Judge Ralph C. Hofer, Case Number: 22STCV25483, Date: 2024-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Raya Torossian alleges that in March of 2020, plaintiff contracted with defendant Zippy Shell, Inc. (Zippy Shell) to have personal belongings moved, in a closed storage container, to North Carolina. In April of 2020, defendant Pack Rats Portable Mini Storage, LLC (Pack Rats), on behalf of Zippy Shell, met with plaintiff to pick up her belongings, and took plaintiff’s belongings into their custody and care.

Plaintiff alleges that at the time Pack Rats took plaintiff’s belongings, the items were free and clear of vermin. The FAC alleges that due the Covid-19 outbreak, plaintiff was forced to keep her container at Pack Rat’s facility for ten months. In February of 2021, plaintiff requested that her belongings be returned to her in California. The following day, Pack Rats showed up with plaintiff’s personal property in an open container, and plaintiff noticed her property was covered in rat feces.

The delivery men admitted to their facility being infested with rats and explained that their supervisor had nevertheless forced them to deliver the property. The delivery men attempted to place some of the property inside plaintiff’s home, but plaintiff refused to accept the property which was covered in fecal matter, and plaintiff and her husband were then forced to go through their now hazardous belongings at defendants’ facility, or otherwise be charged a storage fee.

The FAC alleges that as plaintiff and her husband were going through their property, actual mice were crawling through their belongings. In the midst of going through their damaged property, plaintiff was given a form to list the items damaged and the monetary amount for the damage, but that without being able to think straight, and through plaintiff’s frustration, she was not able to list all her items. Plaintiff alleges that the items included clothing, furniture, electronics, kitchen appliances, strollers, children’s toys and jewelry, and her autistic son’s favorite stuffed animal and learning devices.

Defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to show the emotional distress was serious, as plaintiff alleges that defendants tried to place items covered with rat feces inside her home, that plaintiff went to defendants’ facility to dig through her personal property, which was covered in rat feces, and that she was instantly traumatized when and devasted when she saw her personal items destroyed. Defendants argue that although these allegations would elicit an adverse reaction from any reasonable person, the allegations alone do not amount to serious emotional distress, which has been defined as causing the inability of a reasonable person to “adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.” Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1377-1378, citations omitted.

The cause of action alleges that defendants’ acts of placing plaintiffs belongings in a facility they were aware had rat infestation, attempting to place items covered with rat feces inside plaintiff’s home, and forcing plaintiff to go to defendant’s facility and dig through her personal property “which was covered in fecal matter and rats,” would have caused any reasonable person “to experience a trauma response and thereby suffer emotional distress.” [FAC, paras. 77-81].

“82. There was an instant shock by Plaintiff as she saw her belongings covered in rat feces. She saw rats running out of her children’s stroller. Excrement inside drawers, kitchen appliances, clothes, and everything she owedf [sic]. It was impossible to save any of her belongings as they were now a risk for her and her family’s health.

These paragraphs of the FAC allege a trauma reaction and instant shock which is detailed and supports plaintiff’s general allegation that she “suffered serious and severe emotional distress.” [FAC, para. 85]. The descriptions would support an argument that defendants caused distress at the level that a reasonable person would be unable to adequately cope with it, the standard upon which defendants rely. The Wong case, in fact, was determined on a special motion to strike, based on an evidentiary showing, so was not a pleading case. The allegations are sufficient to withstand demurrer on this ground, and the demurrer as to this cause of action is overruled.

To state a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, plaintiff must plead the following essential elements: Extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; defendant’s outrageous conduct actually and proximately caused emotional distress; the conduct was directed to plaintiff. Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903; KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1028.

It is held that conduct to be outrageous must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community,” and be “of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress…” Christensen, 54 Cal.3d at 903, 905.

The cause of action makes similar allegations to those set forth above concerning the suffering of severe emotional distress. [FAC, paras. 87-95]. The allegations are similarly sufficient to allege facts and severe distress beyond mere conclusory allegations of suffering such distress. The demurrer to this cause of action is also overruled with respect to this argument.

