TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 3

Date: 4/19/2024

Case No: 21 STCV18257 Trial Date:  January 27, 2025 

Case Name: Cui v. Snow Joe, LLC, et al. 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT SECOND INDEPENDENT

MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Moving Party: Defendant Snow Joe, LLC   

Responding Party: Plaintiff Tracy Cui      

REQUEST TO ORDER EXAM OF:

Plaintiff Tracy Cui  

DECLARATION OF MOVING PARTY

Reasonable and good faith attempt to arrange exam by agreement:  ok, Decl., para. 5, Ex. H

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff Tracy Cui alleges that in September of 2020, plaintiff was operating a Snow Joe Electric 3-in-1 Blower/Vacuum/Mulcher in a foreseeable manner while vacuuming up leaves in her yard, when, suddenly, her hair became sucked into hidden air intake valves, causing her hair to be ripped out of her scalp as she struck her head against the subject product, knocking her unconscious. 

The complaint alleges that defendant Snow Joe LLC (Snow Joe) is the manufacturer, designer, and/or distributor of the subject product, and defendant Home Depot, Inc. (Home Depot) is the distributor and/or retailer of the subject product. The complaint alleges causes of action for strict product liability—defective design, negligence, strict product liability—failure to warn, and strict product liability—defective manufacturing. 

The file shows that in February of 2023, the parties entered into a Stipulation Re Good Faith Settlement and Mutual Waiver of Indemnity Claims, which was entered as the order of the court and filed on February 21, 2023.  On February 24, 2023, plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal of the action with prejudice as to Home Depot only, which was entered as requested the same date. 

On October 13, 2023, the court heard a motion brought by defendant Snow Joe to compel an independent medical examination of plaintiff, which was granted, and plaintiff ordered to appear for an examination by a neurological expert, to include a limited mental examination.    

ANALYSIS:

Procedural

Citation to Unpublished Materials

The court agrees that defendant’s reliance on materials from these cases is inappropriate.   

Under CRC Rule 8.1115:

 “(a) Except as provided in (b), an opinion of a California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that is not certified for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action.”

Subdivision (b) states:

“An unpublished opinion may be cited or relied on:

(1) When the opinion is relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel; or 

(2) When the opinion is relevant to a criminal or disciplinary action because it states reasons for a decision affecting the same defendant or respondent in another such action.” 

The minute order of another superior court judge is not a published opinion which may be cited as precedent to this court, and, even if such material constituted an unpublished opinion, neither of the exceptions appear to apply here.  

Defendant’s reliance on such materials appears to be a deliberate violation of the letter, as well as the spirit, of the Court Rule.   See Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc. (2009, 2nd Dist.) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 884-885 (“A written trial court ruling in another case has no precedential value in this court, which is also the rule in federal courts”); Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831 (“a written trial court ruling has no precedential value.”)

The materials and arguments based on them are accordingly disregarded by this court, and the court will consider whether it is appropriate to set an OSC re sanctions against counsel for defendant for engaging in this conduct.  

Notice, Order 

CCP § 2032.310(b) requires that a motion for a mental examination “shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination, as well as the specialty, if any, of the person or persons who will perform the examination.   The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”   Under CCP § 2032.320 (d), an order granting such a motion “shall specify the person or persons who may perform the examination, as well as the time, place, manner, diagnostic tests and procedures, conditions, scope and nature of the examination.” 

Here, the notice of motion does not include these specifics, as is usually done, and no proposed order at all has been submitted. 

The memorandum of points and authorities states:

“Snow Joe’s neuro-psychologist expert Dr. Kalechstein stands in a ready position to conduct an IME of Plaintiff. (Kalechstein Decl. ¶ 8.) Dr. Kalechstein has reserved April 29, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. PST for the IME, to take place at his office, located at: Executive Mental Health, Inc., 11835 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 1270E, Los Angeles, CA 90064. (Id.) That is the first available date and time that Dr. Kalechstein is available to conduct an IME of Plaintiff. (Id.) The parties have also scheduled a private mediation of this matter, which is currently set to take place one month later, on May 14, 2024. (Id.; see also Lee Decl. ¶ 7.) Dr. Kalechstein’s scope of examination for his contemplated neuropsychological evaluation of Plaintiff is described in full in the accompanying Description of the Neuropsychological Evaluation. (Kalechstein Decl. ¶ 9.; see also Exhibit G, Description of the Neuropsychological Evaluation.) 

