Judge: Ralph C. Hofer, Case: 20STCV19634, Date: 2022-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV19634    Hearing Date: December 13, 2022    Dept: 3

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – NORTHEAST District

Department 3

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Dedicato Treatment Center, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY:        Plaintiff Linda Jean Pawlik

Motion for Summary Adjudication by Defendant Dedicato Treatment Center

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply filed in connection with this motion.

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff Linda Jean Pawlik (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on May 22, 2020 against Dedicato Treatment Center (“Defendant”) and 10 Doe Defendants.  This action arises from Defendant allegedly forcefully discharging Plaintiff from Defendant’s drug and alcohol treatment facility and leaving Plaintiff with Las Encinas Mental Hospital while she was in a compromised psychiatric condition.  Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) dependent adult abuse and neglect, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, and (5) recission of void contract.   On July 8, 2020, Defendant filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff’s representatives, Michael Anderson and Paul Tapia, for fraudulent misrepresentation.    

Defendant now files this motion for summary adjudication (“Motion”) as to the second and third causes of action.  

LEGAL STANDARD

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id.)  Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)  Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

EVIDENCE

            Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff and Document 1 is granted.        

Pursuant to subdivision (q) of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, the court rules only on the following evidentiary objections:

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections 1 and 3 are sustained.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections 1 and 9 are sustained. 

DISCUSSION

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.  (Corales v. Bennett (2009) 9th Cir. 567 F.3d 554, 571.)  Conduct is outrageous if it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Id. at 571.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's conduct was outrageous in (1) representing that it would treat Plaintiff allegedly without having any intention of doing so; (2) forcefully removing Plaintiff from Defendant’s facility; (3) leaving Plaintiff at Las Encinas Mental Health Hospital (“Las Encinas”), allegedly without any money or place to go, in physical and emotional distress; (4) allegedly leaving Plaintiff homeless that night; and (5) refusing to refund the $15,000 paid for 30 days of treatment despite refusing to provide the promised treatment. (Complaint, ¶ 23.)  

Defendant asserts its conduct was neither outrageous nor with the intent to cause Plaintiff harm or with reckless disregard for the probability of causing Plaintiff emotional harm. (Motion, 8:12-19.)  The court agrees that the evidence is insufficient to show any conduct on the part of Defendant which was so extreme and outrageous as to “exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication is therefore granted as to Plaintiff's claim for relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Dependent Adult Abuse and Neglect

The elements of dependent adult abuse and neglect under California law are: (1) that the defendant had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care, (2) that defendant knew of conditions that made the dependent adult unable to provide for her own basic needs, (3) that defendant denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the dependent adult's basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness), and (4) that the defendant’s neglect caused the dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain, or mental suffering. (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 396, 406–407; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.07, 15610.57.)  These elements must be proven by the clear and convincing evidence standard. (Id.)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff was voluntarily admitted and was free to leave Defendant’s facility. (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, UMF 2.)  It is also undisputed that Plaintiff was not subject to conservatorship or guardianship. (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, UMF 4.)  As to whether Defendant was responsible for Plaintiff’s basic needs, Defendant cites to Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, in which the California Supreme Court held that a claim under the California Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act) requires a defendant have custodial care of a plaintiff for the Act to apply. (Reply, 4:15-22.) 

The evidence supports a finding that Defendant knew of the conditions that made the dependent adult unable to provide for her own basic needs.  Dr. Keith Marshall indicated that Plaintiff “was not engaging in any self-care” and had to be assigned China Walker, a Clinical Support Technician, “to direct and guide [Plaintiff] with her general care; directing and guiding her with the bathing and the changing of her clothes and bedding.” (Decl. Marshall, ¶ ¶ 14, 15.)   

Defendant argues that although Plaintiff resided at Defendant's facility, because Defendant “was not her Conservator or Guardian” and Plaintiff was “free to leave on her own volition,” “she was not in the custody” of Defendant. (Reply, 4:23-27.)  However, Winn held that a caretaking or custodial relationship exists where “a person has assumed significant responsibility for attending to one or more of those basic needs of the elder or dependent adult that an able-bodied and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of managing without assistance.” (Winn at 155.)  Although the court did note that such a responsibility “entails more than casual or limited interactions,” it granted that the custodial relationship may even exist “beyond the confines of a residential care facility.” (Id. at 158.)  Defendant assigned Walker to manage Plaintiff’s basic needs while at Defendant's facility.  The court finds a custodial relationship did exist.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant knew or should have known that leaving Plaintiff with Las Encinas would result in harm to Plaintiff cannot be proven by clear and convincing evidence and that the claim for dependent adult abuse therefore must be adjudicated.  Additionally, Defendant points to the declarations of Dr. Marshall, Thomas Pitt, and China Walker to rebut Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant “knew injury was substantially certain to befall” Plaintiff when Defendant “abandoned” Plaintiff at Las Encinas in a compromised physical and psychiatric condition. (Motion 7:19-26; Complaint ¶¶ 29, 30.) 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant knew at the time of intake that “Plaintiff was frail; physically that she hurt her knee from a fall and the fact she had a black eye…[T]hey were aware that she [was] looking to change her lifestyle and had moved out of her residence and anticipated staying at [Defendant’s facility] for 60 to 90 days until she had found a place to live.” (Opposition, 4:18-22.) 

The court finds there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant knew or should have known leaving Plaintiff with Las Encinas would result in harm to Plaintiff.  The motion for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court grants the motion for summary adjudication by Defendant as to the second cause of action and denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  December 12, 2022

_____________________________

Colin Leis

Judge of the Superior Court