Judge: Rafael A. Ongkeko, Case: 22STUD01804, Date: 2023-03-02 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STUD01804 Hearing Date: March 2, 2023 Dept: D
3/2/23
Dept. D (To be held in a department to be determined due to non-functioning electronic recording in Dept. D)
Rafael Ongkeko, Judge presiding
Los Angeles Marmion Partners LP v. Maurice Joe Sandoval, et al. (22STUD01804)
Defendant’s motion for JNOV/New Trial
Tentative ruling: None at this time. The court will hear argument and take the matter under submission.
Background:
After one day of testimony on 11/3/22 and approximately two and one-half hours of deliberation, on 11/4/22, the jury rendered its special verdict in favor of Plaintiff in this unlawful detainer action. On 12/21/22, after much delay on Plaintiff’s part in preparing the proposed judgments, the court entered judgment on the special verdict. On 12/27/22, the clerk served notice of entry of judgment. Before the court is Defendant’s JNOV/New Trial motion. There is no issue regarding the timeliness of the motion. The hearing was continued to this date from 2/24/23 to allow electronic recording of the proceedings and to allow the court to consider Defendant’s Reply papers, a courtesy copy of which was provided only the morning of the hearing.
The jury’s special verdict, as polled:
1. Did the 90-DAY NOTICE TO TERMINATE TENANCY state specific grounds for termination?
Yes (12-0) _____ No_____
If your answer is “yes,” go on to question 2. If your answer is “no,” answer no further questions, have the presiding juror date and sign this form, and inform the Court that you have reached a verdict.
2. Did the 90-DAY NOTICE TO TERMINATE TENANCY inform MAURICE JOE SANDOVAL of his right to reply as he may wish?
Yes (11-1) _____ No_____
If your answer is “yes,” go on to question 3. If your answer is “no,” answer no further questions, have the presiding juror date and sign this form, and inform the Court that you have reached a verdict.
3. Did the 90-DAY NOTICE TO TERMINATE TENANCY inform MAURICE JOE SANDOVAL of his right to examine documents from the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles directly relevant to the termination of the tenancy?
Yes (10-2) _____ No_____
If your answer is “yes,” go on to question 4. If your answer is “no,” answer no further questions, have the presiding juror date and sign this form, and inform the Court that you have reached a verdict.
4. Did MAURICE JOE SANDOVAL fail to allow inspection of the premises on September 10, 2021?
Yes (10-2) _____ No_____
Go on to question 5.
5. Did MAURICE JOE SANDOVAL fail to allow inspection of the premises on September 30, 2021?
Yes _____ No (10-2)_____
Go on to question 6.
6. Did MAURICE JOE SANDOVAL’s denials of entry, if any, result in his use of the premises for an illegal purpose?
Yes (10-2) _____ No_____
Go on to question 7.
7. Did MAURICE JOE SANDOVAL’s loss of section 8 benefits result in his use of the premises for an illegal purpose?
Yes (10-2) _____ No_____
Go on to question 8.
8. Does the illegal purpose that MAURICE JOE SANDOVAL is using the premises for, if any, amount to material violations justifying forfeiture of the lease?
Yes (10-2) _____ No_____
The evidence at trial showed the following: Plaintiff is a for-profit affordable housing “Tax Credit Program” landlord whose building in this case (Grant Deed, Trial Exhibit 1) houses mostly Section 8-subsidized tenants, including Veterans Association Supportive Housing (”VASH”) recipients, of which Defendant Maurice Sandoval was one. Sandoval signed a lease in February, 2017 to rent 3500 Marmion Way #207, Los Angeles, CA. (Only odd-numbered pages of the lease were offered; see Trial Exhibit 2.) The four-story building provides supportive services for veterans. He qualified because he was a formerly homeless veteran and was issued a VASH “Section 8” voucher subsidy by the city of L.A.’s housing agency, HACLA. The voucher paid Section 8/VASH landlords at least 2/3 of the recipient’s monthly rent. Defendant’s daughter, Laura Sandoval, was a co-signatory on Defendant’s lease and occupied the sole bedroom on the premises. Defendant slept in the living room.
HACLA
and Plaintiff had a separate agreement which mirrored Defendant’s obligations
to HACLA, acknowledging various requirements for Section 8/VASH tenancies, two
of which were (1) annual inspections of the rented premises and (2) annual
income eligibility certifications. Based
on this agreement, Defendant could be in violation and lose Plaintiff’s housing
assistance payments if Defendant were later found to be ineligible. These requirements were also acknowledged as
material parts of Defendant’s lease with
Plaintiff. In other words, if Defendant
wanted to keep his Section 8/VASH voucher and payments made to the landlord on
his behalf, he was required to allow HACLA to inspect his unit at least
annually, and to comply with HACLA’s income eligibility recertifications. Eventually, as the evidence showed, Defendant
was unable or unwilling to comply with either one, leading to decisions HACLA
made to terminate Defendant’s VASH payments.
(Trial Exhibits 3, 10, 11, 51, 52)
HACLA actions. Income certification issue. As of 9/3/21 HACLA had already sent two letters to Defendant regarding his income certification. The last one, on 9/3/21, was a “final notice,” giving Defendant 14 more days to provide income review documentation. (Trial Exhibits 11 and 51) Another email was dated 9/13/21 on the same subject. (Trial Ex. 52) In a letter dated 9/22/21 and entitled “SECTION 8 VOUCHER PROGRAM NOTICE OF INTENDED ACTION AND RIGHT TO HEARING” (emphasis in orig.), HACLA gave Defendant another 30 days, this time until 10/22/21, before they would terminate his payments and cancel his voucher. This letter (Tr. Ex. 11 and 51) emphasized his request for a hearing must be made within that 30-day period. When Defendant never asked for one, HACLA terminated his Section 8 subsidy to take effect at the latest, as of November 1, 2021.
