Judge Ralph C. Hofer, Case Number: 23GDCV00789, Date: 2024-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Eskarleta Torosyan alleges that in April of 2021, plaintiff was lawfully on commercial premises owned, leased, managed and/or maintained by defendants Mariner Health Care Management Company, Alex Dela Cuadro, and Sona Isayan, to which premises the general public is invited to come. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff was walking into a patient’s room within the subject premises when, suddenly and without warning, plaintiff slipped on water and/or a slippery, greasy and/or hazardous substance on the floor and fell violently to the floor, sustaining serious injuries and damages. The complaint alleges that defendants knew or should have known that the structures or components or other parts of the building were in a dangerous, defective and unsafe condition, and a menace to plaintiff and others lawfully on the premises.

Defendants Alex Dela Cuadra and Sona Isayan argue that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to allege each element of the negligence and premises liability as the causes of action.

To plead a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: The existence of a duty of care, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach. Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.

A premises liability cause of action is stated where the following elements are alleged: Defendant owned, leased, occupied or controlled the property; defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property, plaintiff was harmed, and defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. CACI 1000.

“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.”

Accordingly, it is recognized that every landowner has a duty to maintain property in his possession or control in a reasonably safe condition. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 (disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527, n.5).

The pleading here alleges that defendants were the “owners, lessors, sub-lessors, managing agents, landlords, renters, managers, operators, marketers, inspectors, maintainers and controllers” of the subject commercial property. [Complaint, para. 5]. It is also alleged that all defendants were acting as the agents, servants, and employees of the other defendants within the scope of their authority and with the consent of the other defendants. [Complaint, para. 6]. These are allegations sufficient to allege a duty on the part of the moving defendants on several theories.

The pleading also alleges that defendants breached that duty by allowing a dangerously dirty, slippery or wet floor to be installed or maintained at the property and knew, or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable care, that a dangerous and unsafe condition existed. [Complaint, paras. 9, 10, 15, 16]. These allegations are sufficient to allege a breach of duty on the part of defendants.

The pleading alleges that as “a direct and proximate result,” of defendant’s negligence and carelessness, plaintiff was injured, and specifically alleges that plaintiff was walking into a patient’s room within the premises, slipped on the dangerous condition on the floor, fell violently to the floor, and sustained serious injuries. [Complaint, paras. 8, 11]. Plaintiff’s harm and damages are described as including plaintiff being hurt in her “health, strength and activity,” suffering “severe shock and injuries to her person,” causing pain and suffering, plaintiff suffering “emotional distress” and “permanent” injuries and being required to “obtain medical services.” [Complaint, paras. 11, 12, 16]. These allegations are sufficient to allege that the negligence and the condition of the premises directly caused plaintiff injury, harm, and cognizable damages. Hence, all elements have been sufficiently alleged.

Defendants appear to argue that there is some heightened specificity required, as plaintiff has not alleged where in a large medical center the accident occurred or described specifically as to the moving defendants their role in the incident. There is no case law cited which requires heightened specificity to state a negligence or premises liability claim. As noted above, the complaint alleges that plaintiff was walking into a patient’s room, and the various roles defendants are alleged to have occupied with respect to negligence and premises liability. As noted in the opposition, this situation also appears to be a case where defendants would be in a better position to know the specifics, while plaintiff may well need to conduct discovery to confirm, for example, the room location where she fell, or the employment or agency roles played by the defendants in connection with the incident.

Defendants also argue that with respect to a dangerous condition theory, the condition must be shown to have existed for a certain length of time for liability to be imposed. Again, there is no authority cited under which this level of specificity is a pleading requirement outside a public entity context and there is no allegation that the moving defendants are public entities or agents of public entities. The liability is alleged here on the alternative valid theory that there was actual awareness of the condition on the part of defendants. [Complaint, para. 9].

However, this matter is now at the pleading stage, and under the liberal rules of pleading, parties are permitted to plead duplicative, alternative, or even inconsistent causes of action. See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 177, 180; Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 593 (“a party may plead in the alternative and may make inconsistent allegations.”).

Moreover, the opposition relies on Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnydale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 890, under which it was observed that the duplicative standard referred to by defendants is not listed as a ground to sustain a demurrer under CCP § 430.10. Blickman, at 890. The court of appeal in Blickman noted that although the motion to strike statute previously authorized a court to strike “irrelevant and redundant” matter from a pleading, the statute no longer includes that language, and concluded, “This is not a ground on which a demurrer may be sustained.” Blickman, at 890, italics in original.

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