For the Court’s convenience, the key substantive areas of evaluation can be summarized as follows: 

The purpose of the mental state evaluation is to assist counsel and the trier of fact in understanding the origin, nature, and severity of plaintiff’s alleged difficulties/impairment vis-à-vis cognition, emotion, and/or behavior. Based on the resultant understanding of the origin, nature, and severity of any mental state difficulties/impairments, it is then feasible to formulate prognoses and, if applicable, future treatment needs. 

The clinical interview covers a variety of relevant topics, including background information; the reported circumstances of onset of the alleged mental state injury or injuries; and how those symptoms have unfolded over time to the present, including any other assessments, treatment, or functional impairment. A detailed evaluation of this type is important in differentiating between mental state injuries/complaints that may be pre-existing and not related to the alleged actions of the defendant; injuries/complaints that were pre-existing but may have been exacerbated by the alleged actions of defendant; injuries/complaints that arose concurrently but unrelated to alleged actions of defendant; complaints that arose as a result of defendant’s alleged conduct; complaints that are actually due to substance use or medications; complaints that are due to an underlying general medical disorder; or complaints that arose subsequent to the alleged actions of defendant and were unrelated. 

Pertinent areas of inquiry with regard to plaintiff’s background include developmental history, education, employment, social and marital history, legal history, e.g., disability claims, general medical history, mental health history, substance use, and family history. The clinical interview also will elicit from plaintiff a detailed account of the onset and course of his/her mental state problems/impairments related to the alleged conduct of the defendants, culminating in a review of current mental state and physical complaints. Plaintiff also will be administered a battery of neuropsychological tests. The tests are considered to be valid and reliable measures of cognition and emotion, and will assess the following domains: intellectual function, attention/information processing speed, language/academic achievement, visuospatial skills, motoric function, memory for auditory and/or visual information, executive/frontal function, and/or personality/emotional functioning. Plaintiff may take an unlimited number of breaks. 

The mental state evaluation will not involve any physical examination. There will be no blood tests or other intrusive or protracted medical studies or procedures. The examination will be conducted at the following location: 11835 Olympic Blvd., Suite 1270E, Los Angeles, CA 90064, unless other arrangements are made with respect to the location of the IME. (See id.)

The scope of the testing is also listed below for the Court’s convenience. 

1) b–test: vigilance and information processing speed. 

2) Auditory Consonant Trigrams: working memory. 

3) Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Exam and/or Western Aphasia Battery: language. 

4) Brief Visuospatial Memory Test – Revised: learning and memory 

5) California Verbal Learning Test – 2 or 3: learning and memory. 

6) Continuous Performance Test – 2 or 3: attention/information processing speed. 

7) Controlled Oral Word Association Test: language and/or executive function. 

8) Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System: Executive function 

9) Dot Counting Test: information processing speed. 

10) Finger Tapping Test: motor function. 

11) Grooved Pegboard Test: motor function. 

12) Judgment of Line Orientation: perception of the environment. 

13) Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 or 2-RF or 3: personality/emotional functioning. 

14) Personality Assessment Inventory: personality/emotional functioning. 15) Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test: learning and memory. 

16) Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure Test: visuoperception, learning and memory, and/or executive function. 

17) Ruff Figural Fluency Test: executive function. 

18) Scholastic Abilities Test for Adults (SATA): academic achievement 

19) Selective Reminding Test: learning and memory and/or executive function. 

20) Stroop Test: attention/information processing speed and/or executive function. 

21) Symbol Digit Modalities Test: attention/information processing speed. 22) TOMM: learning and memory 

23) Trailmaking Test-Parts A and B attention/information processing speed and/or executive function.