Annual inspection issue. Plaintiff’s senior regional property manager, Kelly Tesso, confirmed visits she had with Defendant on 9/1/21 and 10/21/21. Her first visit was to prepare for HACLA’s upcoming inspection on 9/10/21. On that visit, Defendant’s daughter refused access. HACLA’s inspector was unable to conduct the inspection on 9/10/21 explaining in its letter of 9/13/212 that “access was not provided.” The evidence showed that Defendant’s daughter would not allow access to her bedroom. HACLA rescheduled a ‘second and final inspection’ for 9/30/21. (Trial Ex. 10) Although there was no evidence that HACLA followed up with the 9/30/21 inspection or any inspection thereafter, Tasso testified that in a housing retention meeting on 10/21/21, Defendant said he could not force his daughter to give access and admitted failing the required inspection. Eventually, on 10/27/21, HACLA wrote Plaintiff notifying it of the “incomplete inspection” due to failure to allow access. (Tr. Exs. 11 and 51) This letter (which is not in evidence, but referred to in the Notice) “warned that the matter had been referred to Advisor Elizabeth Ortiz for termination of benefits.” (Tr. Ex. 3, p.2.) HACLA’s actions were memorialized in letters dated 11/23/21 confirming Defendant did not ask for a hearing and confirming that HACLA stopped making Section 8 payments to Plaintiff on Defendant’s behalf. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s actions. On 1/11/22 Plaintiff issued a 90-day Termination Notice (Trial Exhibit 3) setting forth what it called the Defendant’s “program violations,” which “included failed access to [Defendant’s] unit for annual inspection.” The Notice was in part a copy-and-paste of three HACLA notification letters mentioned earlier. The Notice confirmed that Defendant “did not ask for a hearing to try to keep [his] Section 8 program when [he] was offered to do so.” (Id.) Although the legal sufficiency of the Notice is in dispute, it led to the instant unlawful detainer action against Defendant. The complaint was filed on April 25, 2022.
Defendant’s evidence. Defendant said HACLA never came back for the reinspection scheduled on 9/30/21 nor did it ever attempt to gain access thereafter in order to inspect his daughter’s bedroom. He did concede difficulties related to getting her cooperation. At trial, Defendant, who has lived in his current apartment now for six years, told the jury that he “most definitely” prefers to return to Ventura County (Oxnard) where he’s from and where he feels he can use his two-bedroom voucher to live in a “brand new” VA facility with his daughter who suffers from a mental illness.
JNOV/New Trial- Defendant’s ground(s) for relief
Defendant seeks JNOV/new trial for two reasons related to the sole ground for relief under CCP § 657 (6), insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, and/or the verdict is against law, specifically:
“..two independent bases: (1) that the 90-day notice to quit (hereinafter “Termination Notice”) failed to include disclosures required under federal law when terminating a tenancy at a federally subsidized housing project, and (2) that the facts as developed at trial and determined by the jury’s verdict fail to support a judgment for unlawful detainer based on a theory that Defendant used the property for an illegal purpose.” (Motion 2:4-8)
Defendant’s first point involves defects in the Notice, as follows: failure to advise of rights to make a reply and examine documents, questions which the jury answered against Defendant in Questions 2 and 3 of the special verdict. Defendant’s second point involves Questions 4-8 of the special verdict where Plaintiff was found to have failed to allow inspection only once, which Defendant claims is insufficient to constitute an unlawful purpose under CCP § 1161(4). The court notes that Defendant’s motion papers did not address Defendant’s failure to provide income documentation for the annual recertification process, which was one of two reasons he lost his subsidy. (See, e.g., Jury Instruction C)
[ADDED AFTER INITIAL HEARING]
Plaintiff’s opposition. Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s opposition, filed five days late on 2/6/22. Under CCP § 659a, the opposition was due no later than 10 days after 1/20/23 (plus 2 court days) after the e-served moving papers, or by 2/1/23. The opposition does not request a good-cause extension under the same statute (which provides for up to a 10-day extension). Plaintiff should address Defendant’s objection (which the court did not receive until the morning of the initial hearing) at the continued hearing.
In its opposition, Plaintiff now argues that 24 CFR 982 applies, not 24 CFR 966, attaching as Exhibit 1 a copy of the notice requirements in 24 CFR 982.310 (e) (Oppn., Ex. 1). According to its opposition, “the jury was erroneously instructed on the right to a hearing and the jury did not need to answer those questions.” (Oppn. 2:13-14) Instead, Plaintiff argues “reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence to support the jury’s finding that Plaintiff complied with the governing law, which is 24 CFR Section 982 and 983 not 24 CFR §966.4(l)(3)(ii).” (Oppn. 2:14-16) Plaintiff’s opposition does not address the applicability of Appel v. Beyer (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, which is the only case Defendant cites for the proposition that a more stringent Notice was needed in this circumstance which Defendant argues the evidence fails to prove.
Reply. Defendant filed a timely Reply but it was not brought to the court’s attention until the morning of the initial hearing due to an unexplained delay in e-filing. In his Reply, Defendant provides additional authority supporting his contention that the leased premises are “mixed-finance public housing” and therefore require compliance with the Part 966 notice. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted.
The court will take the matter under submission after hearing argument.