Judge Ralph C. Hofer, Case Number: 21STCV32192, Date: 2024-07-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ralph C. Hofer, Case: 21STCV32192, Date: 2024-07-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV32192 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 3

Date: 7/12/2024

Case No: 21 STCV32192 Trial Date: February 10, 2025

Case Name: Doe, et al. v. Roe, et al.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication)

Moving Party: Defendant Grace Communion International

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Grace Communion International and against plaintiffs Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2.

In the alternative, summary adjudication of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and/or seventh causes of action.

CAUSES OF ACTION: from First Amended Complaint

1) Sexual Abuse of a Minor v. Roe 1, Dean

2) IIED v. Dean

3) Sexual Harassment v. Grace, Dean

4) Negligence v. Grace

5) Negligent Supervision of a Minor v. Grace

6) Violation of 42 USC Section 1983 v. Grace

7) Violation of Civil Rights v. Grace

8) Negligence v. Does

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1, currently 51 years old, and Jane Doe 2, currently 52 years old, allege that they were victims of unlawful sexual assault, abuse and other misconduct perpetrated by defendant Kevin Owen Dean while plaintiffs were students and members of defendant Grace Communion International (Grace Communion), formerly known as Worldwide Church of God.

Plaintiffs allege that the abuse of Jane Doe 1 began in approximately 1983, when she was just 12 years old and continued until 1991 when she was 22 years old. The abuse of Jane Doe 2 began in approximately 1984 when she was just 14 years old and continued until 1988, when she was 18 years old.

Plaintiffs allege that during the time period of 1983 through 1991, defendant Grace Communion was repeatedly contacted related to multiple reports of physical and sexual abuse of plaintiffs and other minor children entrusted into its care and was given evidence of the abuse. It is alleged that employees and agents of Grace Communion witnessed the abuse yet failed to do anything in response to it, and that defendants turned a blind eye and continued to allow defendant Dean to work at Grace Communion, and did not discipline or discharge him, thus allowing Dean to gain access to and ultimately manipulate and sexually abuse plaintiffs.

The file shows that on February 7, 2022, plaintiff filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of the punitive damages claim against Grace Communion only.

ANALYSIS:

Procedural

Third, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action

Plaintiffs in a footnote in the opposition indicate that they:

“agree to dismiss the third cause of action for Sexual Harassment (Civ. Code sections 51.9 & 52), sixth cause of action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and seventh cause of action for Violation of Civil Rights (Civ. Code section 52.1). Thus, the operative claims against Defendant are the two negligence claims (fourth and fifth causes of action).”

[Opposition, p. 3, n.1].

No requests for dismissal have yet been filed with the court.

The court accordingly grants the motion for summary adjudication as to those causes of action at the concession of plaintiffs in the opposition. Defendant has requested this relief in the reply.

The motion is considered to the extent defendant Grace Communion seeks summary judgment or summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action for negligence and fifth cause of action for negligent supervision of a minor.

Substantive

Under CCP § 437c(p)(2) a defendant “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant... has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”

CCP § 437c(f)(1) provides that “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”

Defendant Grace Communion seeks summary judgment or summary adjudication, arguing that plaintiffs will be unable to establish one or more elements of their causes of action against moving defendant.

Issue 2: Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Negligence is Meritless because Grace Lacked knowledge of Kevin Owen Dean’s misconduct or illicit proclivities

Issue 3: Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision of a Minor is Meritless because Grace lacked knowledge of Kevin Owen Dean’s misconduct or illicit proclivities.

To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege and prove the following elements: The existence of a duty of care, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach. Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.

With respect to negligent supervision of a minor in the school context, both sides rely on C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861 in which the California Supreme Court held:

“Ample case authority establishes that school personnel owe students under their supervision a protective duty of ordinary care, for breach of which the school district may be held vicariously liable. (See, e.g., Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747, 87 Cal.Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360; Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1458–1461, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688.) If a supervisory or administrative employee of the school district is proven to have breached that duty by negligently exposing plaintiff to a foreseeable danger of molestation by his guidance counselor, resulting in his injuries, and assuming no immunity provision applies, liability falls on the school district under section 815.2.”

C.A., at 865-866.

The Court in C.A. held that a special relationship exists between a student and a school and its employees:

“In addition, a school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district's pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, “analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.” (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 935, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 968 P.2d 522; see M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 517, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 673; Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist., supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1458–1459, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688.) Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714, the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally. This principle has been applied in cases of employees' alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by another student (J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123, 128–129, 141–148, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 182; M.W., at pp. 514–515, 517–521, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 673), injury to a student by a nonstudent (Leger, at pp. 1452–1453, 1458–1459, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688) and—on facts remarkably close to the present case—injuries to a student resulting from a teacher's sexual assault (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1851–1855, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 671).

C.A., at 869-870, footnote omitted.

In M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School District (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, the court of appeal, in concluding that a school district owed a minor student a duty to protect him from a sexual assault, explained:

“School districts are subject to well-established statutory duties mandating adequate supervision for the protection of the students. These affirmative duties arise from the compulsory nature of school attendance, the expectation and reliance of parents and students on schools for safe buildings and grounds, and the importance to society of the learning activity that takes place in schools. (See Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., supra, 186 Cal. App. 3d at p. 714.)”

M.W., at 524-525.

Defendant Grace Communion argues here that with respect to the negligence-based causes of action, plaintiffs will be unable to establish that defendant engaged in any negligent act because defendant had no notice of the misconduct or proclivities of defendant Dean.

It is held that the issue of due care (a negligent act) in a negligence case ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury. Wahlgren v. Market Street Ry Co. (1901) 132 Cal. 656, 663; Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 141, 144. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a finding on summary judgment as a matter of law only if “the facts of the case permit only one reasonable conclusion.” Capolungo v. Bondi (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 346, 354.

The California Supreme Court has explained in connection with the negligence of a school, “[T he issues of whether or not the school acted negligently in failing to provide adequate supervision,” and “if so, whether the student’s injuries were proximately caused by such negligence, [fall] within the province of the jury.” Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 513.

Defendant argues that a school is not liable for the sexual abuse of a minor unless it had actual or reasonably foreseeable notice of the abuse, and that multiple instances of inoffensive and harmless behavior do not equate to foreseeable sexual misconduct. Defendant relies primarily on John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 and Steven F. v. Anaheim Union High School Dist. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 904.

Defendant relies on a footnote in the John R. case in which the California Supreme Court noted:

“We must also observe that the [concurring and dissenting] opinion seems to reflect an unduly pessimistic view of human nature, for, if we read the opinion correctly, it seems to suggest that sexual misconduct is foreseeable any time a minor and an adult are alone in a room together, at least if not constrained by the possibility of being interrupted. (See conc. and dis. opn., post, p. 465.) Given the facts of this case and the benefit of hindsight, all would have to agree that the prospect of such misconduct is conceivable, but that is a far cry from foreseeability, even under the broad meaning that concept is given in the respondeat superior context.”

John R., at 450, n. 9.

This portion of the footnote was directed to the theory of respondent superior liability for the sexual assault itself.

The actual holding in the John R. case was that a theory of liability on the school district for alleged sexual abuse of a student by a teacher based on vicarious liability based on respondeat superior based on the facts in the case before it was questionable. However, the Court expressly held that plaintiffs were “free to pursue…their claims against the district premised on its own direct negligence in hiring and supervising the teacher.” John R., at 453. The first paragraph of the above quoted footnote in fact emphasized that the majority took issue with the analysis offered which appeared to improperly call for the Court to “prejudge plaintiffs’ direct claims against the district for its own negligence.” [Id.]. There is no dispute that the theories pursued in the subject causes of action are claims based on the direct negligence of defendant. The footnote accordingly has no bearing on the direct negligence claims alleged here.

In addition, as pointed out in the opposition, in the more recent case of Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, the Second District, in considering direct negligence claims against a school district with respect to the alleged sexual assault of a 13 year old student by a school music instructor, reversed the trial court’s granting of summary adjudication on the student’s negligence causes of action, holding:

“We conclude, consistent with California negligence law, that school administrators have a duty to protect students from sexual abuse by school employees, even if the school does not have actual knowledge of a particular employee's history of committing, or propensity to commit, such abuse.”

Lawndale, at 119.

The Second District in Lawndale rejected an argument by the school district based on the same footnote in John R. that it is not foreseeable that school employees will sexually abuse students, and directly addressed the current application of that footnote under current law:

“The District also contends it is not foreseeable school employees will sexually abuse students. According to the District, “sexual abuse is so unforeseeable that it is outside the course and scope of everyone's employment as a matter of law.” But a school district is not like every employer. As the court recognized in United States Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 552, sexual abuse by members “of an organization that provide[s] activities exclusively for children”—like an elementary school district—is reasonably foreseeable, even where the organization “had no knowledge that [the employee] had previously sexually or physically abused anyone or had a propensity to do so.” (Id. at pp. 1132, 1135, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 552; see Archbishop, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 676-677, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 613; Brown v. USA Taekwondo, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1097-1098, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708; Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 404, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 (Juarez), disapproved on another ground in Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 222, fn. 9, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 434, 483 P.3d 159.)

The District relies primarily on John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [256 Cal. Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948] (lead opn.). In that case the Supreme Court held a school district was not vicariously liable for a teacher's sexual molestation of a student under respondeat superior. (Id. at p. 441, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.) The lead opinion, joined by one other justice, included a footnote stating it was “unduly pessimistic ... to suggest that sexual misconduct is foreseeable any time a minor and an adult are alone in a room together ....” (Id. at p. 450, fn. 9, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.) But the issue here is not whether it is foreseeable a particular adult will sexually abuse a student if left alone with the student. As the court recognized in United States Youth Soccer, and as subsequent cases confirmed, the issue is whether it is reasonably foreseeable that organizations or entities that provide services primarily or exclusively for children have employees who may sexually abuse a child if the organization fails to take reasonable measures to prevent the abuse. In any event, to the extent John R. suggests sexual abuse of students by school employees is not reasonably foreseeable, it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's more recent holding in Hart that school personnel owe students a duty to take reasonable measures to protect them from foreseeable injury, including “injuries to a student resulting from a teacher's sexual assault.” (Hart, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 871, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 270 P.3d 699.)

Lawndale, at 132

Lawndale relied on Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Association, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, in which the court of appeal found that an organization such as the Youth Soccer Association had a duty to one of its players in connection with sexual abuse by a coach, even where “defendants had no knowledge that [the coach] had previously sexually or physically abused anyone or had a propensity to do so.” United States Youth Soccer, at 1132.

With respect to Steven F., defendant relies on a list of several specific instances in Steven F, which were held insufficient to provide a school with knowledge of a teacher’s sexual relationship with a student, but, again this case is not applicable here because, as pointed out in the opposition, Steven F. involved an analysis of the scope of a school district’s duty owed to the relatives of a student who had been sexually abused at school. The student’s claims against the district had been settled. The Court held that the student’s parents could not recover under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress, applying an NIED liability analysis which required that there be outrageous conduct on the part of defendants, and finding that in that case, the other teachers’ failure to report their colleague’s spending too much time in the company of a particular student was not sufficiently outrageous. The instant case is not a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought by relatives, but a direct action by the students, and no outrageous conduct on the part of defendant is required.

The school district in Lawndale cited the passage in Steven F. in support of an argument that the standard of care required actual notice of sexual abuse, as defendant argues here. The court of appeal in Lawndale rejected the argument, explaining:

“This language from the 2003 Court of Appeal opinion in Steven F. no longer reflects California law. Imposing liability on school administrators who fail to take reasonable measures to identify and respond to potential sexual abuse of students does not lead to the parade of horribles conjured by the court in Steven F. The language cited by the District is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Hart, which weighed the consequences of imposing liability on school districts and held school administrators may be liable for their negligent supervision of employees that results in sexual abuse. (Hart, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 879, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 270 P.3d 699.)”

Lawndale, at 136-137.

The court of appeal in Lawndale also addressed the language defendant quotes from Santillan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 708, 720, that vicarious liability is precluded “based solely on knowledge of conduct by the employee which is ambiguous in regard to his commission of such an offense.” The Santillan case addressed what evidence was necessary to revive the statute of limitations on childhood sex abuse cases under former CCP section 340.1, which permitted victims to bring an action where an institution “knew or had reason to know” that the perpetrator had engaged in past unlawful sexual conduct, which it had been recognized by the lower court “imposes more stringent demands on constructive knowledge than the concept of foreseeability normally applicable to negligence claims.” Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 542. The Lawndale court of appeal explained that Santillan’s “holding was limited to a defendant’s notice for purposes of extending the limitations period under the statute.” Lawndale, at 130.

The standard to be applied is then not whether defendant had actual knowledge of any misconduct or propensity of its employee Dean, but whether the organization failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the abuse, in effect, failed to take reasonable measures to identify and respond to potential sexual abuse of students from foreseeable sources. Lawndale, at 132, 136; C.A. v. William Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 871.

Defendant has in its legal argument relied on standards which are inapplicable to the analysis here to the extent they require actual knowledge, when, as discussed above, there is no such requirement here. The issues for summary adjudication are noticed and expressly stated as that the negligence and negligent supervision causes of action are “meritless because Grace lacked knowledge of Kevin Owen Dean’s misconduct or illicit proclivities.” This notice suggests that an actual knowledge standard is being applied, which would not defeat the element of a negligent act or omission which could be established by other means, and summary adjudication of the entire causes of action would not be appropriate.

Defendant in the reply does attempt to argue that the more recent case law cited by plaintiffs does not in fact govern the analysis here but concedes that under C.A. (referred to in some case authorities as “Hart”), the law imposes a duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally. C.A., at 870.

In any case, foreseeability is recognized as being broad in this context involving services for children in a school setting, as well as a church and recreational camp setting, and is not directly addressed in the moving papers.

Defendant’s motion on these issues accordingly arguably fails to meet defendant’s initial burden on these issues, and the motion on these issues could be denied on this ground alone.

Even had the burden shifted to plaintiffs to raise triable issues of material fact with respect to whether sexual misconduct on the part of Dean was foreseeable, plaintiffs have submitted evidence which raises triable issues.

As noted above, the issue of whether a breach of duty has occurred in this context is ordinarily a question of fact. Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach School Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 513

First, although defendant argues that Grace Communion had sexual abuse reporting training and programs, plaintiffs have submitted evidence raising some question whether such programs were in fact in place, including evidence that employees did not receive such training, and such programs and sufficient policies did not exist. [UMF No. 29, 30, 33,35 and evidence cited, Ex. 16, Williams Decl., para. 12; Ex. 17, Dailey Decl., para. 12, Ex. 18, Helge Decl., para. 7, Ex. 19, Feazell Decl., para. 11; Additional Facts Nos. 57-63, and evidence cited]. Specifically, the former principal of the high school at the time, John Locke, testified at deposition that he does not recall ever receiving any training related to suspected sexual abuse of students from either the church or the Imperial Schools, and does not recall himself providing any sort of information or training to his staff, teachers, or employees. [Shukry Decl., Ex. 8, Locke Depo., pp. 39-41]. Locke also does not recall receiving anything from the legal department or from the church on the topic. [Locke Depo, p. 41]. School personnel, including then legal secretary Evelyn Dailey, and then teacher, now president, Leston Greg Williams, testified in deposition that they could not recall any written policies at the time. [Additional Facts No. 62, and evidence cited, Shukry Decl., Ex. 7, Dailey Depo. 48-49; Shukry Decl., Ex. 10, Williams Depo., pp. 66-67].

In addition, although defendant has submitted a declaration of Ralph Helge, general legal counsel for the Grace Church organization at the time, stating that at no time prior to or during Dean’s employment with Imperial schools did he receive any complaints, reports, or other information suggesting Dean had sexually abused or was sexually inappropriate with a minor, plaintiffs have submitted deposition testimony in which Doe 1 testifies that she attended a meeting with the lawyer for the church, the declarant Ralph Helge, and her parents, in which the lawyer Helge made it clear he was aware of the sexual abuse of Doe 1 by Dean, but told plaintiff’s father that it would be very damaging to the father’s reputation if the relationship became public. [Helge Decl., para. 8; Response to UMF No. 32, and evidence cited, Additional Facts Nos. 12, 64-65, and evidence cited; Shukry Decl., Ex. 1, Doe 1 Depo., pp. 61-64, 83, 84, 88-91].

Several witnesses for defendant submit declarations indicating that records were reviewed and there were no complaints whatsoever in the records reflecting that Superintendent Dean “posed a risk of danger to minor children,” suggesting known misconduct which had become known to Helge was not reported or recorded. [UMF Nos. 37, 38, and evidence cited, Ex. 16, Williams Decl., para. 11; Ex. 17, Dailey Decl., paras. 10, 11; Ex. 19, Feazell Decl., para. 12]. This circumstance raises triable issues of material fact with respect to whether Helge had actual knowledge of the improper relationship between Dean and a student, and deliberately did nothing about it and did not document it according to his own reported policies and training practices or was actively engaged in covering up the information.

Finally, plaintiffs have submitted evidence which a trier of fact could reasonably find supports a conclusion that school, church and camp administrators should have known, or a reasonable investigation of conduct should have resulted in, discovery of defendant’s misconduct.

Specifically, plaintiffs submit evidence that Dean would do drugs with and provide alcohol to groups of students on multiple occasions, on school property, in his home, which was a church owned property, and at camp, and that drug and alcohol use occurred in the presence of another Imperial teacher and sports coach, Greg Rothwell, who plaintiff and other students believed was also aware of the closeness between Dean and Doe 1. [Additional Facts Nos. 28, 29, and evidence cited, Doe 1 Depo. pp. 44-49]. Plaintiffs also submit deposition testimony of a student at the time, Lisa Davis, who testifies that she was called into the school office and asked about the parties by Principal Locke and Vice Principal Cote, including whether there had been alcohol use, and when Davis could offer no information, Principal Locke “would tell us not to have this conversation with anyone, and one student would have to go get the next one.” [Response to UMF No. 36, and evidence cited, Additional Facts 33, 53-55, and evidence cited, Shukry Decl., Ex. 2, Davis Depo. I, pp. 34; Shukry Decl., Ex. 3, Davis Depo. II, pp. 92-102; Shukry Decl., Ex. 6, Davis Depo. III, 31-33]. As plaintiffs argue, this evidence gives rise to a reasonable inference that Dean’s misconduct, occurring repeatedly, was suspected by the principal and vice principal, known to at least one other teacher, and should have been further investigated and viewed with suspicion as creating an atmosphere of danger for students, and for abuse.

Plaintiffs also submit evidence that Dean’s wife, Carole Dean, a teacher at the Imperial elementary school, witnessed Dean kissing plaintiff Doe 1 in their home. [Additional Facts 8, 24, and evidence cited, Doe 1 Depo., pp. 150].

Evidence is also submitted that camp employees personally assisted in delivering plaintiff Doe 1 to spend time alone with Dean after lights out at camp. [Additional Facts Nos. 35-37, 50, and evidence cited, Doe Depo., p 258-261].

Plaintiffs submit evidence that fellow students were aware of the relationship, observing the physical closeness between the two, particularly in speech class, hearing rumors of the relationship, and overhearing daily telephone calls from plaintiff Doe 1 to Superintendent Dean, in which she laughed and giggled, and was “smiley and flirty when she was on the phone.” [Response to UMF No. 36, and evidence cited, Additional Facts Nos. 27, 31, 32, 34, and evidence cited, Davis Depo., I pp. 31, 32, 39-41; Davis Depo. II, pp. 86-91, 179-185, Davis Depo III, p. 103].

The Second District in Lawndale, in fact, noted as troublesome the instructor’s “frequent physical interactions” with plaintiff student “on campus in the presence of others—which the other middle school students described as ‘flirting.’” Lawndale, at 131.

The evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that ineffective supervision was occurring, despite the special relationship between the school and church and its students, and that there was sufficiently concerning conduct occurring by Dean in connection with students which warranted investigation. As argued in the opposition, at the very least, the drug and alcohol being provided at parties by Superintendent Dean should have led to an investigation which could have uncovered his other improper conduct or resulted in discipline and possible removal from further contact with his alleged sexual abuse victims. Triable issues of material fact remain, and the motion on these issues is denied.

RULING:

Grace Communion International’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication:

Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Motion for Summary Adjudication:

Motion is GRANTED as to the third cause of action for sexual harassment, sixth cause of action for civil rights violation under 42. U.S.C. section 1983, and seventh cause of action for civil rights violation under Civil Code section 52.1 (Issues 1, 4 and 5) based on plaintiffs’ concession in the opposition that these causes of action, specifically, the third cause of action for Sexual Harassment (Civ. Code sections 51.9 & 52), sixth cause of action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and seventh cause of action for Violation of Civil Rights (Civ. Code section 52.1), should be dismissed as to moving defendant, with the only operative claims remaining against this defendant being the two negligence claims (fourth and fifth causes of action).

[See, Opposition, p. 3, n.1].

Issue 2: Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Negligence is Meritless because Grace Lacked knowledge of Kevin Owen Dean’s misconduct or illicit proclivities

Issue 3: Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision of a Minor is Meritless because Grace lacked knowledge of Kevin Owen Dean’s misconduct or illicit proclivities.

Motion is DENIED.

Defendant has failed to effectively establish that actual knowledge is legally required to support a direct negligent or negligent supervision claim in this context under current legal authority.

In addition, plaintiffs have raised triable issues of material fact with respect to whether defendant Grace Communion International in fact obtained actual knowledge of the alleged sexual abuse but failed to appropriately address it. [UMF Nos. 37, 38, Response to UMF No. 32, and evidence cited, Additional Facts Nos. 12, 64-65, and evidence cited, Shukry Decl., Ex. 1, Doe 1 Depo., pp. 61-64, 83, 84, 88-91; Helge Decl., para. 8, Ex. 16, Williams Decl., para. 11; Ex. 17, Dailey Decl., paras. 10, 11; Ex. 19, Feazell Decl., para. 12].

Triable issues have also been raised with respect to the existence of or sufficiency of any sexual abuse reporting and prevention training and policies.

[Additional Facts Nos. 57-63, and evidence cited; Shukry Decl., Ex. 8, Locke Depo., pp. 39-41; Shukry Decl., Ex. 7, Dailey Depo. 48-49; Shukry Decl., Ex. 10, Williams Depo., pp. 66-67].

Plaintiffs have also submitted evidence which supports a reasonable inference that administrators were aware of misconduct with students on the part of Superintendent Dean but failed to appropriately investigate. [Response to UMF No. 36, Additional Facts 33, 53-55, and evidence cited, Shukry Decl., Ex. 2, Davis Depo. I, pp. 34; Shoukry Decl., Ex. 3, Davis Depo. II, pp. 92-102; Shukry Decl., Ex. 6, Davis Depo. III, 31-33].

There is also evidence that at least two teachers, and multiple camp employees, were aware Dean was in an improper relationship with a student, and circumstances were such that other students were aware of the situation, but defendant failed to take reasonable measures to identify and respond to potential sexual abuse of students. [Response to UMF No. 36, and evidence cited, Additional Facts Nos. 8, 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34-37, 50, and evidence cited, Doe 1 Depo. pp. 44-49, 150, 258-261, Davis Depo., I pp. 31, 32, 39-41; Davis Depo. II, pp. 86-91, 179-185, Davis Depo III, p. 103].

UNOPPOSED Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Grace Communion International’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Declarations in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication:

Objection No. 1 is SUSTAINED as to the statement beginning “By March 1986” through “any complaints of sexual misconduct involving Dean.” Objection is otherwise OVERRULED.

Objection No. 9 is SUSTAINED.

Remaining Objections are OVERRULED.

Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiffs’ Evidence in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment:

Objections Nos. 1-235 and Objections to Additional Material Facts, Objections1-56 are OVERRULED. The Court does not consider statements in a Separate Statement evidence.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

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