Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: BS138171, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BS138171    Hearing Date: October 9, 2024    Dept: 34

Judgment Creditor James Dalessandro’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part. Attorney’s fees are AWARDED in favor of Dalessandro and against Mitchell in the total amount of $60,640.00.

Background

On July 10, 2012, Petitioner Writers Guild of America West, Inc. filed its ADR-106, Petition to Confirm Contractual Arbitration Award against Respondent Citizen Jane Productions, LLC and Cibola Entertainment, LLC.

On March 1, 2013, the court approved the Petition and confirmed the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award in all respects.

On March 22, 2013, the court entered judgment in favor of Petitioner and against Respondents in the total sum of $61,558.21.

On December 2, 2013, Petitioner filed its Acknowledgement of Assignment of Judgment Pursuant to C.C.P. §673, which acknowledged Petitioner’s assignment of Petitioner’s right, title, and interest in the Judgment to James Dalessandro (“Dalessandro”).

On July 5, 2016, the court amended the Judgment such that Citizen Jane Production, LLC, Cibola Entertainment, LLC, and Eric Albert Mitchell (“Mitchell”) were jointly and severally liable for the Judgment.

On September 11, 2017, the court entered its Amended Judgment, awarding $61,558.21 in favor of Dalessandro and against Judgment Debtors.

From September 11, 2017 to August 20, 2020, various sanctions and attorney’s fees awards were granted in favor of Dalessandro, Judgment Debtor Mitchell, or both Dalessandro and Mitchell. All awards in favor of Mitchell have been acknowledged as fully satisfied. (See EJ-100s, filed: July 31, 2017; December 22, 2017; December 26, 2017; January 8, 2019; March 21, 2019; September 13, 2019; August 5, 2020 [one for each of Dalessandro and his Counsel]; and September 11, 2020.) However, not all awards in favor of Dalessandro have been fully satisfied.

On February 9, 2021, the court awarded $24,633.30 in attorney’s fees and costs in favor of Dalessandro and against Mitchell.

On March 8, 2022, Dalessandro filed his EJ-190, Application for and Renewal of Judgment. Dalessandro (as assignee of record) applied for renewal of judgment in the total amount of $192,200.81. This consisted of $52,277.21 for the judgment, $39,993.60 for costs after judgment, $99,885.00 for interest after judgment, and $45.00 for the EJ-190 filing fee. Item 5.a. to the EJ190 provided further detail.

On August 30, 2024, Dalessandro filed this Motion for Attorney’s Fees. On September 13, 2024, Eric Mitchell filed his opposition in pro per. As of October 1, 2024, no reply has been filed.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c) provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the prevailing party in the appeal of an anti-SLAPP motion. (Morcos v. Board of Retirement (1990) 51 Cal.3d 924, 927; Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659, disapproved of on other grounds by Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53; Harbour Landing-Dolfann v. Anderson (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 260, 263; Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499.)

Discussion

1.     The Parties’ Arguments

Dalessandro moves the court to award $74,720.00 of attorney’s fees incurred. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, 10:14-15.) Dalessandro argues that, as judgment creditor, he is entitled to costs incurred in successfully enforcing his judgement. (Id., 5:17-19.) Dalessandro also argues that Mitchell cannot claim that the assignment of judgment was invalid after acknowledging its validity for years. (Id., 9:1-11.) Finally, Dalessandro argues that the attorney’s fees requested are reasonable. (Id., 10:12-18.)

In opposition, Mitchell argues that Dalessandro fails to show the actual amount of the alleged fees incurred, that the fees incurred are reasonable, that the fees incurred were for enforcing the judgment, the date of every service provided by Dalessandro’s counsel, and that Dalessandro is not entitled to prevailing party fees or arbitration fees. (Opp., 11:1-5, 12:18-20, 15:10-12, 16:16-18, 17:24-26.)

As of October 1, 2024, Dalessandro has not filed a reply.

2.     Authority for Fees & Prevailing Party

a.      Legal Standard

Civil Code section 1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section, “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.”

b.     Discussion

Dalessandro argues that WGA and CJ successfully brought this matter to arbitration and agreed to an award that was confirmed by the court for $61,558.21 plus attorney’s fees. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, 9:20-27, Judgment dated March 22, 2013.) Dalessandro further argues that since Mitchell’s Motion for Relief from Judgement was denied, Dalessandro is the prevailing party. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, 9:20-27, Minute Order dated October 20, 2020.) Thus, entitling Dalessandro to his attorney’s fees. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, 9:20-27)

In opposition, Mitchell argues that neither Mitchell nor Dalessandro were parties to the original arbitration agreement between Writers Guild of America West, Inc. (“WGA”), and Citizen Jane Production (“CJ”) as shown on the July 10, 2012, ADR-106. (Opp., 18:1-22.) As such, when WGA assigned the judgment to Dalessandro, WGA did not assign any rights to the arbitration agreement between WGA and CJ which required written approval by both parties which never occurred. (Ibid.) Similarly, Mitchell was not assigned any obligations under the agreement.  (Ibid.)

Dalessandro has not filed a reply to Mitchell’s opposition arguments.

Until an arbitration award is confirmed by court judgment, it has only the effect of a contract between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.6.)

