Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case Number: KC070412, Date: 2023-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Joseph Aguilar’s Motion to Amend Judgment to Reflect Pre-Judgment Interest Award is GRANTED.

Joseph is Martha Gonzalez’s (erroneously sued as Martha Aguilar) (“Martha”) nephew. In 1994, Joseph’s grandparents owned the property located at 5403 North Heathdale Avenue, Azusa, CA 91802 (“subject property”). Joseph was only three years old at that time. It was Joseph’s grandparents’ stated intention that the subject property would be Joseph’s inheritance. Joseph’s grandmother transferred the subject property to Martha in trust until Joseph became an adult. On or about February 7, 2011, Martha executed and delivered a grant deed to Joseph; at or about that same time, Joseph and Martha filled out a “Preliminary Change in Ownership Report.” Martha requested that Joseph hold on to the deed and not record it. Following delivery of the grant deed, Joseph and Martha orally agreed that Martha would continue to manage the subject property. In late 2017, Joseph became aware that Martha had sold the subject property and used the sales proceeds for her sole benefit.

On July 13, 2021, Joseph filed a First Amended Complaint, asserting causes of action against Martha and Does 1-25 for:

The case proceeded to jury trial on March 23, 2022. On March 28, 2022, the verdict form was filed. On April 12, 2022, “Judgment After Jury Trial” was filed.

On June 9, 2022, Martha filed (and mail-served) a “Notice of Entry of Judgment.” On July 20, 2022, an abstract of judgment was issued. On August 8, 2022, a writ of execution was issued.

“When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 187).

Joseph moves the court, per Code of Civil Procedure § 187, for an order to amend the judgment entered on April 12, 2022 by adding in $188,577 in pre-judgment interest.

“A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day. . .” (Civ. Code § 3287, subd. (a).) “The purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate plaintiff for loss of use of his or her property.” (Segura v. McBride (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1041).

The jury verdict form, filed on March 28, 2022, reflects a finding that Joseph was entitled to prejudgment interest. (LeBlanc Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A). The judgment entered on April 12, 2022 acknowledges that the jury awarded pre-judgment interest; however, the amount is not stated therein. (Id., ¶ 4, Exh. B.) Joseph asserts that pre-judgment interest runs from November 1, 2012, the date the subject property was sold, and should be calculated at 10% per annum pursuant to Civil Code § 3287. (See RJN).

Martha, in turn, first asserts that the motion is untimely and should have been brought before entry of judgment. Not so. Martha’s citation to North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824 is distinguishable because the question addressed there was “whether plaintiffs timely requested the court to exercise its power to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to interest under section 3287 in circumstances where damages had been awarded but no interest was included in the verdict and where neither court nor jury had determined whether the damages were liquidated or unliquidated.” (Id. at 829) Here, Joseph’s entitlement to recoup prejudgment interest has already been established by the jury verdict form and judgment. The motion here only seeks a determination of the amount of that interest.

Martha next asserts that the Joseph’s claim was unliquidated, such that Civil Code § 3287, subdivision (b) [i.e., “[e]very person who is entitled under any judgment to receive damages based upon a cause of action in contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon from a date prior to the entry of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix, but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed”] applies. The court disagrees.

“[P]rejudgment interest is allowable where the amount due plaintiff is fixed by the terms of a contract, or is readily ascertainable by reference to well-established market values. . . interest is not allowable where the amount of the damages depends upon a judicial determination based upon conflicting evidence and is not ascertainable from established market prices or values.” (Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371, 375.) “The test for recovery of prejudgment interest under section 3287, subdivision (a) is whether defendant actually know[s] the amount owed or from reasonably available information could the defendant have computed that amount.” (Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4^th 1770, 1789 [internal quotations and citation omitted; emphasis in original].) Here, there is no conflicting evidence; the amount of damages was the profit that Martha secured from the sale of the subject property. Martha actually knew the amount owed or could ascertain her potential exposure to Plaintiff via “reasonably available information,” such as the sales documents for the subject property.

The motion is granted. Prejudgment interest, then, is properly calculated from November 1, 2012, the date the grant deed was signed, at the rate of 10% per annum. (RJN; Civ. Code § 3289, subd. (b)).

[1] The motion was filed on August 2, 2023 and served via mail and email that same day on Martha only. Martha claims, in part, that the motion was improperly served since it was not served on her counsel. (Opp., 10:5-13). First, “[i]t is well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of the motion.” (Tate v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 925, 930). Martha filed a substantive opposition and has failed to articulate any prejudice. Martha fails to provide the court with any authority supporting her position that “Plaintiff has failed to confer personal jurisdiction to the Court over Defendant.” (Opp., 10:!3).