Judge: Peter Wilson, Case: 21-01236054, Date: 2022-07-21 Tentative Ruling
Plaintiff Ruben Porcayo seeks to quash the deposition subpoena served by Defendants on Benchmark Administrators (“Benchmark”).
For the reasons which follow, the motion is DENIED.
At the outset the Court notes that while Plaintiff is moving to quash the deposition subpoena to Benchmark Administrators, Plaintiff’s separate statement concerns the subpoena to “Moore & Associates Investigation Services.” (ROA 28.) This is reflected in both the separate statement and its caption. (Id.) The actual subpoena is not provided, but since this issue is not addressed by Defendants, the Court assumes the requests in the respective subpoenas are substantively identical.
The subpoena issued by Defendants is for production of business records from Benchmark Administrators for documents related to Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation matter, claim number 6885951.
Plaintiff contends the subpoena seeks irrelevant private medical information, arguing that Defendants must show the information is “directly relevant” as well as a “compelling” need for it. (Mot. at 7–8.) Plaintiff asserts a workers’ compensation claim has nothing to do with the issues in this case, which concern class-wide wage and hour violations.
California law provides parties with expansive discovery rights. In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 551.) The statutory phrase “‘subject matter’” is “‘broader than the issues’ and is not limited to admissible evidence.” (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 711. “‘For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it “might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement....” [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and information unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery [citation], and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.’” (Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 n.8.)
Plaintiff is correct that he has a constitutional right to privacy in his medical records. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 841 (Vinson) [right to privacy in medical records]; Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014 (Davis).) However, that right is not absolute, and disclosure may be ordered when the information is directly relevant and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit, and where the need for disclosure outweighs privacy concerns. “The scope of any disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed, drawn with narrow specificity, and must proceed by the least intrusive manner. [Citation.]” (Davis, at 1014; see Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [framework for privacy analysis]; Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35 (Hill) [same]; see also Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251 [harmonizing privacy analysis in pre- and post-Hill decisions].)
The party seeking disclosure of the constitutionally protected information bears the burden of establishing direct relevance. (Davis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at 1017.)
As an initial matter, Defendants assert they are not seeking medical records, so this dispute would be moot, but Plaintiff asserts that all 771 pages of Benchmark’s production necessarily contain or reflect medical records and thus has refused to produce any part of the production to Defendants.
As to relevance, Defendants argue the existence of the workers’ compensation case implicates questions regarding adequacy/class certification. More specifically, that the information is relevant to whether Plaintiff has interests antagonistic to the class, can meet his fiduciary responsibility, and whether he is subject to any unique defenses. (Opp. at 10–11) Defendants place heavy reliance on Payton v. CSI Electrical Contractors, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 832, in which the court upheld denial of class certification based on inadequacy of a class representative.
While the Court agrees the worker’s compensation files may have some relevance, to the extent they consist of medical records, the Court does not agree they are directly relevant or essential. For example, Defendants do not suggest that Plaintiff committed fraud in his workers’ compensation case. (See Payton, 27 Cal.App.5th at 846 [“Credibility problems can be an appropriate ground to reject the adequacy of a class representative.”].) Furthermore, Payton is distinguishable because the wrongful termination claim was to be adjudicated as part of the class action trial and the court was concerned this individual claim would dominate the proceedings. (Id. at 846 [“The relevant question is whether issues unique to the class representative will become a major focus at trial distracting from prosecution of the class claims. The trial court reasonably found that Payton's wrongful discharge claim posed that danger here.”].) Accordingly, Defendants have not met their burden to show direct relevance of the medical records. But, again, the Court notes that Defendants have expressly stated they are not requesting medical records.
Which brings us to the agreement concerning production identified by Defendants, and rejected by Plaintiff.
The email correspondence between counsel confirms that the parties reached an agreement, correctly characterized by Defendants as follows:
“(1) to exclude any medical records, (2) to allow Plaintiff a 30-day “first look” agreement, (3) for Plaintiff to produce a “privilege” log containing any objectionable items, and (4) not to seek any sanctions should the Court need to intervene.”
Opp. 2:19-21.
Plaintiff's principal basis for repudiating this agreement is that it was entered into by an attorney no longer with Plaintiff's counsel's firm. That is not a basis for repudiating the agreement. Nothing in the record states or suggests that counsel was not properly authorized to negotiate a resolution to the discovery dispute, and nothing in the record entitles Plaintiff's counsel to simply change their mind that the agreed-upon resolution is no longer acceptable.
Accordingly, the motion to quash the deposition subpoena is denied, and the Court hereby Orders as follows:
1. Documents properly constituting medical records are to be excluded from production to Defendants of any records produced by Benchmark;
2. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date hereof to review the documents already provided to Plaintiff by Benchmark in response to the subpoena;
3. Within 35 days from the date hereof Plaintiff must produce to Defendants the documents already provided to Plaintiff by Benchmark in response to the subpoena, minus any documents constituting medical records, and minus any documents as to which a privilege is asserted;
4. Within 35 days from the date hereof Plaintiff will produce to Defendants a privilege log identifying each document withheld on the basis of an asserted privilege, identifying the privilege asserted, and providing sufficient information as to each such document to enable Defendants appropriately to tests the assertion of the privilege.
Sanctions
Plaintiff requests $5,586.65 in monetary sanctions against Defendants, while Defendants request $5,250 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiff. The requests are DENIED, based on the prior agreement of the parties. If there are further motions arising out of the subpoena to Benchmark, the Court will entertain such arguments as may be appropriate concerning attorney fees based on the failure of any party to comply with the parties’ agreement, and/or to comply with this Order.
Counsel are reminded to comply with the civility standards to which they are bound.
Defendants to give notice.