Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 25STCV03977, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV03977 Hearing Date: June 5, 2025 Dept: 34
Defendant Rebecca Cooper Drew’s Motion to Strike
portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint is GRANTED.
Background
On February
11, 2025, Plaintiffs Jorge Valdez and Armida Navarro (“Plaintiffs”) filed a
complaint against Defendant Rebecca Cooper Drew (“Defendant”) arising from
vehicle collision alleging a cause of action for negligence.
On April 18,
2025, Defendant filed this Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
No opposition or other responsive pleading has been filed.
Legal Standard
The
court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any
pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The
grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or
improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id.,
§ 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the
pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.) “When the defect
which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow
leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761,
768.)
Discussion
Defendant Rebecca Cooper Drew (“Defendant”) moves
to strike the following portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint regarding punitive
damages and attorney’s fees:
1. Page 2, Paragraph 11: “At all times
mentioned in this complaint, defendant REBECCA COOPER DREW, WERE driving and
operating the automobile UNDER THE INFLUENCE (despicable conduct) with the
consent, permission, and knowledge of defendant, REBECCA COOPER DREW, and/or
authorized agents.”
2. Page 2, Paragraph 12: “On March 4,
2023, defendant REBECCA COOPER DREW, and/or, negligently operated a certain
automobile, UNDER THE INFLUENCE, (despicable conduct) and as a proximate result
of the negligent operation, collided with Plaintiff’s automobile. At the
aforementioned time and place mentioned herein above, Defendants, and each of
them, negligently entrusted, maintained, controlled, managed, drove,
manufactured, operated repaired, distributed, inspected, and repaired said
automobile so as to cause their vehicle, or the vehicle carrying them, to
collide and come into direct contact with Plaintiff’s person, thereby causing
Plaintiff to suffer and sustain sever injuries and damages.”
3. Page 4, Prayer for Relief,
Paragraph 5: “Awarding plaintiff attorneys fees”
4. Page 4, Prayer for Relief,
Paragraph 6: “For punitive damages”
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be awarded in an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and
convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Malice” is defined as “conduct which
is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
“Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel
and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code
§ 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the
intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd.
(c)(3).)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs
failed to allege specific facts showing that Defendant’s conduct warrants
punitive damages by merely alleging that Defendant was driving under the
influence. (Motion, at pp. 6-9.)
The California Supreme Court in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24
Cal.3d 890, 892 determined that “the act of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under § 3294 if performed
under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable
dangerous consequences.” [emphasis added]. The complaint in Taylor alleged
that the defendant was, and for a substantial period of time had been, an
alcoholic, had previously caused a serious car accident while driving under the
influence of alcohol, had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on
numerous prior occasions, had accepted employment involving the transportation
of alcoholic beverages and had been driving while consuming an alcoholic
beverage when the accident occurred. The Court determined that “aggravating
factors” such as a “history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps” were not
essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving
cases (Id. at 896); regardless, the court found the aforementioned
allegations sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages, and did not
consider “whether other factual variations upon the theme herein presented
would also be sufficient to withstand a demurrer.” (Id. at 900.)
In Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 89, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal also noted that driving while intoxicated does
not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages. The complaint in Dawes
alleged that defendant, while intoxicated, ran a stop sign and “zigzag[ged]” in
and out of traffic in excess of 65 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone in
a crowded beach area on a Sunday afternoon in June. The court, in determining
that these allegations were sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages,
stated that “we do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes
intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets
is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag
in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area
at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from
ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not
necessarily probable. The risk of injury to others from [Defendant’s] conduct
under the circumstances alleged was probable." (Id. at 89.)
Notably, both Taylor and Dawes were decided prior to 1987,
when the Legislature added the requirement to Civil Code section 3294 that
conduct be “despicable” in order to support imposition of punitive damages
under a malice/willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others standard.
Here, Plaintiffs merely alleged that on March 4, 2023, Defendant collided
with Plaintiffs’ vehicle while Defendant was under the influence, causing
Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-12.) The court finds that Plaintiffs have
not alleged sufficient facts to showcase Defendant’s alleged disregard of the
probable and dangerous consequences from operating a vehicle while intoxicated
to warrant punitive damages. The court also notes that Plaintiffs failed to file an
opposition, effectively consenting to the court sustaining the demurrer without
leave to amend. (Cal. R. Ct., 8.54(c) [“A failure to oppose a motion may be
deemed a consent to the granting of the motion.”]; Sexton v. Superior Court
(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
Defendant’s motion is granted.
Attorney’s Fees
Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege any attorney’s fees provision in any
contract relevant to this action. (Motion, at pp. 9-10.)
Attorney’s
fees are recoverable only when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code
Civ. Proc. § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) The court finds that Plaintiffs did not plead any basis for an award of
attorney’s fees resulting from this action between the parties. Additionally,
Plaintiffs fail to oppose Defendant’s argument.
Defendant’s motion is granted.
Conclusion
Defendant Rebecca Cooper Drew’s Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s
complaint is GRANTED.