24) Victoria Symptom Validity Test: attention/information processing speed 

25) Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – III or IV: intelligence 

26) Wechsler Memory Scale – III or IV: learning and memory 

27) Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: executive function 

28) Woodcock–Johnson Tests of Academic Achievement – IV: academic achievement 

While the Description of the Neuropsychological Evaluation includes the entire universe of all possible tests that Dr. Kalechstein may administer, the actual number of tests will be only a fraction of all the tests listed, such that it will be a much smaller subset. (Kalechstein Decl. ¶ 9.) The specific tests that Dr. Kalechstein will administer will be determined once the testing has commenced. (Id.) Given what Dr. Kalechstein understands about the instant case and Plaintiff’s injuries/complaints, he has estimated that the mental, emotional, cognitive, and personality-based testing, including the interview portion of the examination, will be completed in full in under six (6) hours. (Id.) This expected testing by Dr. Kalechstein is both reasonable and feasible under the circumstances, as Plaintiff already voluntarily underwent 24 tests by her own neuro-psychologist Dr. Grewal.

[Memorandum, pp. 4-6]. 

This information is not included in the notice of motion.  The information also does not clearly establish the qualifications of the examiner. Under CCP section 2032.020 (c)(1):

“A mental examination conducted under this chapter shall be performed only by a licensed physician, or by a licensed clinical psychologist who holds a doctoral degree in psychology and has had at least five years of postgraduate experience in the diagnosis of emotional and mental disorders.” 

The information provided does not permit the court to confirm that the proposed examiner meets these requirements, particularly that the examiner has at least five years of the required experience.   

The opposition argues that the description in the memorandum is so broad it encompasses the whole universe of plaintiff’s humanity, including information with no direct relation to the matters at issue, and that it is unreasonable to expect plaintiff to respond to this broad request.  Specifically, plaintiff argues that as a layperson, she should not be asked to remember or specify a medical history and should not be asked to give an oral history of the incident or provide a second unofficial deposition. 

Plaintiff relies on Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 739, in which the court of appeal ordered issuance of a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate certain portions of its order in connection with a mental examination of plaintiff, in that case, a boy who allegedly suffered brain damage due to oxygen deprivation during a near-drowning while riding a bumper boat at defendant’s entertainment center.   The court of appeal found that the trial court order had improperly ordered that the examining neuropsychologist “may take a history from DAVID NUNEZ but may not require or elicit narrative responses.”  

The court of appeal reviewed the trial court’s concerns, and concluded that an appropriate order would not broadly prohibit narrative responses, but that the trial court could properly order that the examiner “may take a history” from plaintiff, but,

“shall not ask [plaintiff] questions regarding the facts and circumstances of the accident to the extent those matters were already stated by [plaintiff] in his deposition or in his interview with Dr. Baumbach.”

Golfland, at 745-746. 

The breadth of the examination as described in the memorandum makes it difficult to limit to the needs of this matter without some further specification by defendant as to what exactly will be pursued, so that a second examination does not become an unauthorized further deposition.   However, the court is also cognizant that it could in connection with this dispute issue an order that the examiner is simply prohibited from asking plaintiff questions regarding the facts and circumstances of the incident to the extent already stated in her deposition testimony.      

Plaintiff also objects to the lack of notice with respect to which of the numerous listed tests and procedures will in fact be conducted, as the motion concedes that not all of them will be conducted and indicates that the specific tests to be pursued will be decided by the examiner during the course of the examination.   This situation is of concern as the court is required to issue an order identifying the permissible diagnostic tests and procedures with specificity. Plaintiff cites Carpenter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 249, in which the court of appeal observed: 

“Requiring the court to identify the permissible diagnostic tests and procedures, by name, confirms that the court has weighed the risks of unwarranted intrusion upon the plaintiff against the defendant's need for a meaningful opportunity to test the plaintiff's claims of physical or mental injury. Furthermore, the resulting specificity and clarity of the order will also aid the examiner in understanding and complying with the parameters imposed by the court.