Here, WGA and CJ’s ADR-106 was confirmed in the judgement dated March 22, 2013. On December 2, 2013, WGA filed its Acknowledgement of Assignment of Judgment Pursuant to C.C.P. §673, which acknowledged WGA’s assignment of WGA’s right, title, and interest in the judgment to Dalessandro. Additionally, on July 5, 2016, the court amended the judgment such that CJ, Cibola Entertainment, LLC, and Mitchell were jointly and severally liable for the judgment.

As such, the judgement and its assignment to Dalessandro holding Mitchell liable for satisfaction prevails over WGA and CJ’s agreement and failure to assign those rights and obligations with written approval by both parties.

Dalessandro is the prevailing party and is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the judgement.

3.     Method of Calculation for Fees

Dalessandro argues that the lodestar adjustment method should be used to calculate attorney’s fees. (Motion for Attorney’s Fees, 10:12-19.) Mitchell does not dispute this or propose a different method. The court uses the lodestar adjustment method to calculate fees.

4.     Reasonableness of the Fees Claimed

a.      Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates

                                                    i.     Legal Standard

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437, citations omitted.) 

                                                  ii.     Discussion

Counsel for Dalessandro claims the following hourly rates: (1) $600.00 per hour for Counsel E. Jay Gotfredson; (2) $350.00 per hour for Counsel Everett J. Gotfredson; (3) $450.00 per hour for Counsel Jeff Levitan; (4) $350.00 per hour for Counsel Doug G. Chapman; and (5) $200.00 per hour for Paralegal Timothy Wilson. (Gotfredson Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.)

In opposition, Mitchell argues that the court should use the factors listed in Clarion Development Co. V. Falvev (1998) 206 Cal. App. 3d 438. 447 to determine the reasonableness of the attorney’s hourly rate and fees requested. (Opp., 13:8-17.)

“In general, the reasonableness of attorney’s fees is determined by evaluating the hourly rate charged and the time spent against the following factors; (1) the nature of the litigation; (2) its difficulty; (3) the amount involved; (4) the skill required in its handling; (5) the skill employed; (6) the attention given; (7) the success or failure; and (8) other circumstances in the case to ensure that the amount awarded represents reasonable attorneys' fees” (Ibid.)

Dalessandro has not replied to Mitchell’s opposition arguments.

After considering the information provided, the court finds that the appropriate hourly rate for (1) Counsel E. Jay Gotfredson is $500/hr; (2) Counsel Everett J. Gotfredson is $300/hr; (3) Counsel Jeff Levitan is $450/hr; and (4) Counsel Doug G. Chapman is $350/hr. Furthermore, the court finds that attorney’s fees should not be awarded for services provided by Paralegal Timothy Wilson. (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312.)

b.     Reasonableness of the Number of Hours

                                                    i.     Legal Standard

“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances¿of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to¿the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [cleaned up].) 

                                                  ii.     Discussion

Counsel for Dalessandro claims the following hours were incurred: (1) 52 total hours for Counsel E. Jay Gotfredson; (2) 98 total hours for Counsel Everett J. Gotfredson; (3) 5.50 total hours for Counsel Jeff Levitan; and (4) 7.90 total hours for Counsel Doug G. Chapman. (Gotfredson Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.)

In opposition, Mitchell argues that Dalessandro failed to meet his burden of establishing the actual amount of the attorney’s fees incurred since Gotfredson’s declaration does not provide any detail regarding which services incurred are associated with which fees and costs, when they were incurred, and at what hourly rate each service was billed. (Opp., 11:1-28.) Mitchell argues that Dalessandro could have provided all relevant invoices and billing statements to justify the attorney’s fees requested. (Id., 12:1-17.) Additionally, Mitchell argues that this motion arises out of attorney’s fees incurred to enforce a judgment which is neither difficult nor complex. (Id., 13:18-28.) As such, it is unreasonable for Dalessandro to require a team of five people which spent a total of 182.50 hours in this matter. (Id., 14:6-17.) Additionally, Mitchell argues that Dalessandro failed to show that the fees incurred were for enforcing the judgement since the fees incurred were to oppose Mitchell’s motions and to argue Dalessandro’s frivolous motions. (Id., 15:10-28, 16:1-15.) Mitchell also argues that Dalessandro failed to show that the attorney’s fees were timely made since Gotfredson’s declaration does not list the date and time each service was made. (Id., 12:1-17.)

Dalessandro has not replied to Mitchell’s opposition arguments.

In this case, the declaration provided by Dalessandro’s counsel is sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.) Here, Gotfredson’s declaration lists out the tasks each counsel provided in efforts to enforce the judgement, which includes the filing and opposing of motions, over a two year period.

The court finds that the time spent by Dalessandro’s counsel is reasonable. However, the court will not grant attorney’s fees on 19.90 hours spent as the court finds that attorney’s fees should not be awarded for services provided by Paralegal Timothy Wilson. (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312.)

Mitchell’s argument that Dalessandro should have submitted all relevant invoices does not dispute the reasonableness of the hours incurred since submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Accordingly, the court grants Dalessandro’s requested attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $60,640.00 for 163.40 hours billed.

Conclusion

Judgment Creditor James Dalessandro’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part. Attorney’s fees are AWARDED in favor of Dalessandro and against Mitchell in the reduced amount of $60,640.00.