TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 3

Date: 3/8/2024

Case No: 23 GDCV00401 Trial Date:    April 14, 2025

Case Name: Mansur v. Badruzzaman 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Moving Party: Defendant Mohammed Badruzzaman  

Responding Party: Plaintiff Abed Mansur  

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant file answer to complaint:  Yes, filed April 6, 2023 

CAUSES OF ACTION FROM THE Complaint  

1) Fraud 

2) Quiet Title 

3) Nuisance 

4) IIED 

5) Retaliation/Constructive Eviction

6) Wrongful Eviction/Self-Help

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Plaintiff Abed Mansur alleges that plaintiff lives at a rented/owned dwelling in Glendale, and that defendant Mohammed Badruzzaman was the property manager/co-owner of the premises.   

Plaintiff alleges that in January of 1988, plaintiff, defendant, and Mohammad Kamruzaman purchased the premises through a purchase agreement, which expressly allocated a one-third ownership interest to each of the three purchasers.   The complaint alleges that the purchase agreement also provides that title will be placed in defendant Badruzzaman’s name, but this was based on an understanding that defendant’s credit was superior to that of the other two owners, and it was agreed that defendant’s name being placed on title made no impact on the division of the interest in the property.   Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff contributed a greater share toward the down payment, contributing $12,000, when Kamruzaman contributed $9,000 and defendant contributed $9,355, but plaintiff did not have any expectation as to an increased interest in the property.  

The complaint alleges that plaintiff has been current on his portion of the mortgage payments and continues to make timely payments toward the mortgage proportionate to his share in the property, but that defendant has failed to make mortgage payments, forcing the lender to send out a default notice.  Upon receipt of the notice, plaintiff paid funds to the lender to refinance the loan and cure the default.   

Plaintiff notified defendant that he was leaving the country on December 5, 2022, and returning January 25, 2023.  When plaintiff arrived back in the country, the locks had been changed, and plaintiff had been wrongfully evicted from the premises.   Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff sent defendant a letter about the wrongful eviction, but defendant has yet to respond. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant has accepted plaintiff’s payments toward the mortgage payments as a one-third owner, but never intended to put plaintiff on title or to give plaintiff his share of the ownership of the premises.   The complaint seeks to quiet title in plaintiff as a 33% owner of the property and seeks damages for the harm allegedly caused by defendant’s wrongful conduct. 

Defendant Badruzzaman has filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff as cross-defendant, alleging that cross-complainant Badruzzaman is the only true owner of the property, and has paid all incurred mortgage payments, costs, insurance, and property taxes.   The cross-complaint alleges that cross-complainant rented the premises to cross-defendant, his brother, at the request of their mother, and that the monies for the down payment were loans from his brothers, which were paid off.    

The cross-complaint alleges that cross-defendant Mansur prepared a fraudulent agreement stating that the loaned money would entitle cross-defendant and the third brother to one third interest in the property, which was later notarized and attached to the complaint.   The cross-complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, cancellation of instrument and damages for alleged fraud and deceit. 

ANALYSIS:

CCP § 438 establishes the procedures for moving for judgment on the pleadings, and provides, in pertinent part:

“(c)(1) The motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following 

grounds:...

(B) If the moving party is a defendant, that either of the following conditions exist:

(i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

(ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”

Subdivision (d) provides that “The grounds for the motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.”  

The motion may be granted with leave to file an amended complaint, or without leave to amend, in which case, judgment may be entered in favor of the moving defendant.   CCP § 438 (h).

“As used in this chapter:

(a) “Contract for sale of real property” means an agreement wherein one party agrees to convey title to real property to another party upon the satisfaction of specified conditions set forth in the contract and which requires conveyance of title within one year from the date of formation of the contract, whether designated in the agreement a “contract for sale of real property,” “land sale contract,” “deposit receipt,” “agreement for sale,” “agreement to convey,” or otherwise.”

It is not clear how this section makes the alleged contract in this matter somehow invalid such that a cause of action has not been stated in the complaint. 

As an initial matter, the alleged contract upon which this argument is based is not before the court.

The complaint alleges that the parties “purchased the Premises through a purchase agreement.  [Exhibit A].”   However, there is no Exhibit A attached to the version of the complaint which was filed with the court.  The court accordingly cannot ascertain that the contract at issue was in fact a contract for the sale of real property under the definition.  

As noted above, under CCP § 438 (d): 

“The grounds for the motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.”  

In addition, as argued in the opposition, this case is not an action alleging a claim for an unperformed contract for the sale of real property, wherein one party, upon satisfaction of conditions set forth in the contract, will convey title.  The agreement is not with the seller for purchase of the property, but rather is based on the agreement between the three purchasers concerning the way interest in the property would be held.   This situation appears in the nature of a partnership agreement to hold properties pursuant to a partnership interest.  The agreement also is not alleged to have required “conveyance of title within one year from the date of formation of the contract,” so any argument that a statute of limitations has expired does not appear to apply.   There is no cause of action stated for breach of contract.  

The opposition attaches a copy of a “Real Estate Investment/Purchase Agreement,” which is apparently the document upon which the moving papers rely.  Although this document, as noted above, is not included in the copy of the complaint filed with the court, and is not properly before the court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, even if the court were to consider it, the document confirms that the agreement is not subject to the statute relied upon, as it is not an agreement to purchase particular property, but an agreement between the three brothers to invest in property, hold it, and pay the mortgage in accordance with their respective interests in the property.   [See Opposition, Ex. A].  The Agreement, as alleged in defendant’s own cross-complaint, was drafted and executed in 1998 after the purchase of the property had been completed in 1988.  There is no provision calling for a conveyance of title within one year of the date of formation of the contract.  

Defendant seems to argue in the alternative that even if the contract had been recorded, which defendant argues it has not, then Civil Code section 886.020, 886.030 or 886.040 would apply. 

Civil Code section 886.020 provides, in pertinent part:

“If the party to whom title to real property is to be conveyed pursuant to a recorded contract for the sale of real property fails to satisfy the specified conditions set forth in the contract and does not seek performance of the contract or restitution of amounts paid under the contract, the party shall, upon demand therefor made after the operative date of this chapter, execute a release of the contract, duly acknowledged for record, to the party who agreed to convey title.”

“Upon the expiration of record of a recorded contract for sale of real property pursuant to this chapter, the contract has no effect, and does not constitute an encumbrance or cloud, on the title to the real property as against a person other than a party to the contract.”

Defendant argues that the contract was not recorded, but even if it was recorded, it expired over twenty years ago, so has no effect and does not constitute an encumbrance on the property.   Again, there is nothing from the face of the pleading which suggests the contract was recorded, or from the document attached to the opposition.   The statutory scheme also clearly does not apply to “a party to the subject contract,” when it is alleged, and the document shows, that defendant and plaintiff were in fact parties to the subject contract.  [Complaint, paras. 5, 7, Opposition, Ex. A.]. 

The statutes relied upon simply do not apply here, and the motion is denied. 

RULING:

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE 

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