In sum, the plain meaning of section 2032.320 is that the trial court must “specify the ... diagnostic tests and procedures” of the mental examination by naming the tests and procedures to be performed.”

Carpenter, at 261-262, italics in the original. 

The information provided here is insufficient to permit the court to grant the relief requested or prepare the order with the detail required under CCP §§ 2032.310 (b) and 2032.320 (d).  The motion could be denied without prejudice for failure to meet the procedural requirements of seeking the subject additional examination, but the court elects not to do so.

“An order granting a physical or mental examination shall specify the person or persons who may perform the examination, as well as the time, place, manner, diagnostic tests and procedures, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination.”  

Substantive

If the procedural issues can be addressed or resolved at the hearing, the court now considers the merits of the motion. 

By this motion, defendant Snow Joe seeks an order to allow defendant’s neuro-psychologist expert to conduct an independent medical examination of plaintiff.  

Under CCP section 2032.220, any defendant may demand one physical examination of plaintiff, “[i]n any case in which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for personal injuries...”   

CCP § 2032.020 (a) provides, in pertinent part: “Any party may obtain discovery, subject to the restrictions set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2019.010), by means of a physical or mental examination of (1) a party to the action... in any action in which the mental...condition... of that party...is in controversy in the action.”  

Defendant seeks relief under CCP section 2032.310 (a), which provides that if a second physical examination or mental examination is sought by any party, “the party shall obtain leave of court.”  CCP § 2032.320 (a) provides that “The court shall grant a motion for a physical or mental examination under Section 2032.310 only for good cause shown.”  

A showing of good cause generally requires the requesting party to show both relevancy to the subject matter, and specific facts justifying the discovery, in effect, specific facts showing the need for the information sought. See Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 840; Weil & Brown, Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group, 2024 rev.)  8:1557.  Weil & Brown note that the party should also show a lack of means for obtaining the information elsewhere.   Id. 

Weil & Brown note that good cause for permitting a second examination in personal injury cases can be shown in circumstances where plaintiff claims additional injuries, that the symptoms or conditions are worsening or that there has been a significant lapse of time since the initial exam.  Civ.Proc. Before Trial, at 8:1558.  

Weil & Brown note in connection with mental and physical exams, the court may order more than one examination, with each to be justified by “good cause:”

“Where plaintiff’s injuries are complex, several exams may be necessary by specialists in different fields.  There is no limit on the number of physical or mental exams that may be ordered on a showing of good cause.  The good cause requirement checks any potential of harassment of plaintiff.  [Shapira v. Sup. Ct. (Sylvestri) (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1249, 1255… (citing text)—second mental examination may be ordered.” 

Civ. Proc. Before Trial 8:1558.5 (italics in original). 

Defendant relies on Shapira, cited in Weil and Brown, above, in which the court of appeal vacated a trial court order denying a motion to compel a second mental examination by a different mental specialist, finding that there was no limitation on the number of mental examinations which could be ordered, and directing the trial court to determine if good cause had been established for the second exam.  

The trial court’s determination of good cause with respect to requiring a physical examination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See Harabedian v. Superior Court (1961, 2nd Dist.) 195 Cal.App.2d 26, 31.

 

Defendant’s counsel indicates in a declaration supporting the motion:

“The neurologist expert Dr. Gold recently conducted a court-ordered IME of Plaintiff and evaluated her head injury, headache, cognitive decline, and memory loss claims. However, Dr. Gold advised that Plaintiff complained to him of ongoing anxiety, stress, and trauma. Dr. Gold stated that he cannot give an opinion on complaints of a psychological nature, and thus, input from a neuropsychologist would be required. Attached is a true and accurate copy of Dr. Gold’s IME report. (See Exhibit E, IME Report by Dr. Gold, at pages 31-33.) To that end, Snow Joe’s neuro-psychologist expert Dr. Kalechstein has explained that his field deals primarily with neuro-psychological claims and conditions, which include anxiety, depression, stress, and trauma, such that he would be in the proper position to provide expert testimony and opinion on these such claims.”

