a Rippling account. (Ibid.) Once Plaintiff created her
Rippling credentials, she completed and signed all the personnel documents provided
through Rippling. (Ibid.) This included the at-will employment agreement
containing the arbitration provision, also referred to as the “NDA”. (Ibid.)
Defendant further provides that there is no stand-alone signature page for any
personnel document, instead Rippling incorporates the electronic signatures provided
by employees after completing each document. (Ibid.) The court notes
that Defendant provides proof of Plaintiff’s electronic signature of the “NDA”.
(Wolff Decl., Exh. A.) Additionally, Defendant provides proof of Plaintiff’s
digital history from Rippling showing that on August 31, 2023, Plaintiff was
sent the employment agreement, and that Plaintiff signed it the same day.
(Supp. Wolff Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. B.) Defendant also provides evidence of the
digital history of two additional documents Plaintiff signed through Rippling on
August 31, 2023, to further corroborate and authenticate Plaintiff’s acceptance
of the arbitration provision. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6, Exhs. C-D.) As Defendant only needs to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that
Plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement, the court finds that it has done so
here. (Gamboa v. Ne. Cmty. Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 167-168
[similar evidence needed to authenticate paper and electronic signatures,
subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard].)
As such, the court finds that a valid arbitration
agreement exists between the parties.
Additionally, the court notes that
Plaintiff does not dispute that the arbitration agreement is governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or that her claims fall within the scope of the
arbitration provision. (D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court¿(1964) 60 Cal.2d
723, 728, fn. 4 [where nonmoving party fails to oppose a ground for a motion,
"it is assumed that [nonmoving party] concedes" that ground].)¿ As such,
under the FAA, the court’s inquiry is limited to a determination of (1) whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists and (2) whether the arbitration agreement covers
the dispute. (9 U.S.C., section 4;¿Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostics
Systems, Inc.¿(9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130;¿Howsam¿v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.¿(2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84;¿see¿Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv,
Inc.¿(9th Cir. 1999) 175 F.3d 716 [if the finding is affirmative on both
counts the FAA requires the Court to enforce the arbitration agreement in
accordance with its terms].) As the court has found that a valid
arbitration agreement exists and there is no dispute that Plaintiff’s claims
fall within the arbitration scope, the court grants Defendant’s
motion.
Stay Request
If a party applies to a court “for an order to
arbitrate a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding
pending before a court of this State and such application is undetermined, the
court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a
party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until the
application for an order to arbitrate is determined and, if arbitration of such
controversy is ordered, until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order
to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.” (Code of Civ.
Proc., § 1281.4.)
Because the court has found that arbitration is warranted in this matter,
the court also stays the proceedings during the pendency of the arbitration
process.
Conclusion
Defendant AllVoices Holding Co.’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED.