TENTATIVE RULING

 

Calendar:    4

Date:          8/26/22 

Case No: 22 GDCV00218 Trial Date: None Set 

Case Name: Abolian, et al. v. Bloom, et al.

DEMURRER

MOTION TO STRIKE (2 Sets)

Moving Party:            Defendant Suzanne Bloom

Defendant Suzanne Bloom, as Trustee of Suzanne Bloom Trust       

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Sarmen Abolian and Talin Shahbazian, as Trustees 

Pleading filed on: May 11, 2022 Demurrer filed on: August 2, 2022 

Pleading served on: May 18, 2022, pers. within 30 days?: No   

Meet and Confer?      Yes 

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Sustain demurrer to complaint  

Strike prayers for general and special damages.       

CAUSES OF ACTION: from Complaint  

1) Intentional Trespass to Real Property 

2) Negligent Trespass to Real Property 

3) Quiet Title 

4) Declaratory Relief

5) Nuisance 

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Plaintiffs Sarmen Abolian and Talin Shahbazian, a married couple, allege that they are trustees of a family trust, and as trustees own real property on Dunsmere Road in Glendale.  Defendant Suzanne Bloom, as trustee of Bloom Trust, owns property on Linda Vista Road in Glendale, which adjoins plaintiffs’ property. 

The complaint alleges that in April of 2021, plaintiffs received a recorded survey which revealed a series of encroachments over a portion of the Dunsmere Property created by defendants, and plaintiffs recently commissioned a new survey, presenting a more detailed description of such encroachments. 

Plaintiffs allege that a fence was build some time ago by either defendants or their predecessors in interest, which was used by defendants to create a disputed area between the fence and the correct location of the boundary line (the “Disputed Area.”).  Plaintiffs allege that defendants have also intentionally installed a deck which encroaches on the Disputed Area.   The complaint alleges that the encroachments cover an area of approximately 1030 square feet, that plaintiffs have never given their permission to the placement of the fence or deck, or to the use of the Disputed Area, and that defendants have failed to take any remedial action despite having received a copy of the recorded surveys from plaintiffs. 

ANALYSIS:

Procedural

Untimely 

Under CCP §436, the court may “upon motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion” strike out “all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or an order of the court.”  

Under CCP §435, a party may serve and file a notice of motion to strike “within the time allowed to respond to a pleading…” 

Under CCP §430.40, the time permitted to demur to a complaint is “within 30 days after service of the complaint…” 

CRC Rule 3.110(d) provides:

“The parties may stipulate without leave of court to one 15-day extension beyond the 30-day time period prescribed for the response after service of the initial complaint.”

Here, the complaint was served by personal service on May 18, 2022.   Thirty days from this date would have been June 17, 2022.  The demurrers and motions to strike were filed on August 2, 2022, with proofs of service showing they were served by mail and email on August 1, 2022.   This is 45/46 days late.  This is at least thirty days beyond any maximum extension to which the parties were permitted to stipulate without leave of court.   The Declarations of Paul Brent in support of the motions indicate that there was an “agreement” that “the last day to file and serve a responsive pleading to the operative Complaint is August 1, 2022.”  [Brent Decl., para. 2].  There was no leave of court obtained to stipulate to this period of an extension.  In addition, the motions were not filed by August 1, 2022, as agreed, but were filed on August 2, 2022, one day late.  The demurrers could be overruled and the motions to strike denied as untimely on this basis alone, but the court elects not to do so.  

Insufficient Notice

Plaintiffs argue in the opposition that the motions are not brought on sufficient notice. 

Under CCP section 1005(b):

“Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing.” 

CCP section 1010.6 (a)(4)(B) provides that if the notice is served by electronic means, the period of notice before the hearing shall be extended by two court days. 

The motions were filed on August 2, 2022, and served by mail and email service on August 1, 2022 for an August 26, 2022 hearing.  Calculating from the email service, this was 

sixteen court plus 2/3 court days prior to the hearing.  The motions accordingly appear to have been filed and served on sufficient notice.  

However, the opposition appears to be relying on the service of the papers by mail, submitting a declaration stating that, “No stipulations were made by counsels of the parties as to the manner of service…”  [La Mendola Decl., para. 5]. 

Plaintiffs are evidently relying on CCP § 1010.6, governing electronic service of documents, which provides, in pertinent part:  

“(ii) For cases filed on or after January 1, 2019, if a document may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission, electronic service of the document is not authorized unless a party or other person has expressly consented to receive electronic service in that specific action or the court has ordered electronic service on a represented party or other represented person under subdivision (c) or (d). Express consent to electronic service may be accomplished either by (I) serving a notice on all the parties and filing the notice with the court, or (II) manifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party's electronic address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. The act of electronic filing shall not be construed as express consent.”

CCP § 1010.6(a)(2)(A)(ii).

It appears that consent was not obtained here, and defendants have pointed to no court order with respect to electronic service applicable to this matter.  This outcome leaves the service by mail.  Under CCP section 1005 (b), if the notice is served by mail, “the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by five calendar days if the place of mailing and the place of address are within the State of California…”  The full five calendar day period was not permitted, and defendants concede as much in the reply.  Defendants argue that there has been no prejudice from this oversight and apologizes for any inconvenience.  The demurrers could be overruled, and the motions denied as not brought on sufficient notice, but the court elects to proceed on the merits.  

However, plaintiffs have filed timely opposition addressing the merits of the motion.  It is held that insufficient or defective notice may be waived if opposing counsel argues the merits of the motion.  Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984, 2nd Dist) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 7; Carlton v. Quint (2000, 2nd Dist.) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697. The court reluctantly deems the notice irregularity waived and considers the motions on their merits.   

Substantive

Demurrer

First Cause of Action—Trespass 

Plaintiffs have brought two separate demurrers, one by plaintiff Bloom individually, and one by plaintiff Bloom as trustee, which make the same arguments, and will be analyzed together. 

The elements of a cause of action for trespass are: Plaintiff’s lawful possession or right to possession as owner or otherwise of described property; Defendant’s wrongful act of trespass thereon; proximately causing damage to plaintiff or the property.  Morgan v. French (1948) 70 Cal.App.2d 785, 787.

The pleading here alleges that plaintiffs own the Dunsmere Property and describes the property in great detail.  [Complaint, para. 4].  It is alleged that a fence was built to create a disputed area between the fence and the appropriate boundary line, and a deck was intentionally installed by defendants that encroaches on the disputed area.  [Complaint, paras.  7, 8, 13, 14 (first para. 14)].   It is alleged that the fence and deck are being maintained on the disputed area without remedial action, so that defendants are “continuously trespassing” over the Disputed Area, and that as a consequence of defendants’ illegal use of the Disputed Area, plaintiffs have suffered damages.  [Complaint, paras. 14 (first and second), 15, 17, 18].   All elements have accordingly been alleged. 

Defendants argue that this cause of action is uncertain because it fails to allege the dates or times of the facts averred.  Specifically, defendants argue that the pleading fails to allege when plaintiffs became owners of the Dunsmere Property, or on what date the alleged trespass occurred.  

There is no legal authority under which a trespass cause of action is subject to a heightened pleading standard, and, in any case, it appears that the cause of action sufficiently alleges that plaintiffs are the current owners of the property, and that the alleged trespass is also currently and continuously occurring.  The complaint sufficiently alleges the date of at least two alleged trespasses, which are clearly alleged to have been occurring as of the date of the filing of the complaint, a date upon which it is alleged that plaintiffs were the owners of their property.    

The case defendant relies on, Gonzales v. State of California (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 621, 634, abrogated on other grounds in Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, is a case in which the court of appeal affirmed the sustaining of a demurrer where the complaint sought to set aside or vacate a prior criminal judgment of conviction, but under the circumstances of that case, the pleading failed to sufficiently state facts which would permit the court to determine whether it had jurisdiction based in part on a failure to allege when, so in what court, the prior conviction had been obtained. The court of appeal reasoned as follows:

“We perceive that although a conviction may be collaterally attacked on constitutional grounds in order to avoid the effect of the judgment of conviction in a pending proceeding, such avoidance does not have the effect of wiping out the prior judgment of conviction. Such a result may only be achieved upon direct attack. Accordingly, in order to set aside a judgment imposing a fine the underlying conviction upon which such judgment rests must be vacated and set aside by the court in which the prior conviction was obtained and the fine imposed.

It should be noted that a proceeding to set aside or vacate a prior judgment of conviction, if successful, subjects a defendant to a retrial. (Gonzalez v. Municipal Court, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d 706, 712.) Therefore, although a court is empowered collaterally to determine the constitutional validity of prior convictions sustained in another jurisdiction (People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204, 215 [60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15]), that court has no jurisdiction to vacate or set aside a judgment of conviction and order a retrial in an action prosecuted in the court of another judicial district. ( Gonzalez v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 712, fn. 11.)

We conclude, therefore, that in order for the individual plaintiffs to state a cause of action it was incumbent upon them to plead that the prior convictions in the instant case were vacated or set aside in the court in which the prior conviction was obtained, and the sentence imposed. Their failure to clearly set forth how or in what manner the convictions were declared constitutionally invalid rendered the complaint vulnerable to demurrer for uncertainty. A similar infirmity is to be found in the failure of the complaint to set forth when the alleged causes of action arose and when the setting aside of the previous convictions occurred. These matters are material to plaintiffs' cause of action.

Gonzales, at 63- 634, emphasis added.  

  

As argued in the opposition, neither the date of plaintiffs’ acquisition of the property nor the date of the trespass are essential elements of a trespass claim, or are necessary to establish any essential jurisdictional fact, and, as set forth above, in any case, such dates have been sufficiently alleged for purposes of the current continuing trespasses alleged.     

The cause of action sufficiently alleges the elements of a trespass claim in sufficient detail and is not uncertain.  The demurrer to this cause of action accordingly is overruled. 

Second Cause of Action—Trespass

Defendants again argue that the cause of action fails to state the date or time of the facts averred, specifically, the date of the alleged trespass.  The cause of action incorporates previous allegations which are sufficient to allege a trespass claim which is continuing.  [Complaint, paras. 4, 7, 8, incorporated by para. 20]. The cause of action itself specifies that defendants “during the time since they purchased” the Linda Vista property, caused or allowed the still-existing structures to be placed on plaintiffs’ property.  [Complaint, paras.  21, 22].   No further specificity of dates and times is required, as at least two current continuing trespasses are alleged to support this cause of action.  The demurrer accordingly is overruled. 

Third Cause of Action—Quiet Title 

Defendants argue that the cause of action for quiet title fails because the complaint fails to allege damages in support of this cause of action, while at the same time requesting damages in the prayer, arguing that this makes the cause of action ambiguous or unintelligible.  

The elements of a cause of action to quiet title are:   A description of the property; Plaintiff’s title or interest in the property and the basis therefor; Defendant asserts an adverse claim or antagonistic property interest; the date as of which the determination is sought; a prayer for determination of plaintiff’s title.  CCP § 760.010 et seq.  See also Friends of the Trails v. Blasius (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 810, 831.

The complaint provides a description of the property at issue, alleges that plaintiffs own the disputed area in fee simple according to an identified and recorded grant deed, that defendants claim an adverse interest, that plaintiffs seek to quiet title, “as of the date this Complaint was filed,” and includes a prayer for determination of title.  [Complaint, paras. 25, 26, 28, 29, Prayer, para. 1].  

All elements of the cause of action are alleged, and there is no requirement that damages be alleged.  

The argument seems to be that the request in the prayer for “general and special damages,” is not supported by the allegations in the cause of action.  [See Prayer, para. 2].  

The cause of action sufficiently alleges a claim for quiet title, and appropriate remedies, including judgment quieting title, and injunctive relief. [Prayer, paras. 1, 3].  The demurrer is accordingly addressed to only part of the cause of action, one of several remedies sought in the prayer, which is improper on demurrer. 

A demurrer does not lie to only part of a cause of action (or to a particular type of damage or remedy), and a cause will survive demurrer if there are sufficient allegations that might entitle the pleader to relief.  Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelop. Agency (2003, 2nd Dist.) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046; PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682. 

The cause of action includes sufficient allegations which might entitle plaintiffs to relief, and the demurrer accordingly is overruled.   

Fourth Cause of Action—Declaratory Relief  

With respect to declaratory relief, CCP § 1060 provides that a person “who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to another, or in respect to or over or upon property... , may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties...bring an...action...for a declaration of his or her rights or duties.”   

A very liberal pleading standard applies:

“A complaint for declaratory relief is sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties... and requests that the rights and duties be adjudged by the court.”  

Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, 947, citations omitted.

The pleading here sufficiently alleges that an actual controversy has arisen relating to the parties’ respective rights and duties in that plaintiffs claim ownership of the Disputed Area, and defendants maintain they have acquired a prescriptive easement over the area, and requests that the duties and rights be adjudged.  [Complaint, paras. 31-33, Prayer, para. 1].  These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the liberal pleading standard. 

Again, the argument appears to be that the request for general and special damages in the prayer is not supported by any allegations in the cause of action.  Again, there is no pleading requirement in a cause of action for declaratory relief that damages be alleged.  The argument accordingly is improperly addressed to only part of a cause of action, when the facts alleged would entitle plaintiffs to some relief.  For the same reasons discussed above in connection with the third cause of action, the demurrer on this ground is overruled. 

Fifth Cause of Action—Private Nuisance 

The elements of a cause of action for nuisance are: Plaintiff’s ownership or occupancy of real property; defendant’s substantial and unreasonable interference with the comfortable enjoyment of the property; separate and ongoing acts by defendant constituting nuisance; and past and future damages.   Kafka v. Bozio (1923) 191 Cal.746; Alonso v. Hills (1950) 95 Cal. App.2d 778; Capogeannis v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 668.  

The pleading describes the encroachments, as set forth above, and alleges that they constitute an obstruction to the free use of plaintiffs’ property so as to interfere with comfortable enjoyment, and describes injury to plaintiffs, and damages.  [Complaint, paras. 34-36, incorporating paras. 6-8].   The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs have been damaged.

Defendants again argue that this claim fails because plaintiffs fail to allege when they became owners of the property and when the nuisance arose.  Again, the complaint alleges a current nuisance, which is continuing, and these time frames are sufficient. 

Defendants also argue that the cause of action fails to allege that plaintiffs failed to object, and therefore consented to the nuisance.  This argument makes no sense, as consent to a nuisance would not be an essential element of a nuisance claim.  As pointed out in the opposition, the elements also do not strictly include lack of consent.  There is legal authority under which consent is treated as an affirmative defense in actions involving parties with interests in the same property, as would be the case here.  See Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334, 341-346.  The demurrer accordingly is overruled on this ground.     

Defendant also argues that where an encroachment is permanent in nature, it is considered a trespass, and not a nuisance.  However, the matter is at the pleading stage, and under the liberal rules of pleading, parties are permitted to plead duplicative, alternative, or even inconsistent causes of action.   See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 177, 180.  

The demurrer to the nuisance cause of action accordingly is overruled. 

Motion to Strike 

The motions to strike are also similar to each other and seek to strike the prayer for damages in the third cause of action and fourth cause of action seeking general and special damages. 

Third Cause of Action—Quiet Title 

As noted above, the demurrer to this cause of action on the ground that the cause of action does not appropriately request damages in the prayer when damages are not mentioned in the cause of action will be overruled on the ground the demurrer would dispose of only part of a cause of action.  The proper way to dispose of only part of a cause of action would be a motion to strike that claim for damages.

Under CCP section 435, a party may serve and file a motion to strike a part of a pleading.  Upon such a motion, a court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.”  CCP sec. 436(a).  

Under CCP section 431.10(c), an “immaterial allegation,” as defined in that section, “means ‘irrelevant matter’ as that term is used in Section 436.”

CCP Section 431.10(b) defines an immaterial allegation as follows:

“(b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following:

(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense.

(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense.

(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.”  

(Emphasis added). 

The motions to strike seek to strike the claim for general or special damages from the prayer for this cause of action, as that relief is not supported by the allegations of the cause of action as alleged.   

The cause of action itself does not include any allegations concerning damages. 

Both defendants in the motion and plaintiffs in opposition argue that the cause of action is equitable in nature.  Defendants argue that this mandates that no damages can be awarded, and plaintiffs argue that the court in quieting title is authorized to award damages if equity so requires. 

  

CCP § 760.030, from the Quiet Title Chapter, provides:

“(a) The remedy provided in this chapter is cumulative and not exclusive of any other remedy, form or right of action, or proceeding provided by law for establishing or quieting title to property.”

In Santoro v. Carbone (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 721 (overruled on other grounds in Tenze v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 30) the Second District generally observed that, “An action to quiet title is equitable and is governed by equitable principles,” and that “The relief awarded in such an action may vary according to the circumstances of the case.” Santoro, at 731, citations, quotations omitted. 

Although the cause of action itself does not mention damages, the cause of action is equitable in nature, and it is possible that damages could in the discretion of the court be part of an equitable judgment.  However, the court notes that the cause of action does fail to allege such damages in the cause of action itself to support the prayer, and the incorporated allegations also do not allege the damages previously alleged in the first cause of action.  [See Complaint, para. 24, incorporating only allegations of paragraphs 1-11 of the Complaint].    

The motion to strike accordingly is granted on this ground with leave to amend to permit plaintiffs to plead facts in the cause of action itself which support the damages sought in the prayer, if plaintiffs intend to pursue damages.  

Fourth Cause of Action—Declaratory Relief 

Similarly, the demurrer to this cause of action will be sustained on the ground the argument made only applies to part of the cause of action, but a motion to strike the damages not supported by the cause of action appears proper.  

Both the motion and the opposition argue that declaratory relief is equitable in nature, but plaintiffs argue that the remedies provided by the declaratory relief statute are cumulative, in reliance on CCP section 1062, which provides, with respect to declaratory relief:

“The remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative, and shall not be construed as restricting any remedy, provisional or otherwise, provided by law for the benefit of any party to such action, and no judgment under this chapter shall preclude any party from obtaining additional relief based upon the same facts.”

Under CCP § 1060, a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief, “may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief…”

Although the cause of action itself does not mention damages, the cause of action appears to also be equitable in a nature pursuant to which damages could in the discretion of the court be part of an equitable judgment.  However, the court notes that the cause of action, like the third cause of action, does fail to allege such damages in the cause of action itself to support the prayer, and the incorporated allegations also do not allege the damages previously alleged in the first cause of action.  [See Complaint, para. 30, incorporating only allegations of paragraphs 1-11 of the Complaint].    

The motion to strike accordingly is granted on this ground with leave to amend to permit plaintiffs to plead facts in the cause of action itself which support the damages sought in the prayer, if plaintiffs intend to pursue damages.    

 

RULING:

Demurrers of Defendant Suzanne Bloom to Complaint:  

The Court notes that the demurrer is untimely, filed and served 46/45 days late, over thirty days beyond any permissible stipulation for extension of time to plead which may be entered into by the parties without leave of court.  See CRC Rule 3.110(d).  

The Court also notes that the demurrer was not brought on sufficient notice, as defendants concede in the reply that the full five calendar days for service by mail was not provided.  

 

The Court has nevertheless considered the demurrer on its merits, but counsel for defendants is cautioned that in the future the Court may refuse to consider pleadings not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. 

Demurrer is OVERRULED. 

Motion of Defendant Suzanne Bloom to Strike Portions of Complaint: 

The Court notes that the motion is untimely, filed and served 46/45 days late, over thirty days beyond any permissible stipulation for extension of time to plead which may be entered into by the parties without leave of court.  See CRC Rule 3.110(d).  

The Court also notes that the motion was not brought on sufficient notice, as defendants concede in the reply that the full five calendar days for service by mail was not provided.  

 

The Court has nevertheless considered the Motion on its merits, but counsel for defendants is cautioned that in the future the Court may refuse to consider pleadings not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. 

Motion to Strike prayer for damages in connection with the third cause of action for quiet title and fourth cause of action for declaratory relief is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Ten days leave to amend the third and fourth causes of action only to address the issue of damages claimed.   

Demurrers of Defendant Suzanne Bloom as Trustee of Suzanne Bloom Trust to Complaint:  

The Court notes that the demurrer is untimely, filed and served 46/45 days late, over thirty days beyond any permissible stipulation for extension of time to plead which may be entered into by the parties without leave of court.  See CRC Rule 3.110(d).  

The Court also notes that the demurrer was not brought on sufficient notice, as defendants concede in the reply that the full five calendar days for service by mail was not provided.  

 

The Court has nevertheless considered the demurrer on its merits, but counsel for defendants is cautioned that in the future the Court may refuse to consider pleadings not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. 

Demurrer is OVERRULED. 

Motion of Defendant Suzanne Bloom as Trustee of Suzanne Bloom Trust to Strike Portions of Complaint: 

The Court notes that the motion is untimely, filed and served 46/45 days late, over thirty days beyond any permissible stipulation for extension of time to plead which may be entered into by the parties without leave of court.  See CRC Rule 3.110(d).  

The Court also notes that the motion was not brought on sufficient notice, as defendants concede in the reply that the full five calendar days for service by mail was not provided.  

 

The Court has nevertheless considered the Motion on its merits, but counsel for defendants is cautioned that in the future the Court may refuse to consider pleadings not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. 

Motion to Strike prayer for damages in connection with the third cause of action for quiet title and fourth cause of action for declaratory relief is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Ten days leave to amend the third and fourth causes of action only to address the issue of damages claimed.   

The parties are ordered to meet and confer in full compliance with CCP § 435.5 before any further motion to strike may be filed.  

GIVEN THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS, AND TO ADHERE TO HEALTH GUIDANCE THAT DICTATES SAFETY MEASURES, DEPARTMENT D IS ENCOURAGING AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES

Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect/Microsoft Teams by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance.  Please note that LACourtConnect/Microsoft Teams offers free audio and video appearance. Counsel and parties (including self-represented litigants) are encouraged not to personally appear.  With respect to the wearing of face masks, Department D recognizes that currently, the Los Angeles Department of Public Health strongly recommends masks indoors, especially when interacting with individuals whose vaccination status is unknown; for individuals who have a health condition that puts them at higher risk for severe illness; individuals who live with someone who is at higher risk; and for individuals who are around children who are not yet eligible for vaccines.  In accordance with this guidance, it is strongly recommended that anyone personally appearing in Department D wear a face mask.  The Department D Judge and court staff will continue to wear face masks.  If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect/Microsoft Teams, or otherwise, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.