[Lee Decl., para. 6]. 

“Dr. Gold stated that he cannot give an opinion on complaints of a psychological nature, and thus, input from a neuropsychologist would be required. (See id., at pages 31-33.) To that end, my field deals primarily with neuro-psychological claims and conditions, which include anxiety, depression, stress, and trauma.”

[Kalechstein Decl., para. 7].

Subdivision (c) provides:

“A stipulation by a party under this subdivision shall include both of the following:

(1) A stipulation that no claim is being made for mental or emotional distress over and above that usually associated with the physical injuries claimed.

(2) A stipulation that no expert testimony regarding this usual mental and emotional distress will be presented at trial in support of the claim for damages.”

In this case, plaintiff has conceded that she is seeking damages for the types of psychological issues the examination would explore, including anxiety, depression, stress, and trauma.

There is no stand-alone stipulation submitted with the opposition for the court to confirm that such a stipulation conforms with statute. 

 

Plaintiff evidently relies on an email from counsel, not an executed stipulation, which states: 

“We confirm that we will not re-designate Dr. Bal Grewal as an expert, nor be calling any neuropsychologist to testify as an expert at trial. We also agree not to rely on his findings as a treating physician in proving our noneconomic damages. However, we cannot agree to waive emotional distress, anxiety, trauma, stress, or depression, as all of those fall within the "garden variety" emotional distresses that may be proven in a personal injury claim. They do not put a plaintiff's mental condition at issue.  (See Davis V. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1015-1016; ["an allegation of pain and suffering from a physical injury permits a party to recover for a range of emotional injuries. Pain and suffering have included physical pain, fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror and ordeal."]; Turner v. Imperial Stores (S.D. Cal. 1995) 161 F.R.D. 89 [holding that a claim for damages for emotional distress without alleging a psychic injury or psychiatric disorder is considered "garden variety" and does not warrant a mental examination.])  

Plaintiff's emotional distress, pain and suffering, which as noted by Davis, includes a "range" of emotional injuries, can be established through Plaintiff's testimony, her treating doctors, and Plaintiff's other experts. It is improper under the Code and the above cases to allow a second adversarial evaluation for the purposes of exploring Plaintiff's emotional distress and pain and suffering.”

[Ex. C]. 

“5.  In the event that my prior emails are not sufficiently clear to this Court to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.320, I hereby stipulate, on behalf of Plaintiff that no claim is being made for mental and emotional distress over and above that usually associated with the physical neurological injuries claimed and their sequelae. I further stipulate that no expert testimony regarding this usual mental and emotional distress will be presented at trial in support of Plaintiff’s claim for damages. This disclaimer covers any psychological, psychiatric, or mental or emotional distress injuries that may have been previously alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint or discovery responses that are beyond the mental and emotional distress usually associated with her physical injuries.

6. While Plaintiff may testify at trial to feelings of sadness, anxiousness, and stress in connection with the incident giving rise to Plaintiff’s complaint, or feeling somewhat traumatized by the incident, Plaintiff is not, and will not claim any clinical diagnoses of depression, anxiety, acute stress disorder, acute stress reaction, or posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). To the extent that any of the above damages described is considered by this Court to be above and beyond the usual mental and emotional distress associated with Plaintiff’s physical injuries, Plaintiff will stipulate that such damages will not be claimed at trial.”

[Kayne Decl., paras. 5, 6].  

First, CCP section 2032.320(b) requires that “a party” stipulate “as provided in subdivision (c).”  Subdivision (c) expressly states, that “A stipulation by a party,” include certain required representations.  There is no stipulation by the “party” here, only by counsel.   

In addition, with respect to subdivision (c)(1), it is required that such a stipulation state that “no claim is being made for mental or emotional distress over and above that usually associated with the physical injuries claimed.”  