With respect to outrageous conduct, the cause of action alleges that defendants placed plaintiff’s belongings “in a facility which they were fully aware had a rat infestation,” “intentionally tried to place items covered with rat feces in plaintiff’s home, and then forced plaintiff to dig through her personal property which was covered with fecal matter and rats themselves. [FAC, paras. 87, 89, 90].

Plaintiff in opposition relies on Gonzales v. Personal Storage, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 464, 477, in which the court of appeal found that a jury had not erred in permitting an award of emotional distress damages in favor of a plaintiff against a storage facility which had been found liable to plaintiff for negligence, violation of the California Self-Storage Facility Act, and conversion, in connection with the storage of household goods, including rare furniture, family keepsakes, heirlooms and personal belongings plaintiff had stored with defendant following a divorce, which were wrongly handled. The court of appeal specifically dealt with the cause of action for conversion, and the nature of the responsibility of the self-storage facility.

“where a converter takes possession and disposes of household goods or family heirlooms on the basis of a reasonable but erroneous belief as to title, the converter may legitimately contend that he acted without knowledge as to rightful ownership. However, the converter cannot claim he was unaware of the potential emotional harm his interference would cause. In contrast, the negligent destroyer of personal property—the defendant who fails to properly secure the bulldozer or the warehouseman who leaves paint rags next to a gas burner—has considerably less direct knowledge of the emotional consequences of his conduct. (See Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 647 [257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814]; Cooper, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 1012.) Thus, in the context of a conversion claim there is far less likelihood that allowing recovery for emotional distress damages will create liability which is out of proportion to the nature of the defendant's act.

Although not cited by the parties, the court of appeal in Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 844, similarly found the trial court appropriately awarded personal injury emotional distress damages to plaintiff based on a jury verdict, where a jeweler had negligently lost plaintiff’s property, consisting of rings which she had informed the jeweler were of great sentimental value.

“Whenever the terms of a contract relate to matters which concern directly the comfort, happiness or personal welfare of one of the parties, or the subject matter of which is such as directly to affect or move the affection, self-esteem or tender feelings of that party, he may recover damages for physical suffering or illness proximately caused by its breach. In its application, this rule permits recovery of damages for mental suffering.”

In this case, it is alleged that storage defendants took possession of personal property from plaintiff’s home, to be moved to another state, promising the property would be stored in a closed container, but intentionally stored it in an open container in a facility which defendants knew was infested with rats which would have direct access to the personal property. The facts are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendants were aware of the emotional attachment which would arise from any harm or damage to or conversion of the subject property. The cause of action is sufficiently alleged to withstand demurrer, and the demurrer on this ground is overruled.

Civil Code § 3294 authorizes recovery of punitive damages on the basis of findings that “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.” “Oppression” is defined to mean “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of the person’s rights.” “Malice” is defined to mean “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Despicable” has been defined as a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible”. Civil Code § 3294 (c); See also, College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 709. “Despicable conduct” is defined as “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary, decent people.” Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1990) 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 331; See also CACI 3940-3948, defining despicable conduct as “conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people.” Such conduct has been described as “[having] the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 894.

As discussed above, the conduct alleged includes allegations sufficient to support a claim that defendants engaged in outrageous conduct to support their claim for IIED. This result means that the conduct was sufficiently despicable to support a punitive damages claim.

Plaintiff in opposition argues that these actions also included forcing plaintiff and her husband to put their safety at risk by sifting through hazardous materials covering their belongings under threat of exacting additional fees and extorting plaintiff to act under threat of being charged additional fees for items defendant had destroyed. [FAC, para. 26). These facts further support the claim that defendants acted despicably.

In addition, the FAC alleges a cause of action for conversion. Defendants have not demurred to that cause of action or challenged its sufficiency. Conversion is considered a cause of action in the nature of a criminal act, theft, such that such a claim ordinarily supports a claim for punitive damages. See Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th Ed.) 6 Witkin, Torts section 1760 (2023) (“Conversion is a tort that often justifies an award of punitive damages,” citing multiple authorities, including Haigler v. Donnelly (1941) 18 Cal.2d 674, 681).