Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: BC694779, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

1. Plaintiff Elinton Gramajo’s Motion To Set Hearing On Plaintiff’s Motion For Attorney’s Fees And Costs is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff Elinton Gramajo’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part. Fees and costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the reduced amount of $106,872.84, comprised of $79,940.00 in attorney’s fees and $26,932.84 in costs and expenses.

On February 20, 2018, Plaintiff Elinton Gramajo (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against his former employer Defendant Joe’s Pizza On Sunset Inc.[1] (“Joe’s Pizza”) asserting various wage and hour violations.

On June 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) adding Giuseppe Vitale (“Vitale”) as a defendant.

On November 1, 2019, Defendants Joe’s Pizza and Vitale (“Defendants”) filed an answer to Plaintiff’s FAC.

From October 12, 2021 to October 19, 2021, the court held a jury trial in this matter.

On May 10, 2022, the court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (“First Motion for Attorney’s Fees”).

On June 28, 2022, the court granted Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs against Plaintiff.

On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an appeal on the court’s May 10, 2022 order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and June 28, 2022 order granting Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs.

On July 16, 2024, the Appellate Court reversed the court’s orders denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and granting Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs, remanding the matter to the trial court.

On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Motion to Set Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. On August 28, 2024, Joe’s Pizza filed an opposition. On September 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply.

On November 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a second Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Second Motion for Attorney’s Fees”). On December 4, 2024, Defendants filed an opposition. On December 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply.

II. MOTION TO SET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

If a prior appellate opinion expressly ruled upon a party’s entitlement to attorney fees, the trial court is bound to follow the appellate court’s expressions on the subject, under principles of law of the case. (Benson v. Greitzer (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 11, 14; Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 308-309.)

Plaintiff appealed the court’s May 10, 2022 order denying Plaintiff’s First Motion for Attorney’s Fees and June 28, 2022 order granting Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs. (Motion to Set Hearing, at p. 1.) The appellate court reversed both orders and remanded the matter for the trial court to determine Plaintiff’s reasonable fee and costs award. (Ibid.) Plaintiff now moves the court to make these determinations, in one hearing, based on the full briefing provided for the two related motions. (Id., at p. 2.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that although Plaintiff may stand on his pleadings submitted prior to appeal, Defendants have a statutory and due process right to file new oppositions. (Opp., 1.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that the appellate court did not order further briefing on either issue. (Reply, at p.1.) Plaintiff also contends that Defendants did not cite any authority to argue that additional briefing is required. (Ibid.)

As the court must give full deference to the Court of Appeals’ decision, the court finds that the issues remanded on appeal must be determined through review of the fully briefed motions filed subject to appeal. The appellate court did not instruct the court otherwise. Below are the court’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees and costs.

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Civ. Code § 1717(a).) “A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)

Plaintiff moves the court to award him $323,852.84, which is comprised of $148,460.00 in attorney’s fees actually incurred lodestar attorney time billed, $26,932.84 in costs and expenses associated with litigation, and $148,460.00 in a lodestar multiplier of 2.0. (First Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 10; Memorandum of Costs, at p. 1.) Plaintiff argues that Labor Code section 1194 entitles the award. (First Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 10.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs should be denied for failure to recover a judgment above the jurisdictional limit under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033(a). (Opp., at p. 5; Motion to Tax Costs, at pp. 7-12.) Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request is excessive in that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate is perjured, Plaintiff’s counsel’s hours are unreasonable, and there is no basis to award a multiplier. (Opp., at pp. 10-16.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that receiving a judgment less than $25,000.00 does not preempt Plaintiff from recovering reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in an unlimited jurisdiction court as Labor Code section 1194(a) controls over Code of Civil Procedure section 1033(a). (Reply, at pp. 4-10.) In addition, Plaintiff argues that his requested attorney’s fees and costs are reasonable. (Id., at pp. 10-11.)

As an initial matter, on appeal, the appellate court held that “employees who prevail in actions to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages are entitled to their reasonable litigation costs under Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a), irrespective of the amount recovered.” (Remittitur B322697 and B323024, at p. 2.) The appellate court also held that “Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a), controls” over Code of Civil Procedure section 1033. (Ibid., at p. 9.) As such, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs should be denied for failure to recover a judgment above the jurisdictional limit under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033(a) is disregarded. The court follows the appellate court’s instructions of reversing the trial court’s previous orders denying Plaintiff’s First Motion for Attorney’s Fees and order granting Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs, and remanding the matter for the court to determine a “reasonable” award of attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff. (Ibid., at p. 17.)

Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit.” (Cal. Lab. Code § 1194(a).)

Here, the court found that Plaintiff prevailed in his claims for wage and hour violations. (Judgment, filed on February 22, 2022.) Accordingly, as the prevailing party on unpaid minimum and overtime wages, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. (Remittitur B322697 and B323024, at p. 2.)

Plaintiff uses the lodestar adjustment method to calculate his request for attorney’s fees. (First Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 5.)

Defendants do not dispute using the lodestar method nor propose a different method.

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437, citations omitted.)

Counsel for Plaintiff, Alfredo Nava (“Nava”), has an hourly rate of $650.00 per hour. (Nava Decl., ¶ 4.) Nava graduated from Stanford University School of Law and has practiced law as an attorney for over 10 years. (Id., ¶ 6.) Nava declares that his hourly rate is in line with comparable hourly rates under the Laffey matrix. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel had previously declared that his hourly rate is $350.00 per hour. (Opp., at pp. 11-12.) Nevertheless, Defendants still contend that a reasonable hourly rate here should be $0 and at most $15.00 per hour due to quality of work rendered and legal work performed by Plaintiff’s counsel. (Ibid.)

In reply, Plaintiff concedes that Nava had previously indicated that $350.00 was his billing rate, however, Nava now requests a $650.00 hourly rate as he entitled to the market rate value for his services. (Reply, at pp. 10-11.)

After considering the information provided, the court finds that the appropriate hourly rate for Counsel Alfredo Nava is $350.00/hr according to Nava’s previous representations to the court of his hourly rate. (Linde Decl., ¶ 17, Exh. 9.)

“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances¿of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to¿the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [cleaned up].)

Counsel Nava claims that 228.40 total hours were incurred in litigating this matter over four years. (First Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 6; Nava Decl., ¶ 4.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hours are excessive. (Opp., at p. 12.) Defendants argue that this case did not present any complex issues, that this case was over-litigated, and that the judgment is disproportionate to the size of the fees requested. (Ibid.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hours should be reduced from 228.40 hours to 112.70 hours. (Ibid.)

In reply, Plaintiff continues to argue that the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable. (Reply, at pp. 10-11.)

In this case, the declaration provided by Plaintiff’s counsel is sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on 228.40 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent litigating this case through the jury trial. (Nava Decl., ¶ 4.) The fees incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing entries submitted. Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case. Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing entries are not sufficient to meet their burden to challenge Plaintiff’s fee request as they provide no authority to support the argument that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hours should be reduced.

Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $79,940.00 for 228.40 hours at $350.00 per hour.

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The contingent risks, preclusion of other work, skill, and difficulty counsel assert are absorbed by counsel’s hourly rates. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.)

Plaintiff argues that since this case was taken on a contingency fee basis without any assurances of recovery, the fee rate requested must be adjusted to reflect such risks. (First Motion for Attorney’s Fees, at p. 9.) As such, Plaintiff requests that a multiplier of 2.0 be applied to the combined lodestar of $148,460.00 for a total award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $296,920.00. (Id., at p. 10.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that there is no basis to award a multiplier as Plaintiff does not argue that any of the factors weigh in favor of a multiplier as this case did not present any difficult issues. (Opp., at p. 16.)

In reply, Plaintiff does not address Defendants’ arguments against the multiplier.

The court denies Plaintiff’s request for a 2.0 lodestar multiplier. Given the routine work done in this case and the results obtained, a multiplier is not appropriate. Any contingency risk factor is already accounted for in the hourly rate of $350.00 per hour, which the court has found to be reasonable.

Plaintiff lists $26,932.84 in costs and expenses as seen evidenced in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs. (Memorandum of Costs, at p. 1.)

Defendants filed a Motion to Tax Costs against Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs arguing that Plaintiff has not provided enough information to determine if his claimed costs are proper. (Motion to Tax Costs, at p. 16.) Additionally, Defendants argue that multiple individual costs requested by Plaintiff should be taxed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Id., at pp. 16-19.)

The court notes that as a prevailing party, Plaintiff can obtain costs pursuant to Labor Code section 1194(a). Accordingly, the court finds that all of these costs are reasonable and allowable under at least one of the cost statutes.

[1] Plaintiff’s complaint was filed against Defendants Joe’s Pizza On Sunset Inc., Joe’s Pizza On Sunset LLC, and Does 1-100. Defendant Joe’s Pizza On Sunset was a corporation but converted to an LLC on May 19, 2015.