The email and declaration here do not clearly state this disclaimer but indicate that plaintiff will not be pursuing such distress, other than that “usually associated with the physical neurological injuries claimed and their sequelae.”   It is not clear what “sequelae” is intended to encompass, and the representation highlights that this is not the usual case where physical injuries not ordinarily directly affiliated with mental or emotional process are at issue but involves direct physical injury to plaintiff’s brain and neurological faculties.  The representations also consistently represent that plaintiff has every intention of testifying to her emotional distress, anxiety, stress, and trauma.  Plaintiff has not satisfied this subdivision of the statute. 

With respect to subdivision (2), requiring that a party stipulate “that no expert testimony regarding this usual mental and emotional distress will be presented at trial in support of the claim for damages,” the representation appears to be that no expert testimony from a neuro-psychologist will be presented regarding such usual mental and emotional distress, but the email represents that plaintiff will support her claims with her own testimony, as well as that of “her treating doctors, and Plaintiff's other experts.”  The purported stipulation is not clear enough to foreclose efforts at trial to support plaintiff’s emotional and mental distress claims with expert testimony.  

Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the court that an appropriate stipulation has been offered here.  

This situation is not the typical case where mental and emotional distress damages can be carved out by stipulation, such as where, for example, plaintiff is prepared to concede that emotional distress from a wrongful employment termination claim has ceased to be an issue and is not an ongoing or current concern.  See, e.g.,  Doyle v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1878, 1886;  Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833.  Here, plaintiff is evidently not willing to concede that there are no current and ongoing distress issues for which plaintiff seeks compensation.  

This outcome leaves the matter in the posture where good cause has been established to conduct a second IME by the neuropsychologist, as limited to psychological issues.  The motion is granted because the court is finding good cause for a second IME.  

The court is aware that the opposition evidently intends to extend an alternative choice here, and the court will hear argument whether the court should take plaintiff up on plaintiff’s willingness to stipulate that plaintiff will not be claiming any psychological affiliated emotional or mental distress, including that associated with anxiety, depression, stress, or trauma, and to not offer any expert testimony of any sort on such issues.  Plaintiff would need to make this showing for the court to deny the motion.  The court doubts that plaintiff can make such a showing. 

However, to the extent plaintiff intends to continue to pursue what has previously been alleged to have been significant emotional distress damages affiliated with a traumatic brain injury, which appear beyond the garden variety emotional distress suffered in an ordinary personal injury claim involving injury to a body part other than the brain or neurological functions,  plaintiff will not be permitted to assert or attempt to prove such damages without having first permitted defendant the opportunity to conduct a reasonable further mental examination with a neuropsychologist.  

If the motion is granted, as noted above, there is no proposed order submitted with this motion.  Under CCP section 2032.320(d):

“An order granting a physical or mental examination shall specify the person or persons who may perform the examination, as well as the time, place, manner, diagnostic tests and procedures, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination.”  

Defendant will be ordered to submit and serve a proposed order reflecting this information. 

RULING:

Defendants Snow Joe, LLC’s Motion for Leave to Conduct Second IME:

The Court notes it has not in connection with the merits of this motion, considered reference to or argument based on materials relied upon by defendant from other superior court cases, which materials are not properly citable precedent. 

Motion is GRANTED:

Good cause appearing, plaintiff Tracy Cui is ordered to submit to an examination to be conducted by licensed neuropsychologist Dr. Ari Kalechstein. 

The examination will be limited to examination concerning plaintiff’s claimed injuries and damages of a psychological nature, including, and limited to, anxiety, depression, stress, and/or trauma.     

Plaintiff will not be required to provide a description of the facts and circumstances of the incident to the extent such matters were already addressed by plaintiff in her deposition in this matter. 

The examination is not to exceed six hours, exclusive of breaks.  

Examination is to be completed by no later than June 14, 2024.

Defendant is ordered to submit and serve a proposed order which fully complies with CCP section 2032.320 (d) and present it to plaintiff’s attorney for review and approval.  If plaintiff’s attorney will not approve the order, defendants’ attorney can file an Exparte Application for the IME court order.  

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE 

AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES

Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance.  Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances.  However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. 

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.